Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant J.G. appealed a district court order that denied his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Concluding the district court did not err in finding J.G. engaged in sexually predatory conduct and the State established by clear and convincing evidence that J.G. remained a sexually dangerous individual, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of J.G." on Justia Law

B.F. (father) appealed a district court judgment that appointed G.S., G.J., and K.C. as guardians over J.S.L.F. J.S.L.F. was born in the summer of 2008 to B.F. and S.M.L. They lived in Grand Forks for the first few months of the child's life, and were the subject of several complaints received by Grand Forks County Social Services. Father, mother, and child moved to Glenburn allegedly to avoid social services. While they were in Glenburn, there were at least three more reports from social services about their supervision of the child, the condition of the house they lived in, and the feeding of the child. In November 2010, the mother left the child with two of the co-petitioners so she could move to Bismarck. She signed a co-petition for appointment of a guardian in which she gave consent for G.S., G.J., and K.C. to be appointed guardians. Several weeks later, the mother arrived at G.S. and G.J.'s home with the police and took the child back. The next day, the district court entered an ex parte order giving G.S., G.J., and K.C. a temporary guardianship over the child. In the order, the court found an emergency existed because the mother was unable to care for the child, and found the mother's parental rights had been suspended by the circumstances. The father was not given notice before the guardianship was entered, and no hearing was held before the temporary guardianship. The temporary guardians made a motion to make the guardianship permanent, and B.F. was served with notice of the petition. A hearing on the petition for permanent guardianship was held late summer 2011. The district court ruled that both parents' rights had been suspended by the circumstances, and that it was in the best interests of the child to appoint G.S., G.J., and K.C. as the child's permanent guardians. On appeal, B.F. argued his parental rights were not suspended by circumstances. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the facts in the record did not support a finding of abandonment (to preclude suspension of rights by the circumstances), and therefore the district court's finding that B.F. abandoned J.S.L.F. was clearly erroneous. View "Guardianship of J.S.L.F." on Justia Law

William and Carla Trotter and Kevin and Cheryl Buehner appealed a judgment which declared "Trotter Road" a public road, and that awarded Ralph and Patricia Howard damages. Since 1984, the Howards have used Trotter Road to access their farmland. In 1986 or 1987, Gene Buehner built a dam along Trotter Road because the road had frequently been washed away by high water traveling through the ravine. In the fall of 2009, the road had become increasingly narrow due to high water. The width of the road made it impossible for the Howards to access their farmland with heavy farm equipment, which had previously not been a problem. Also in the fall of 2009, the Trotters erected steel poles across Trotter Road further preventing the Howards from accessing their farmland. In 2011, the Howards sued the Trotters and Buehners seeking injunctive relief and money damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in finding Trotter Road was a public road, and in awarding the Howards damages. View "Howard v. Trotter" on Justia Law

Kadrmas, Lee & Jackson, Inc., ("KLJ") appealed a district court judgment awarding the City of Valley City ("City") costs and expenses the City incurred defending itself in the underlying lawsuit and pursuing its indemnity claim against KLJ. The City entered into a contract with KLJ to provide engineering services for a paving and sewer project. The City hired a general contractor for the project. The contract between the City and the contractor required the contractor to furnish all labor, materials, and equipment for the project. The contractor was required to provide a payment bond under the terms of its contract with the City, and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul") was the surety under the bond. Specialized Contracting, Inc. ("SCI"), entered into a subcontract with the contractor to complete some of the work on the project. In 2007, SCI sued St. Paul for breach of its duties under the payment bond, seeking compensation for additional work SCI alleged it completed on the project for which the contractor refused to pay. St. Paul served a third-party complaint against the City for breach of contract and indemnity, alleging the concrete repair work was outside the scope of the City's contract with the contractor, the City was liable to the contractor for any additional compensation SCI was claiming against the payment bond if SCI established KLJ's decision to replace the concrete was beyond the scope of the contract, and the City was required to indemnify St. Paul for any judgments against it in favor of SCI arising from decisions made by KLJ. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded KLJ did not have a duty to defend the City. The Court reversed the district court's judgment awarding the City costs and expenses, and remanded the case for a determination of whether KLJ was entitled to recover its costs and expenses as a prevailing party. View "Specialized Contracting, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins." on Justia Law

Brendan Muldoon appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order from an administrative law judge ("ALJ") which: affirmed an order of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") finding Muldoon was an employer under N.D.C.C. 65-01-02(17); that Muldoon wilfully failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for his employees; and that Muldoon was personally liable for past premiums and penalties owed to WSI. Upon review of the ALJ's record, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the ALJ's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Muldoon v. WSI" on Justia Law

Appellant Collette Bishop appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative law judge's order ("ALJ") which affirmed an order of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") denying further vocational rehabilitation benefits and temporary total disability benefits to Bishop. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding the ALJ's finding that Bishop was capable of performing the return-to-work options identified in her vocational rehabilitation plan was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Bishop v. No. Dakota Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

Clinton Gardner appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges for one year. Gardner argued that because he wasn't given the implied consent advisory for the request for chemical testing, his conduct could not be deemed a refusal. He also argued he consented to the test when he said "yeah, I'll take the test," but was never given the opportunity to take the test. The administrative officer found the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe Gardner was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and had effectively refused the blood test by his conduct despite stating he would take the test. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the hearing officer's decision was supported by the weight of the evidence in the record, and was entitled to deference. View "Gardner v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota, by and through the Department of Human Services and its Child Support Enforcement Division ("the Department"), appealed a district court order denying its application for an order to enforce an administrative subpoena. In July 2010, the Department issued an administrative subpoena to the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund ("NDIRF") directing it to provide information on all claims submitted to the Fund. NDIRF objected to the subpoena, contending that the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF and that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. The Department filed an application for an order enforcing the administrative subpoena in district court. The district court determined that the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF and denied the application. The district court did not address NDIRF's arguments that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in holding the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying the Department's application for an order enforcing the administrative subpoena. Because the district court did not address NDIRF's contentions that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome, the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings to properly consider these issues under the limited four-factor review of enforcement of an administrative subpoena. View "North Dakota v. No. Dakota Ins. Reserve Fund" on Justia Law

Steven Zaiser, as Chairman of the Sponsoring Committee for the Statutory Initiative Relating to the North Dakota Medical Marijuana Act, asked the Supreme Court to order Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to place an initiated measure for the Medical Marijuana Act on the November 6, 2012, general election ballot after the Secretary of State rejected 7,559 signatures on circulated petitions and decided the measure did not qualify for placement on that ballot. The Sponsoring Committee claimed that although the submitted petitions included some elector signatures forged by petition circulators, the petitions contained sufficient valid signatures to place the measure on the ballot. Because of time constraints for placing the measure on the November 6, 2012, ballot, the Supreme Court issued a dispositive order on September 19, 2012, denying the Sponsoring Committee's request for relief and stating a written opinion would be filed at a later date. Because the circulators' petitions at issue in this case included signatures forged by the circulators in violation of a mandatory constitutional provision, the Secretary of State correctly rejected those petitions in calculating the number of elector signatures necessary to place the measure on the November 6, 2012, ballot and correctly determined the remaining petitions contained insufficient signatures to place the measure on that ballot. View "Zaiser v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

Merwin Carlson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision that denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits after remand. Under the law of the underlying case, the Supreme Court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in concluding WSI properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction under N.D.C.C.65-05-04 to deny Carlson benefits on remand. The Court reversed and remanded for WSI to award Carlson benefits based on the ALJ's calculation that Carlson's average weekly wage was $722. View "Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law