Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Duke Energy Progress filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its retail electric service rates and that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.25 percent. The Commission entered an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent. The Attorney General, who had intervened in the proceedings, appealed the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission made sufficient findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers and that these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Dominion North Carolina filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting an 11.25 percent return on equity (ROE), among other things. During the course of public hearings, the Commission received evidence that Dominion made certain adjustments to a study of the costs of providing retail electric service to a large industrial customer. The Commission ultimately issued an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent and approving of Dominion’s adjustments to the cost-of-service study. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err by approving Dominion’s adjustments to the cost-of-service study; but (2) the portion of the Commission’s order in which it authorized a 10.2 percent ROE for Dominion did not contain sufficient findings of fact to demonstrate that it was supported by competent and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his shoulder while working for Employer. Plaintiff was terminated later that year for “reduction of staff due to lack of work.” Employer accepted Plaintiff’s injury as compensable. In January 2009, Plaintiff began to receive unemployment benefits from Employer and Insurer (together, Defendants). In December 2010, Defendants sought to terminate payment of compensation, alleging that Plaintiff could no longer show he was disabled. The Industrial Commission concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments made after December 2010 and that Defendants were entitled to a credit for any payments they had made after that date, finding that Plaintiff’s inability to find work was not due to his injury but to large-scale economic factors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove that his inability to earn the same wages as before his injury resulted from his work-related injury. View "Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Through the Towing Ordinance and the Mobile Phone Ordinance the Town of Chapel Hill sought to regulate the business of towing vehicles parked in private lots and the use of mobile telephones while driving. Plaintiff, who operated a towing business within the town limits of Chapel Hill, sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate both ordinances, claiming that the Town lacked the authority to enact either ordinance. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of both ordinances. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Towing Ordinance covered a proper subject for regulation under the Town’s police power; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to challenge the Mobile Phone Ordinance because he had not been cited for a violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the fee schedule and credit card fee provisions of the Towing Ordinance exceeded the Town’s authority, but the remainder of the Towing Ordinance was valid; and (2) the legislature’s comprehensive scheme regulating use of a mobile phone on streets and highways precluded the Town from doing so. View "King v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law

By 2013, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) had purchased several hundred properties for the construction of a highway project known as the Northern Beltway. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and declaratory judgment against NCDOT, asserting claims for, inter alia, inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs also sought class certification for themselves and all others similarly situated whose property NCDOT was “obliged to purchase.” The proposed class included over 800 property owners within the Northern Beltway. The trial court denied NCDOT’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation but denied class certification. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals, holding (1) the courts below erred in analyzing the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim at the class certification stage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the unique nature of property, coupled with the large number of diverse tracts involved in this litigation, would make individual issues predominate over common issues of law and fact in a trial on the merits. View "Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury while working for Defendant. Since Plaintiff's injury, his wife (Wife) attended to his needs. The North Carolina Industrial Commission later determined that Plaintiff required attendant care services, which Wife provided. Plaintiff and Defendant disagreed whether Wife should be compensated for the attendant care she provided Plaintiff before the Commission approved her rendering that service. The Commission concluded that Wife's attendant care services were medical compensation for which Defendant was responsible and further compensated Wife for the attendant care services previously provided. The court of appeals reversed in part the opinion and award entered by the Commission that provided retroactive compensation for Wife's attendant care services to her husband. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals on that issue because the court relied on a provision of the Commission's medical fee schedule that was not authorized by the legislature. Remanded. View "Mehaffey v. Burger King" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission (Commission) to increase its state retail electric service rates approximately 15.2 percent over current revenues. The application requested that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.5 percent. The Commission approved a 10.5 percent ROE for Duke. The attorney general appealed the Commission's order, arguing that the order was legally deficient because it was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence and did not include sufficient conclusions and reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to make the necessary findings of fact to support its ROE determination. Remanded to the Commission to enter sufficient findings of fact. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

In 2007, Brunswick County conducted an authorized appraisal of all property in the County. However, in 2008, which was not a statutorily designated year for setting property values for tax purposes, the County reassessed the tax value of real property belonging to Ocean Isle Palms LLC. Ocean Isle disputed the resulting tax values, arguing that the values were unlawful because they were based on an invalid reassessment. The County Board of Equalization and Review declined to change the valuations. On appeal, the Property Tax Commission found the 2008 revaluation was unlawful and granted Ocean Isle's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reassessment conducted in the nonreappraisal year 2008 violated the relevant statutes, and the alteration of the taxable value of Ocean Isle's property under the 2008 reassessment was unlawful. View "In re Ocean Isle Palms LLC" on Justia Law

A property owner sought a driveway permit from the State Department of Transportation (DOT) to connect its proposed subdivision's system of roads to a state road by which the property was accessed. Two railroad companies opposed the permit, claiming that the rail traffic at a nearby crossing, located approximately one-quarter of a mile away from the proposed driveway connection, might pose a safety hazard to future residents. Consequently, a DOT engineer denied the permit. On appeal, a DOT division engineer granted the permit request subject to the conditions that the owner make improvements to the railroad crossing and obtain the owning and operating railroads' consent to the improvements. On judicial review, the trial court ruled in favor of DOT, finding the agency acted within the scope of its powers in issuing the driveway permit subject to these conditions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conditions imposed by DOT in this case were not statutorily authorized, and therefore, DOT exceeded its authority when it issued the conditional permit. View "High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

This appeal considered whether defendant County had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (APFO) that effectively conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's public schools. The trial court concluded that the County did not have the authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina's general zoning or subdivision statutes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County did not have the statutory authority to adopt its APFO, and N.C. Sess. Laws 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO. View "Lanvale Props. v County of Cabarrus" on Justia Law