Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

S.R.B. appealed the trial court's order for hospitalization and treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital for ninety days and its order requiring use of prescribed medication. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded insufficient findings appeared in the record to support the trial court's orders. The case was remanded with instructions for expedited entry of findings for the order for hospitalization and treatment, and the Court reversed the order requiring use of prescribed medication. View "Interest of S.R.B." on Justia Law

Robert R. Hoff appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by not independently making an individualized determination on the record whether it was necessary to restrain Hoff during the hearing, and its failure to do so was not harmless error. View "Interest of Hoff" on Justia Law

Slawson and Gadeco were owners of oil and gas leasehold interests in a section of real property located in Mountrail County which comprised the spacing unit for the Coyote 1-32H well. In 2009, Slawson sent Gadeco and to other working interest owners in the spacing unit invitations to participate in the cost of drilling and completing the well. The Supreme Court reversed an Industrial Commission order authorizing Slawson Exploration Company to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC, for failing to accept Slawson's invitation to participate in the well within 30 days, and remanded to the Commission to explain its decision. On remand, the Commission determined Slawson's invitation to Gadeco to participate in the well complied with regulatory requirements and authorized Slawson to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco. Gadeco appealed the district court judgment affirming the Industrial Commission's order on remand. The district court reversed the Commission's decision holding that, after sending the July 8, 2009 invitation to participate, Slawson changed three of the five requirements for an invitation, The court determined the changed facts required that Slawson provide Gadeco with a new invitation to participate. The Commission again authorized Slawson to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco, ruling Slawson's invitation to participate complied with the regulatory requirements for a valid invitation to participate and Gadeco failed to accept the invitation within 30 days of receipt. The district court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding its "findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence." The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the Commission has discretion and administrative expertise to evaluate compliance with the requirements for an invitation to participate. The Commission therefore did not err in construing the language in the regulation to require Gadeco's election to participate to be received by Slawson within 30 days of Gadeco's receipt of the invitation and in authorizing Slawson to assess the risk penalty against Gadeco. View "Gadeco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Tyler Dawson appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded a reasoning mind could not reasonably conclude the finding that Dawson drove or was in physical control of a motor vehicle within two hours of the performance of a chemical test was supported by a preponderance of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and the Department hearing officer's decision and remanded to the Department for reinstatement of Dawson's driving privileges. View "Dawson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

HIT, Inc. appealed a district court judgment affirming the administrative order requiring HIT to pay back excess reimbursements in the amount of $90,699.80. HIT argued the Department used an incorrect method to calculate the margin to determine whether HIT was required to refund the excess reimbursements. Furthermore, HIT argued it was reversible error for the ALJ to defer to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "HIT, Inc. v. N.D. Dep't of Human Services" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Human Services appealed a district court order reversing and remanding the Department's order decreasing Plaintiff-Appellee Penne Nienow's monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits. The County determined Nienow received income from a prior mineral rights lease and, therefore, the 2011 payment was a recurring lump-sum payment. The County reduced Nienow's SNAP benefits to $16 per month. Nienow filed a request for hearing to the Department, and an evidentiary hearing was held. The County's representative testified Nienow stated that she leased the mineral rights and received income from the lease every five years and that she had leased the rights at least once before. After the hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") concluded the County correctly determined Nienow's income and properly reduced her SNAP benefits. The Department adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Nienow appealed the Department's order to the district court. The district court reversed and remanded, concluding Nienow's payment was a mineral leasing bonus, a nonrecurring lump-sum payment, and should not have been considered as income in determining Nienow's eligibility. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court order and reinstated the Department's final order reducing Nienow's SNAP benefits. View "Nienow v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court's judgment reversing the administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend Petitioner-Apellee Timothy Mees's driving privileges for ninety-one days for driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded reasonable minds could have concluded the hearing officer's finding that the officer who administered the Intoxilyzer ascertained that Petitioner did not have anything to eat, drink, or smoke for twenty minutes prior to the Intoxilyzer test was supported by the weight of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the hearing officer's decision to suspend Petitioner's driving privileges. View "Mees v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Roland Riemers appealed a district court order that denied his petition for a writ to require the Secretary of State to remove the Republican and Democratic candidates for governor and lieutenant governor from the November 2012 general election ballot, or alternatively to place him on that ballot as the Libertarian party candidate. According to Riemers, both he and his running mate for lieutenant governor filed separate certificates of endorsement and statements of interests with the Secretary to place their names on the June 2012 primary ballot, but Richard Ames did not submit a signature page with his statement of interests. Accordingly, the Secretary placed Riemers' name on the primary ballot, but not that of his running mate Ames. Riemers received enough votes in the primary to qualify for placement on the general election ballot. The Secretary asked the Attorney General whether under North Dakota law, Riemers could be nominated for governor without an accompanying candidate for lieutenant governor. The Attorney General issued a written opinion ruling that Riemers was not nominated because the requirements for a joint ballot for governor and lieutenant governor were not satisfied. Riemers thereafter submitted sufficient signatures to the Secretary of State for certification on the November general election ballot as an independent candidate for governor, with Anthony Johns as his accompanying candidate for lieutenant governor. In September 2012, after filing matter in the district court and being informed a previous attempt to serve the petition on the Secretary of State by certified mail was insufficient under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2), Riemers personally served an Assistant Attorney General with the petition for a writ of mandamus, a writ of prohibition, a writ of quo warranto, and for preventive or declaratory relief. Riemers named the Secretary of State as the respondent and asked the district court to require the Secretary of State to remove the Republican and Democratic candidates for governor and lieutenant governor from the November general election ballot for failure to file a joint certificate of endorsement for the primary election. Riemers alternatively sought an order requiring the Secretary of State to place his name on the general election ballot as the Libertarian candidate for governor with Anthony Johns as the Libertarian candidate for lieutenant governor. Riemers also sought an order directing the Secretary of State to stop discriminating against minor party and independent candidates. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Riemers failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to be certified for the general election ballot as the Libertarian candidate for governor and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for a writ to require the Secretary of State to certify his name for that ballot as the Libertarian candidate for governor. View "Riemers v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

Claimants appealed a district court judgment that affirmed Job Service of North Dakota's decision to deny them unemployment benefits. Upon review of the administrative record and the plain language of N.D.C.C. 52-06-02(4), the Supreme Court concluded that claimants were only disqualified from unemployment compensation for employee-initiated work stoppages due to labor disputes, not to locked out Claimants as in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case back to Job Service for further proceedings. View "Olson v. Job Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Morrow appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision that suspended his driving privileges for one year. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that N.D.C.C. 39-20-04 required an officer to specifically indicate his or her belief that the driver's body contained alcohol on the Report and Notice form, which he says was nowhere on the face of the form. The Department argued that formulating the opinion that the driver's body contained alcohol was a prerequisite to requesting an onsite screening test, and therefore checking "Refused onsite screening test" implied the officer formulated an opinion that the driver's body contained alcohol. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the arresting officer failed to indicate his belief that Plaintiff's body contained alcohol, thereby making the report and notice deficient. The Court reversed the district court's order affirming the administrative suspension of Plaintiff's driving privileges. View "Morrow v. Ziegler" on Justia Law