Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Neil Bartelson appeals from a district court order denying his petition to remove Guardian and Protective Services ("GAPS") as the personal representative of the Estate of Ralph Bartelson, an order denying his motion to vacate the order denying his petition and an order awarding attorney's fees. Ralph Bartelson had four children--Jean Valer, Jane Haught, Bartelson and Diane Fischer. In 2008, the district court approved a settlement agreement appointing Valer as guardian and GAPS as conservator. Ralph Bartelson died August 23, 2008, and GAPS was appointed the personal representative of the estate. Bartelson and Fischer alleged Valer and Haught misappropriated Ralph Bartelson's funds. GAPS did not pursue a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. The district court ordered it did not have jurisdiction over claims of misappropriation occurring before the court's 2008 appointment of a guardian and conservator for Ralph Bartelson. Bartelson and Fischer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, holding the court erred in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the misappropriation claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings and for the court to determine whether Bartelson and Fischer had standing to assert their misappropriation claims when they did not allege that GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by not filing a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. On remand, Bartelson filed a petition to be appointed as the successor personal representative. The district court ruled neither Bartelson nor Fischer's estate had standing to assert their misappropriation claims. The court denied a motion to reconsider. Bartelson then petitioned to remove GAPS as personal representative of Ralph Bartelson's estate, arguing GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pursue collection of assets belonging to the estate and failing to bring an action against Valer and Haught for misappropriation, but did not hold a hearing on that motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Bartelson's petition for removal of GAPS as the personal representative without conducting a hearing. The case was remanded for a hearing on the petition. View "Estate of Bartelson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Allen Davenport appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision to terminate benefits on his claim for treatment of his cervical spine and left shoulder and denying his claims for benefits for treatment of his anxiety and depression and lower back condition. He argued his anxiety and depression and his cervical spine, left shoulder and back conditions were "compensable injuries." Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded Davenport failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that work incidents subject to this claim substantially accelerated the progression of, or substantially worsened the severity of, his existing conditions and that his physical injury caused at least 50 percent of his anxiety and depression. View "Davenport v. WSI" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed the reversal of its hearing officer's decision to suspend Debbie Ann Painte's driving privileges for 180 days. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in deciding the hearing officer made insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to establish the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of a vehicle. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Department laid a proper foundation for the admission of Painte's chemical test for intoxication. The district court's judgment was reversed and the hearing officer's decision suspending Painte's driving privileges was reinstated. View "Painte v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment that reversed its administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend Jay Olson's driving privileges for 180 days for driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded reasonable minds could have concluded the hearing officer's finding that Olson did not have anything to eat, drink, or smoke during the twenty minutes before the Intoxilyzer test was supported by the weight of the evidence in the record. The Court therefore reversed the district court's judgment which found differently, and reinstated the administrative suspension of Olson's driving privileges. View "Olson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In early 2013, S.R.B.'s father filed a petition for his involuntary commitment. The petition alleged S.R.B. was mentally ill and there was a reasonable expectation of a serious risk of harm if left untreated. The petition alleged that S.R.B. called a nearby school looking for his daughter, wife, and lover, of which he had none. The petition also alleged S.R.B.'s neighbor saw S.R.B. "walking around his house this morning with nothing on but his underwear shorts." The father requested emergency treatment, noting S.R.B. was not taking his medication. S.R.B. appealed the trial court's order for hospitalization and treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital for ninety days. The Supreme Court held the trial court's findings were insufficient to support the trial court's order, and remanded for expedited findings. On remand, the trial court entered additional findings and issued an amended order. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence that supported the order for hospitalization and treatment. View "Interest of S.R.B." on Justia Law

Workforce Safety & Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court's judgment reversing its denial of worker's compensation benefits to claimant Brenda Albright. Albright submitted her claim to WSI for a work-related back injury. Albright had a history of back problems; an independent medical records review of Albright's case showed she had "well-documented multilevel degenerative disk pathology" which contributed to the claim at issue here. The ALJ hearing Albright's case concluded her injury was not the result of a single incident, and denied her application for benefits. Finding that the evidence in the record supported the ALJ's decision to deny Albright's application for benefits, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, affirmed the ALJ and reinstated WSI's order denying benefits. View "Albright v. ND Workforce Safety & Ins" on Justia Law

Michael Jassek appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the binding dispute resolution decision of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") that denied payment for a myoelectric prosthesis. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore vacated the judgment. Jassek contended that because WSI failed to explain its reasons for disregarding the medical evidence favorable to Jassek, its binding dispute resolution decision was arbitrary, and that WSI's binding dispute resolution procedure violated his right to due process because it failed to provide a formal hearing. The language of N.D.C.C. 65-02-20 unambiguously provides that "[a] dispute resolution decision under this section requested by a medical provider concerning . . . a request for . . . treatment is not reviewable by any court." The statute based appealability on the identity of the party who requests binding dispute resolution, not on who appeals the binding dispute resolution decision. Jassek’s orthotist was a "medical provider," and this dispute concernd "a request for diagnostic tests or treatment," specifically the determination of an appropriate prosthetic device. Accordingly, WSI's decision on the medical provider’s request for binding dispute resolution was not reviewable by the district court, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction, and the judgment affirming WSI's decision was void. View "Jassek v. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law

S.R.B. appealed the trial court's order for hospitalization and treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital for ninety days and its order requiring use of prescribed medication. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded insufficient findings appeared in the record to support the trial court's orders. The case was remanded with instructions for expedited entry of findings for the order for hospitalization and treatment, and the Court reversed the order requiring use of prescribed medication. View "Interest of S.R.B." on Justia Law

Robert R. Hoff appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by not independently making an individualized determination on the record whether it was necessary to restrain Hoff during the hearing, and its failure to do so was not harmless error. View "Interest of Hoff" on Justia Law

Slawson and Gadeco were owners of oil and gas leasehold interests in a section of real property located in Mountrail County which comprised the spacing unit for the Coyote 1-32H well. In 2009, Slawson sent Gadeco and to other working interest owners in the spacing unit invitations to participate in the cost of drilling and completing the well. The Supreme Court reversed an Industrial Commission order authorizing Slawson Exploration Company to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC, for failing to accept Slawson's invitation to participate in the well within 30 days, and remanded to the Commission to explain its decision. On remand, the Commission determined Slawson's invitation to Gadeco to participate in the well complied with regulatory requirements and authorized Slawson to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco. Gadeco appealed the district court judgment affirming the Industrial Commission's order on remand. The district court reversed the Commission's decision holding that, after sending the July 8, 2009 invitation to participate, Slawson changed three of the five requirements for an invitation, The court determined the changed facts required that Slawson provide Gadeco with a new invitation to participate. The Commission again authorized Slawson to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco, ruling Slawson's invitation to participate complied with the regulatory requirements for a valid invitation to participate and Gadeco failed to accept the invitation within 30 days of receipt. The district court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding its "findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence." The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the Commission has discretion and administrative expertise to evaluate compliance with the requirements for an invitation to participate. The Commission therefore did not err in construing the language in the regulation to require Gadeco's election to participate to be received by Slawson within 30 days of Gadeco's receipt of the invitation and in authorizing Slawson to assess the risk penalty against Gadeco. View "Gadeco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law