Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Arjuna Zerr appealed a judgment dismissing his action seeking declaratory relief against North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI"). The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing his complaint based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Zerr did not exhaust his statutory administrative remedies. View "Zerr v. Workforce Safety & Insurance" on Justia Law

Paving District 476 Group; SPCM, LLC; Schuler Repair; Feland Brothers Properties, LLC; Hudye Group LP; and Northern Plains Apartments, LLC (collectively "landowners") appealed an order dismissing their complaint against the City of Minot. The City received a petition to make improvements to 36th Avenue Northeast. The City Council approved Resolution No. 3109, declaring work necessary for the improvements. At a July 2016, meeting, the City Council approved a special assessment commission report for the paving district. Several property owners attended the meeting and spoke before the council, raising concerns about a change in the area being improved and about paying for improvements to properties outside city limits. The landowners sued the City, seeking a judgment declaring the assessments invalid and the assessments be held in abeyance until they did not include the area between 10th and 13th Streets and enjoining the City from certifying future assessments. They claimed the assessments were invalid because they did not receive proper notice, the City violated their due process rights by expanding the improvements beyond the original parameters and failing to give notice the improvements included the expanded area, and they were assessed for improvements between 10th Street and 13th Street which did not benefit their properties and constituted a gift to third parties. After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, concluding the landowners were barred from bringing the action because they failed to appeal or commence the action within the thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. 40-22-43 and any statutory irregularities did not deprive the landowners of their constitutional due process rights. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the City's alleged failure to give the landowners notice of the full extent of the proposed improvements did not violate the landowners' constitutional due process rights and the landowners' action to invalidate the assessments for failure to follow statutory procedural requirements is barred by N.D.C.C. 40-22-43. View "Paving District 476 Group v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

An individual may be committed as a sexually dangerous individual only when, among other things, the individual has a present serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior making that individual a danger to others. Danny Nelson appealed a district court order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. He argued the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a sexually dangerous individual. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings were insufficient to demonstrate Nelson was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct or that he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. As such, the Court reversed the district court's order of commitment and directed Nelson be released from civil commitment. View "Interest of Nelson" on Justia Law

When a person committed as a sexually dangerous individual petitions for discharge, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual. Expert testimony in sexually dangerous individual proceedings will not be reweighed on appeal, and a choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Kelly Tanner appealed a district court order finding he remained a sexually dangerous individual and denying his petition for discharge from the North Dakota State Hospital. Tanner, at age 22, was convicted of sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old female. The district court sentenced Tanner to one year of probation for the offense. In 2009, Tanner was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to five years in prison with four years and eleven months suspended for two years of supervised probation. In 2010, Tanner's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to one year of incarceration with two years of supervised probation to follow. Just before Tanner was released from incarceration, the State petitioned the district court to civilly commit Tanner as a sexually dangerous individual. After the commitment hearing, the district court found Tanner was a sexually dangerous individual and ordered civil commitment. Tanner petitioned for discharge in 2013 and 2014, and the district court ordered continued commitment on both occasions. Tanner petitioned for discharge a third time in September 2015. The State's doctor evaluated Tanner and filed a report, which was updated with an addendum twice. An independent doctor who previously evaluated Tanner, conducted an evaluation and filed a report. The district court held a hearing at which both doctors testified. The district court concluded Tanner remained a sexually dangerous individual and denied the petition for discharge. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court order denying Tanner's petition for discharge was supported by the record and was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, it affirmed the district court order continuing civil commitment. View "Interest of Tanner" on Justia Law

A Department of Transportation decision suspending or revoking driving privileges may be appealed to the district court by serving the director and filing a notice of appeal with specifications of error in the district court within seven days after the date of the hearing as shown by the date of the hearing officer's decision. Fritz Opp appealed and the Department of Transportation cross-appealed judgments affirming the Department's decisions revoking Opp's driving privileges for 180 days and reciprocally disqualifying him from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Opp's untimely appeals of the Department's decisions, and reversed and remanded for the district court to enter judgments dismissing Opp's appeals to the district court. View "Opp v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Ulises Barrios-Flores appeals from a judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision revoking his driving privileges for two years for refusing to submit to an onsite screening test of his breath. Under N.D.C.C. 39-20-05(3), the limited scope of an administrative hearing for refusing to submit to an onsite screening test requires a determination of: (1) whether the law enforcement officer had reason to believe the person committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in an accident as a driver; (2) whether in conjunction with the violation or accident, the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the person’s body contains alcohol; and (3) whether the person refused to submit to the onsite screening test. Here, the hearing officer found the law enforcement officer observed a vehicle driven by Barrios-Flores was speeding and initiated a traffic stop, Barrios-Flores had bloodshot watery eyes, and he admitted he had a couple of beers. Evidence in the record supported the hearing officer’s findings, and a reasoning person could conclude the hearing officer’s findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Those findings provided the law enforcement officer with a reasonable suspicion Barrios-Flores was driving while impaired to request an onsite screening test of Barrios-Flores’ breath and he refused the test. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Department’s decision revoking Barrios-Flores’ driving privilege was in accordance with the law and did not violate his constitutional rights. View "Barrios-Flores v. Levi" on Justia Law

Section 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a), N.D.C.C., does not require both treating and non-treating physicians to testify at a medication hearing addressing a request to involuntarily treat with medication. M.G. appealed a district court's order authorizing involuntary treatment with prescribed medication. F.M.G. argued the district court erred in granting the request to treat her with prescribed medications, because the proper medical providers did not testify at the hearing under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a), and the mandatory certification requirements under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(2) were not met. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a) did not require both treating and non-treating physicians to testify at the hearing, and F.M.G. did not adequately raise the issue of whether the form used to request involuntary treatment with medication met the certification requirements under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(2) before the district court. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Interest of F.M.G." on Justia Law

A party petitioning for termination of a guardianship must make a prima facie showing that the ward is no longer incapacitated, and if a prima facie case is established, the guardian has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the ward remains an incapacitated person. M.E. appealed a trial court order denying her petition to be restored to capacity, arguing the district court erred by denying her petition because no evidence showed she lacked the ability to care for herself and the court failed to order the least restrictive form of intervention. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding M.E. failed to establish a prima facie case for termination of the guardianship or for a less restrictive form of intervention. View "Guardianship & Conservatorship of M.E." on Justia Law

An action for equitable relief generally cannot be combined with a statutory appeal seeking a review of a local governing body's decision. Donald Cossette and the Angela R. Cossette Revocable Living Trust appealed a district court order dismissing their complaint against the Cass County Joint Water Resource District. The District passed a resolution of necessity determining the Cossettes' property was necessary for the Diversion Project and the District intended "to acquire a Permanent Right of Way Easement over, across, and through the [Cossettes'] Property." The Cossettes sought a declaration that the District inappropriately passed the resolution, and appealed from the District's resolution of necessity relating to the District's intent to acquire an interest in the Cossettes' real property through eminent domain. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed that part of the district court order dismissing the Cossettes' request for declaratory relief. The Court reversed that part of the district court order concluding the Cossettes were not entitled to appeal the District's resolution of necessity, and remanded. View "Cossette v. Cass County Joint Water Resource District" on Justia Law

Ryan Crawford appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision suspending his driving privileges for two years. Crawford argued: (1) the arresting officer did not have grounds to initially stop his vehicle; and (2) the results of a warrantless blood test should not have been admitted into evidence in the license suspension proceeding. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initially stop Crawford's vehicle. The Court also found that assuming Crawford's consent to the warrantless blood test was involuntary for purposes of this appeal, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the results of the blood test in this civil administrative license suspension proceeding. View "Crawford v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law