Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Grand Forks appealed a district court order suppressing the results of Thomas Barendt's chemical breath test after the City charged Barendt with actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding North Dakota's implied consent advisory had to be read after placing an individual under arrest and before the administration of a chemical test. View "City of Grand Forks v. Barendt" on Justia Law

In May 2016 Walsh County, North Dakota notified Jann Thompson she failed to pay her 2013 property taxes. The notice stated the County would foreclose on the property unless Thompson paid the taxes by October 1, 2016. Thompson previously attempted to pay the taxes with promissory notes and other instruments; however, they were not accepted by the County. On October 6, 2016, the County recorded a tax deed for the property due to Thompson's failure to pay the 2013 taxes. The County informed Thompson she had the right to repurchase the property before the tax sale by paying all outstanding taxes and costs against the property. On November 2, 2016, Thompson paid the 2013, 2014 and 2015 taxes and redeemed the property. Before paying the outstanding property taxes, Daniel and Jann Thompson sued Defendants the County auditor, the State Attorney, and the County Board of Commissioners, claiming the State had no authority to tax their property, and county officials improperly refused payment by not accepting the Thompsons' promissory notes. The Thompsons also alleged fraud, inverse condemnation and slander of title. The Thompsons subsequently filed a number of other documents and motions relating to their complaint. Defendants denied the Thompsons' allegations, and requested dismissal of the complaint and denial of the additional civil filings and motions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, dismissing the claims. Finding the trial court did not err by dismissing the Thompsons’ claims, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thompson v. Molde" on Justia Law

In August 2016, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue issued an order assessing personal liability against David Knapp, a North Dakota resident, for $65,843.80 in unpaid Minnesota sales and use taxes relating to his interest in a business in Bemidji, Minnesota. In December 2016, the Commissioner issued a third-party levy on securities held by broker Edward Jones for Knapp by sending a notice to Edward Jones at its Missouri office. The third-party levy said Edward Jones had to sell Knapp's securities under Minn. Stat. Ann. 270C.7101(7) and send the Minnesota Department of Revenue payment up to the amount due. The levy instructed Edward Jones not to send money that was exempt or protected from the levy and cautioned that state law allowed the Commissioner to assess debt to businesses, officers, or other individuals responsible for honoring the levy, including assessing the total amount due plus a twenty-five percent penalty. Knapp petitioned the district court to dissolve the levy and for a writ of prohibition against the Commissioner and Edward Jones to prohibit them from taking any further action to levy on his account. Knapp alleged that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction in North Dakota to levy on his North Dakota property and that his property was exempt from the levy. The district court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition to stay the levy pending the filing of an answer showing cause under N.D.C.C. 32-34-05, but later concluded Knapp failed to establish he was entitled to relief. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Knapp's petition for a writ of prohibition, and affirmed the judgment and the order. View "Knapp v. Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Ryan Korb appealed a judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision suspending his driving privileges for ninety-one days. Korb argued: (1) the arresting officer improperly included additional language before he read the statutorily required implied consent advisory; and (2) the record evidence was insufficient to establish that this blood test sample had been properly obtained. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the officer did not act improperly by prefacing the implied consent advisory with accurate information, and the record evidence was sufficient to establish that the blood test sample had been properly obtained. View "Korb v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing the Department's decision to suspend Jim DeForest's driving privileges. In November 2017, Deputy Jared Lemieux stopped appellee Jim DeForest for exceeding the speed limit by ten miles per hour. During the stop, DeForest exhibited signs of intoxication. After conducting field sobriety tests, Lemieux arrested DeForest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Lemieux read DeForest Miranda warnings and a post-arrest implied consent advisory, omitting reference to criminal penalties for refusal of breath or urine tests. Lemieux then requested a blood test. Prior to Lemieux's advisory and request, DeForest had asked for a chemical blood test. DeForest consented to a blood test. During the administrative hearing, DeForest objected to admission of the blood test result, arguing non-compliance with the required implied consent advisory procedure. The hearing officer admitted the blood test evidence over the objection and found Lemieux "read the implied consent advisory in accordance with N.D.C.C. section 39-20-01(3)(a)." DeForest appealed to the district court, arguing the implied consent advisory given was incomplete and thus the blood test evidence was inadmissible. The district court concluded the hearing officer erred in admitting the blood test evidence and reinstated DeForest's driving privileges. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the phrase "any criminal penalties" in N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(a) meant what it plainly said, and included all criminal penalties, including penalties for refusal of "blood, breath, or urine" tests under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01(1)(e)(2). "It is not consistent with plain meaning to read 'any criminal penalties' as implicitly referring only to criminal penalties for refusing blood tests." Therefore, the Court reversed the district court judgment and reinstated the hearing officer's decision to suspend DeForest's driving privileges. View "DeForest v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

William Beaulieu appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order awarding benefits and affirming prior Workforce Safety & Insurance ("WSI") orders. The ALJ's order finding Beaulieu had a fifty percent permanent partial impairment rating was not in accordance with the law and not supported by the evidence. Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the ALJ erred in awarding permanent partial impairment and permanent total disability benefits. View "WSI v. Beaulieu" on Justia Law

Tre Schoon appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision suspending his driving privileges for two years. Schoon argued that because he was given an incomplete implied consent advisory, evidence of his blood test results was inadmissible under N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(b). After review of the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed the advisory was incomplete and reversed the district court. View "Schoon v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Joshua Rose appealed a district court order denying his motion to reinstate his driver's license. Because the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the Minot Regional Child Support Unit's decision to suspend Rose's license, the North Dakota Supreme Court vacated the orders relating to his suspension. View "North Dakota v. Rose" on Justia Law

N.B., the father, and J.G., the mother, appealed a juvenile court order finding their child, J.B., to be a deprived child and granting legal custody to Cass County Social Services. A "deprived child" under North Dakota law is a child who is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means of the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian. The phrase "proper parental care" meant the minimum standards of care which the community will tolerate. "A court need not await the happening of a tragic event to protect a child, particularly when a sibling has been found to be deprived. Abuse of one child is relevant to the care a parent will provide to other siblings." After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that J.B. was deprived and affirmed the order. View "Interest of J.B." on Justia Law

D.D. appealed a district court order requiring his involuntary hospitalization and treatment, directing law enforcement to seize D.D.'s firearms, and finding that federal and state firearm restrictions applied to him. And application for evaluation and emergency admission was filed, request for transportation for emergency detention made, and petition for involuntary commitment, alleging that D.D. was mentally ill and in need of emergency treatment was granted. D.D. was admitted to the North Dakota State Hospital. After a preliminary hearing, the district court ordered involuntary hospitalization and treatment at the State Hospital for fourteen days, and found the firearm restrictions under 18 U.S.C. sections 922(d)(4), 922(g)(4), and N.D.C.C. 62.1-02-01(1)(c) applied. Law enforcement seized about 100 firearms from D.D.'s residence. The State Hospital released D.D. three days after that seizure. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the state and federal firearms restrictions were not unconstitutionally vague and applied to D.D. However, the Court reversed the order to seize D.D.'s firearms because neither the state nor the district court identified legal authority for issuing a summary seizure order as part of a mental health commitment process. View "Interest of D.D." on Justia Law