Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert and Susan Hale appealed a district court summary judgment that dismissed their nuisance and governmental takings claims against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales own property on what is otherwise agricultural land approximately one mile southeast of a shooting range used for training Minot area local, state and federal law enforcement officers. Mr. Hale brought suit against Ward County and Minot alleging the law enforcement shooting range was a private and public nuisance and the shooting range devalued his property, resulting in a governmental taking. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. "When viewed in the light most favorable to the Hales, the maps, photographs and additional evidence raise[d] a genuine issue whether the terrain surrounding the shooting range prevents bullets from exiting the shooting range." The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the Hales' public nuisance claim, but affirmed in all other respects.

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Hale appealed a district court order dismissing his action against the State of North Dakota, the Governor of North Dakota in his official capacity, the Director of the Department of Commerce in his official capacity and the Department of Commerce; the Minot City Council members in their official capacities and the City of Minot; and the Minot Area Development Corporation (MADC) for a declaration that the state and the federal constitutions prohibit the disbursement of public funds to private persons, associations, or corporations for economic development. Plaintiff primarily argued the "gift clause" provisions of N.D. Const. art. X, section 18 prohibit the State entities and the Minot defendants from using public funds to loan, give credit or make donations to individuals, associations, or corporations for economic development. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded statutes authorizing the State entities and the Minot defendants to implement economic development programs constitute an enterprise for a public purpose under N.D. Const. art. X, section 18 and are not unconstitutional.

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court's judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend Petitioner's driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. "A reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded that the hearing officer's finding that [Petitioner] did not have anything to eat, drink, or smoke during the twenty minutes before the Intoxilyzer test" was supported by the weight of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the administrative suspension of Petitioner's driving privileges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Erling "Curly" Haugland appealed and Defendant-Appellee City of Bismarck cross-appealed a grant of summary judgment that declared North Dakota's Urban Renewal Law constitutional, and Bismarck's implementation of an urban renewal plan and use of tax increment financing to fund urban renewal projects in its urban renewal area compliant with the Act. Plaintiff claimed the Act violates the gift clause provisions of N.D. Const. art. X, section 18, the requirements for imposing taxes in N.D. Const. art. X, sections 3 and 5, and the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. He also claimed Bismarck's implementation of a perpetual urban renewal plan violated the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the Act is constitutional, but the summary judgment record in this case did not establish whether Bismarck's renewal plan complied with the provisions of the Act.

Defendant Mitchell Holbach appealed a municipal court judgment that summarily dismissed his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the judgment was not appealable, but considered Defendant's appeal under its supervisory jurisdiction. Defendant was convicted for driving under suspension and driving without insurance. The arresting officer mistakenly believed Defendant's last name was "Knutson," and a check on "Mitchell Knutson" revealed a bench warrant was out for Knutson's arrest. The officer stopped Defendant on the mistaken identity, discovered his mistake, and learned of Defendant's suspension. Defendant admitted to the officer that he had no insurance. Defendant pled guilty to both offenses in municipal court, and signed and dated an acknowledgement indicating he had been informed of and understood his rights. Several years later, Defendant filed this appeal, alleging his conviction was based on evidence obtained from an unlawful arrest. The Supreme Court held that post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1 was not available in municipal courts in North Dakota. The Court concluded the judgment was void and directed the municipal court to dismiss Defendant's application.

Empower the Taxpayer, Charlene Nelson, and Robert Hale (collectively "Empower") appealed an order dismissing their request for injunctive relief against numerous state and local government officials and other entities. Empower supported North Dakota Initiated Constitutional Measure 2 to abolish property taxes which is on the June 2012 primary election ballot. In February 2012, Empower brought this action seeking injunctive relief against the defendants to prohibit them from, among other things, "advocating any position on Measure 2" and to declare them "no longer eligible to run for public office." Empower alleged the officials and entities had violated provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act by distributing false and misleading information about the effect of Measure 2. The district court dismissed the action, concluding "Empower lacks standing to bring this claim as the Corrupt Practices Act is a criminal law, the Defendants' actions did not violate Empower's legal rights, and the legislature did not imply a private right of action" for violation of the Act's provisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Empower failed to establish that there was a private right of action to enforce provisions of the North Dakota Corrupt Practices Act.

