Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In North Dakota, the Sargent County Water Resource District ("District") initiated an eminent domain action to acquire permanent and temporary easements over five properties adjacent to Drain 11 for a drainage project ("Project"). The landowners argued that the project was unlawful because it did not qualify as “maintenance” and exceeded the six-year maximum maintenance levy without the approval of the majority of landowners. The District countered that the landowners’ arguments were foreclosed because they did not appeal the District’s “Resolution of Necessity” and their arguments were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. The district court ruled that the landowners’ arguments were not foreclosed and granted condemnation of the property for the Project.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the landowners' arguments were not foreclosed and the district court did not err in reaching this conclusion. The Court ruled that the landowners were not precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel from challenging whether the Project was authorized by law in defending against an eminent domain action.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's finding that the Project was a use authorized by law and that no landowner vote was required for the Project. The Court concluded that the Project as currently designed and approved exceeded the statutory maximum maintenance levy and could not proceed without the approval of the majority of landowners as required by state law. The judgment was therefore reversed. View "Sargent Cty. Water Resource District v. Beck" on Justia Law

Lawrence Didier appealed an order and judgment denying his discharge from civil commitment. Between 1988 and 2008, Didier was convicted of gross sexual imposition and indecent exposure, and was twice convicted of sexual assault. After a State petition, the district court ordered Didier committed as a sexually dangerous individual in November 2010 under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Didier petitioned for an annual review hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18 seeking discharge from commitment. Dr. Deirdre D’Orazio, Ph.D., a doctor of clinical and forensic psychology, submitted a report for the North Dakota State Hospital stating her expert opinion was that Didier remained a sexually dangerous individual. The district court held a hearing and subsequently issued an order and judgment denying Didier’s petition for discharge from civil commitment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that Didier had serious difficulty controlling his behavior based on both his past and present conduct was not clearly erroneous, and was supported by the record. Accordingly, the distric court's order and judgment were affirmed. View "Matter of Didier" on Justia Law

A.I. appealed a district court’s order continuing her commitment to the North Dakota State Hospital (“NDSH”) for a period not to exceed 180 days. She argued the court erred in not ordering a less restrictive alternative treatment as testimony supported A.I.’s needs could be met with a lower level of care. In addition, A.I. asserted the entry of an order, that indicated a waiver of the continuing treatment hearing filed after a hearing was held, was clearly erroneous. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court’s order to continue her hospitalization was not clearly erroneous, and the court’s order following waiver of treatment or continuing treatment hearing, as conceded by both parties, was entered in error. The Court affirmed the district court’s order for continued treatment and vacated the superfluous order entered in the record at docket entry 43. View "Interest of A.I." on Justia Law

