Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A Job Service claims deputy issued an initial determination that Kenneth Risovi misrepresented facts in order to obtain unemployment benefits, which he was not eligible to receive. Job Service disqualified Risovi from receiving unemployment benefits from November 4, 2012, to October 26, 2013. Risovi appealed the determination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Risovi v. Job Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Fred Hector appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action against the City of Fargo for claims involving special assessments against his land. He argued the district court erred in granting Fargo summary judgment, because N.D.C.C. 40-26-07 authorized his action to judicially establish Fargo's special assessments as void to the extent the assessments exceeded Fargo's actual costs of improvements, and his claims were not barred by administrative res judicata. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. sections 40-26-01 and 40-26-07 authorized a court to review issues about a municipality's special assessments in the context of the adequate legal remedy of an appeal. Furthermore, the issues Hector raised in this action were res judicata. View "Hector v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Erling "Curly" Haugland appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action against the City of Bismarck for declaratory relief involving Bismarck's implementation of an urban renewal plan and use of tax increment financing to fund renewal projects in its renewal area. Haugland argued Bismarck failed to establish as a matter of law that it complied with the procedural requirements of N.D.C.C. 40-58-06 for substantially modifying its urban renewal plan in 1994. On remand, the district court decided an appropriate 1994 resolution existed to add six city blocks to the renewal area and authorized renewal projects in the renewal area were pending in January 2011. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed that portion of the summary judgment concerning Bismarck's urban renewal plan including pending authorized projects for the existing renewal area when the district court decided the case in January 2011. However, the Court reversed and remanded summary judgment with respect to approval of the 1994 plan, finding no disputed issues of material fact existed regarding approval. View "Haugland v. City of Bismarck" on Justia Law

Joseph Daniel Potratz appeals the district court's judgment affirming the administrative hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges. A Burleigh County Deputy Sheriff arrested Potratz for driving under the influence ("DUI"). The administrative hearing officer concluded the deputy had reasonable grounds to believe Potratz had been driving under the influence and Potratz was properly tested after his arrest to determine his alcohol concentration within two hours of driving. Potratz appealed the hearing officer's decision. The district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Potratz v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment that reversed the decision of a hearing officer that suspended the driving privileges of petitioner Scott Fossum. Upon review of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that the implied-consent requirements of N.D.C.C. 39-20-01 did not apply when an individual voluntarily consents to a chemical test. Therefore the Court reversed the judgment and reinstated the hearing officer's decision to suspend Fossum's driving privileges. View "Fossum v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Michael Hamre appealed a district court order affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation ("DOT") order disqualifying his commercial driver's license for one year. Hamre argued: (1) that DOT misapplied the law by considering the administrative suspension of his noncommercial license a "conviction" under N.D.C.C. 39-06.2-10(7) (2011); (2) that N.D.C.C. 39-06.2-10(7) (2011) was void for vagueness; (3) that the one-year suspension of his driving privileges commenced on May 29, 2012, rather than on January 13, 2013; and (4) that he was entitled to attorney fees and costs. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hamre v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Mother S.L.-C., and father N.P., separately appealed a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their three children. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court's findings that the children were deprived and had been in foster care more than 450 out of the previous 660 nights were supported by the evidence and were not clearly erroneous. As such, the Court affirmed the termination of both parties' parental rights. View "Interest of R.L.-P." on Justia Law

Richard L. Hagar, judge of the district court for the North Central Judicial District, filed exceptions to the Judicial Conduct Commission's recommended findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to diligently and promptly decide judicial matters assigned to him. He also objected to the Commission's recommended sanctions. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission's findings of fact and ordered that Judge Hagar be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay commencing April 1, 2014. Moreover, the Court assessed $3,710.49 for the costs and attorney fees necessary for the prosecution of these proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Hagar" on Justia Law

Sandy Mangelsen appealed a district court order finding he was a sexually dangerous individual and committed him to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings that Mangelsen had exhibited serious difficulty in controlling his behavior and that he was a sexually dangerous individual were not clearly erroneous. View "Matter of Mangelsen" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed the reversal of an administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Tammy Wampler's driving privileges. A Jamestown city police officer received a call regarding an intoxicated driver. The officer arrived on the scene, located the vehicle, and observed it weaving between lanes. The officer initiated his overhead lights, but the vehicle continued to drive for almost half a mile before it came to a stop, and it did so only after the officer turned on his siren. The officer administered three field sobriety tests, and Wampler failed two of them and could not complete the other. Wampler submitted to an on-site chemical screening test, which indicated an alcohol concentration level of at least .08. Wampler was then placed under arrest for Driving Under the Influence. Within two hours of driving, Wampler submitted to an intoxilyzer breath test. The test results showed Wampler's alcohol concentration was 0.159. When the officer completed his certified written report to the director, he wrote "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank. Wampler made a timely request for an administrative hearing with the Department. At that hearing, Wampler raised three arguments, one of which was that the Department lacked the authority to revoke her driving privileges because the law enforcement officer failed to write "by weight" next to the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank of his Report and Notice. The administrative hearing officer rejected Wampler's argument, holding "the failure to write 'by weight' is not jurisdictional." The administrative hearing officer suspended Wampler's driving privileges for 91 days, and Wampler appealed to the district court, raising all three issues. The district court determined North Dakota law required the law enforcement officer to complete a certified written report which indicated that test results showed Wampler had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater by weight, that this was a basic and mandatory provision of the statute under prevailing case law, and that, while the law enforcement officer's Report and Notice included the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank, the omission of the phrase "by weight" stripped the Department of authority to suspend Wampler's driving privileges. The district court determined this was the dispositive issue on appeal and did not address Wampler's other arguments. The district court reversed the decision of the administrative hearing officer and ordered that Wampler's driving privileges be restored. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of the phrase "by weight" in the "Test Results" portion of a law enforcement officer's certified written report was not necessary to satisfy N.D.C.C. 39-20-03.1. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and reinstated the administrative hearing officer's decision. View "Wampler v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law