Dakota Resource Council ("the Council") appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Stark County Board of County Commissioners ("the Board") decision approving a zoning change for certain land from agricultural to industrial and authorized nine conditional uses for the property. The Board and Great Northern Project Development ("Great Northern") cross-appealed. Great Northern planned to construct and operate a coal gasification facility on a tract of land in Stark County. Great Northern's planned 8,100 acre complex would include a coal gasification plant, chemical fertilizer plant, electrical power plant, coal mine, solid waste landfill, and facilities for manufacture and storage of hazardous, explosive, and odorous products. Great Northern submitted an application to the Stark County Zoning Commission ("the Commission") to change the zoning of the land from agricultural to industrial and to allow nine conditional uses of the land. The Commission scheduled a hearing on the application and sent notice of the hearing by certified mail to all persons who owned land within 200 feet of the boundaries of the proposed rezoned tract. Following the hearing, the Commission voted to recommend that the Board approve the application, conditioned upon Great Northern obtaining all necessary local, state, and federal permits or approvals. The Board subsequently approved the application to rezone the property from agricultural to industrial and approved the requested conditional uses. The Council, Neighbors United, and several individuals who owned land near the rezoned tract appealed the Board's decision to the district court. The district court initially determined that the Council, Neighbors United, and the individual landowners had standing to challenge the Board's decision, but the district court affirmed on the merits the Board's decision to rezone the property and allow the conditional uses. In their cross-appeal, the Board and Great Northern contended the Council lacked standing to appeal the Board's decision to the district court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Council had standing to appeal the Board's decision and the Board did not misinterpret or misapply its zoning ordinance.

Respondents-Appellants Darlene Hankison, Michael Flick, Steven Flick, David Flick, landowners in Wells County, and Weckerly F.L.P., a landowner in Sheridan County, appealed a Wells County district court judgment and a Sheridan County district court order that denied their motions to dismiss and granted Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.'s petitions to enter their property to conduct testing and surveys. The Wells County district court held that for purposes of a petition to enter land for surveying and testing, Minnkota only needed to show it was in charge of a public use or it was in the category of persons entitled to seek eminent domain. The court determined Minnkota was in charge of a public use and also was entitled to seek eminent domain. The Sheridan County court held, under N.D.C.C. § 10-15-52, a foreign cooperative is entitled to all rights, exemptions, and privileges of a cooperative organized for the same purposes under the laws of this state when it is issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state. Minnkota was issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, and it is organized to provide power to its members. Because North Dakota electric cooperatives have authority to use eminent domain, the court determined Minnkota also has the power to use eminent domain. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district courts did not err in concluding that Minnkota was entitled to seek the power of eminent domain under North Dakota law.

Petitioner-Appellant Cecil H. Bell appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation decision to revoke his driving privileges for one year. Petitioner argued he was denied his statutory right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test. Finding no denial of rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Parizek appealed a district court order that affirmed an administrative enforcement action which placed a lien on his personal property held by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The State, through the High Intensity Enforcement Unit of Child Support Enforcement, placed a lien on any funds or accounts the Department was holding for Plaintiff to secure payment for his past due child support obligation. Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested judicial review of the lien, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and therefore the property did not qualify for an account lien. Plaintiff them moved to dismiss the lien with prejudice, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and an account lien could not be enforced against the accounts it managed, and his spending account did not qualify as personal property. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued the Department and the State violated state law by entering into an agreement or relationship under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, with the sole purpose of enforcement of an administrative action upon him. Furthermore, Plaintiff claimed the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the lien without allowing him a hearing as he requested. He maintained the court erred when it failed to allow him 14 days from the service of the "notice of proposed order" before denying his motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the order denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss was filed after the notice of appeal, and therefore it was not appealed and was not properly before the Court.