William Kirkpatrick appealed a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges for one year for driving under the influence. Kirkpatrick argued the Department lacked authority to suspend his driving privileges because the arresting officer failed to forward the results of an analytical blood test report performed at the request of the officer to the Department. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred: Kirkpatrick’s alcohol-related breath and blood test results needed to be provided to the Department, and without them the Department did not have authority to suspend Kirkpatrick’s driver’s license. The Court reversed the district court’s judgment affirming the Department’s decision suspending Kirkpatrick’s driving privileges for one year. View "Kirkpatrick v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the North Dakota Public Employees Retirement System petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court seeking declaratory relief and a writ of injunction, challenging N.D.C.C. § 54-52-03 and section 41 of S.B. 2015 (2023), enacted by the 68th Legislative Assembly, both of which provided for the appointment of sitting legislators to the Board. The Board claimed the law placing legislators on the Board violated N.D. Const. art. IV, § 6; violated the separation of powers between branches of government and encroached on the powers of the executive branch in violation of articles IV, V and XI of the Constitution; violated the common-law rule against incompatibility of office; and violated the single subject rule of N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13. The Supreme Court concluded section 41 of S.B. 2015 violated article IV, § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution, and invalidated S.B. 2015. Because the constitutional “single subject” rule was dispositive, it was unnecessary to address the Board’s remaining claims. View "Bd. of Trustees of N.D. Public Employees Retirement System v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Robert Goff appealed an order denying his request for costs and attorney’s fees relating to the Department of Transportation’s suspension of Goff’s driving privileges. In December 2021, Fargo police officers arrested Goff in an apartment parking lot for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. A driveway used to access the parking lot included a sign reading “private property, private drive.” Goff requested an administrative hearing, arguing an ordinance, Fargo Municipal Code § 8-1011, limited the public’s right to access property marked as private without written permission from the owner. The owner of the property, John Goff, testified the parking lot was for tenant parking only. John Goff testified that deliverers and visitors are prohibited from going past the sign to access the parking lot. The hearing officer concluded the ordinance prohibited the public from parking in the private parking lot, but did not limit the public’s right to access the lot. The hearing officer found the public had a right of access to the private lot for vehicular use. The Department suspended Goff’s driving privileges for 91 days, and the district court affirmed. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the hearing officer misinterpreted the ordinance. The case was then remanded for a determination of whether the Department acted without substantial justification requiring an award of costs and attorney’s fees to Goff under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-50(1). On remand, Goff argued he was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees because the Department’s action against him was not substantially justified. Goff claimed a reasonable person would not believe the public had a right to access the private parking lot in light of signage on the property and Fargo Municipal Code § 8-1011. The district court decided the Department acted with substantial justification, and denied Goff ’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the district court abused its discretion in deciding the Department’s proceeding against Goff was substantially justified. The case was remanded for a determination of Goff's reasonable attorney's fees. View "Goff v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Andrew Hennessey appealed a district court order dismissing with prejudice his action against the Milnor School District (“District”). The District employed Hennessey as a teacher for the 2021-2022 school year. In October 2021, the District placed Hennessey on paid administrative leave for immoral conduct and conduct unbecoming his position. The District requested Hennessey sign a resignation letter, which would have immediately terminated his employment, salary, and benefits. He declined to sign the resignation letter and requested an administrative hearing. The District then converted Hennessey’s leave from paid to unpaid leave and recommended his dismissal for cause. Hennessey subsequently signed a severance agreement providing him salary through October 2021 and insurance benefits through December 2021, and waiving his rights to challenge the dismissal. He later learned through an open records request that the District’s legal counsel had advised the District in an email, in part, to convert his leave to unpaid to have “some leverage over this guy.” In December 2022, Hennessey filed this action seeking to rescind the agreement’s release and waiver section to allow him to challenge his dismissal. He claimed the District exerted undue financial pressure on him to secure the waiver of his rights to an administrative hearing and to challenge his termination in district court when it converted his paid leave to unpaid leave. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding Hennessey failed to allege facts sufficient to support rescinding a contract for undue influence under N.D.C.C. § 9-09-02. View "Hennessey v. Milnor School District" on Justia Law

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DOCR”) petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original supervisory jurisdiction to direct the Honorable Judge Stacy Louser (hereinafter “district court”) to amend a portion of a criminal judgment imposing probation as part of a sentence for a class B misdemeanor and requiring the DOCR to supervise the probation. The DOCR argued it does not have statutory authority to supervise probation when the underlying charge was a class B misdemeanor. The DOCR requested the criminal judgment be amended to relieve the DOCR from the obligation to supervise the probation. Without deciding whether the district court has the authority to require a defendant to be supervised by the DOCR as part of a sentence imposed for a class B misdemeanor, the Supreme Court concluded the DOCR did have the authority to provide the supervision and declined to exercise supervisory jurisdiction. View "DOCR v. Louser, et al." on Justia Law

Fritz Opp appealed the dismissal of his case for want of jurisdiction. Opp attempted to appeal a Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) decision denying his application for a concealed weapons license under N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04. The court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Opp had not complied with the requirements for perfecting an appeal under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 (“AAPA”). The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the action for want of jurisdiction, but modified the judgment to dismiss without prejudice. View "Opp v. Office of the North Dakota Attorney General - BCI CWL Unit, et al." on Justia Law

Lance Hagen filed a public records request related to a condemnation case he was a party to involving the City of Lincoln and North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund (“NDIRF”). Hagen sought to determine how the City of Lincoln and NDIRF spent approximately $1.1 million dollars on litigation costs defending the action. NDIRF did not produce all requested records, and the parties sought relief from the district court. Hagen appealed the district court’s judgment that concluded certain documents belonging to NDIRF were exempt from release under the potential liability exception outlined in N.D.C.C. § 44-04-19.1(8). Hagen argued the court abused its discretion by finding NDIRF itself faced potential liability because its members could face potential liability, and because the court discussed the fiscal effect of a disclosure on NDIRF, which Hagen argued exceeded the scope of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s remand order in Hagen v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, 971 N.W.2d 833. Because the Supreme Court concluded the potential liability exception under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-19.1(8) did not apply to any of the documents determined by the district court to be exempt, the Court reversed. View "Hagen v. N.D. Insurance Reserve Fund" on Justia Law