Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Carolina Supreme Court
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In 2007, Brunswick County conducted an authorized appraisal of all property in the County. However, in 2008, which was not a statutorily designated year for setting property values for tax purposes, the County reassessed the tax value of real property belonging to Ocean Isle Palms LLC. Ocean Isle disputed the resulting tax values, arguing that the values were unlawful because they were based on an invalid reassessment. The County Board of Equalization and Review declined to change the valuations. On appeal, the Property Tax Commission found the 2008 revaluation was unlawful and granted Ocean Isle's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reassessment conducted in the nonreappraisal year 2008 violated the relevant statutes, and the alteration of the taxable value of Ocean Isle's property under the 2008 reassessment was unlawful. View "In re Ocean Isle Palms LLC" on Justia Law

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A property owner sought a driveway permit from the State Department of Transportation (DOT) to connect its proposed subdivision's system of roads to a state road by which the property was accessed. Two railroad companies opposed the permit, claiming that the rail traffic at a nearby crossing, located approximately one-quarter of a mile away from the proposed driveway connection, might pose a safety hazard to future residents. Consequently, a DOT engineer denied the permit. On appeal, a DOT division engineer granted the permit request subject to the conditions that the owner make improvements to the railroad crossing and obtain the owning and operating railroads' consent to the improvements. On judicial review, the trial court ruled in favor of DOT, finding the agency acted within the scope of its powers in issuing the driveway permit subject to these conditions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conditions imposed by DOT in this case were not statutorily authorized, and therefore, DOT exceeded its authority when it issued the conditional permit. View "High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

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This appeal considered whether defendant County had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (APFO) that effectively conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's public schools. The trial court concluded that the County did not have the authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina's general zoning or subdivision statutes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County did not have the statutory authority to adopt its APFO, and N.C. Sess. Laws 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO. View "Lanvale Props. v County of Cabarrus" on Justia Law

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This case involved a dispute between the City of Kannapolis (Defendant), which rezoned rural land to promote commercial development, and neighboring landowners (Plaintiffs). At issue was whether Defendant approved a statement of reasonableness as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-383 when adopting the zoning amendment. The trial court entered an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims and dismissing Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to show the city council did not approve a statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the zoning amendment at issue was invalid because Defendant failed to properly approve a statement under section 160A-383, thus rendering the amendment void. Remanded.

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Petitioners in this action were inmates who had been sentenced to death by lethal injection. Respondent, North Carolina Council of State, approved the lethal injection protocol after it was submitted to the Council by the Department of Corrections (DOC), an administrative agency. Although Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the state's method of execution, at issue on appeal was whether the Council's statutorily-mandated approval of the DOC's action was subject to the requirements of the North Carolina APA when the DOC's action was exempt from the APA. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) ALJ recommended that the Council reconsider its approval of the execution protocol. The Council declined to reconsider its approval based upon its conclusion that the OAH did not have jurisdiction to review the issue. The superior court dismissed Petitioners' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the superior court's ruling that the APA does not apply to the Council's approval of the execution protocol, and (2) affirmed the court's ruling, as modified, that Petitioners' rights do not include the right to present evidence to the Council and that the Council's obligations do not include a substantive review of the protocol before it is approved.

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Morris Communications Corporation d/b/a Fairway Outdoor Advertising (Fairway) sought to re-erect a sign after its lawfully constructed sign was condemned by the DOT. Fairway applied for and received a sign permit for the relocated sign. The permit required that the work commence six months from the date of issuance. After Fairway took down its sign and reinstalled it, the city sent Fairway a notice of violation, asserting that the sign violated the city's outdoor advertising ban and asserting that Fairway's sign permit had expired because work on the project had not commenced prior to the permit's expiration date. Fairway appealed the notice to the board of adjustment (BOA), which affirmed the determination. The court of appeals affirmed. Fairway appealed. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in determining the BOA's interpretation of the sign ordinance was entitled to deference under de novo review. Because the BOA's interpretation of its sign ordinance constituted an error of law, the Court reversed.