Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

D&P Terminal, Inc., and Potter Enterprises appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the decision of the Board of City Commissioners of Fargo in approving special assessments against their property. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Fargo Special Assessment Commission did not use an inappropriate method to calculate the benefits to property included in the improvement district.

Plaintiff-Appellant Dennis Meier appealed a judgment dismissing his appeal from an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision. The ALJ affirmed a decision by the Department of Human Services to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Plaintiff did not properly perfect his appeal because he failed to serve the notice of appeal and specifications of error on Human Resource Management Services.

In 2011, the City of Johnston charged Appellant Matthew Johnston with driving under the influence after police arrested him for driving his bicycle into a parked vehicle. Appellant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing a bicycle (moved under human power) is not a "vehicle" under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01. The district court denied Appellant's motion, and after a hearing to reconsider the motion, the court again denied it. Appellant conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving his right to have this Court review whether a bicycle is considered a "vehicle" for the purposes of driving under the influence. The City of Lincoln responded that the legislature intended a bicycle to be considered a "vehicle" under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 because N.D.C.C. 39-07-01 provides: "For the purposes of chapters 39-08 through 39-13, a bicycle or a ridden animal must be deemed a vehicle." The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert and Susan Hale appealed a district court summary judgment that dismissed their nuisance and governmental takings claims against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales own property on what is otherwise agricultural land approximately one mile southeast of a shooting range used for training Minot area local, state and federal law enforcement officers. Mr. Hale brought suit against Ward County and Minot alleging the law enforcement shooting range was a private and public nuisance and the shooting range devalued his property, resulting in a governmental taking. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. "When viewed in the light most favorable to the Hales, the maps, photographs and additional evidence raise[d] a genuine issue whether the terrain surrounding the shooting range prevents bullets from exiting the shooting range." The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the Hales' public nuisance claim, but affirmed in all other respects.

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Hale appealed a district court order dismissing his action against the State of North Dakota, the Governor of North Dakota in his official capacity, the Director of the Department of Commerce in his official capacity and the Department of Commerce; the Minot City Council members in their official capacities and the City of Minot; and the Minot Area Development Corporation (MADC) for a declaration that the state and the federal constitutions prohibit the disbursement of public funds to private persons, associations, or corporations for economic development. Plaintiff primarily argued the "gift clause" provisions of N.D. Const. art. X, section 18 prohibit the State entities and the Minot defendants from using public funds to loan, give credit or make donations to individuals, associations, or corporations for economic development. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded statutes authorizing the State entities and the Minot defendants to implement economic development programs constitute an enterprise for a public purpose under N.D. Const. art. X, section 18 and are not unconstitutional.

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court's judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend Petitioner's driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. "A reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded that the hearing officer's finding that [Petitioner] did not have anything to eat, drink, or smoke during the twenty minutes before the Intoxilyzer test" was supported by the weight of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the administrative suspension of Petitioner's driving privileges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Erling "Curly" Haugland appealed and Defendant-Appellee City of Bismarck cross-appealed a grant of summary judgment that declared North Dakota's Urban Renewal Law constitutional, and Bismarck's implementation of an urban renewal plan and use of tax increment financing to fund urban renewal projects in its urban renewal area compliant with the Act. Plaintiff claimed the Act violates the gift clause provisions of N.D. Const. art. X, section 18, the requirements for imposing taxes in N.D. Const. art. X, sections 3 and 5, and the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. He also claimed Bismarck's implementation of a perpetual urban renewal plan violated the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the Act is constitutional, but the summary judgment record in this case did not establish whether Bismarck's renewal plan complied with the provisions of the Act.

Defendant Mitchell Holbach appealed a municipal court judgment that summarily dismissed his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the judgment was not appealable, but considered Defendant's appeal under its supervisory jurisdiction. Defendant was convicted for driving under suspension and driving without insurance. The arresting officer mistakenly believed Defendant's last name was "Knutson," and a check on "Mitchell Knutson" revealed a bench warrant was out for Knutson's arrest. The officer stopped Defendant on the mistaken identity, discovered his mistake, and learned of Defendant's suspension. Defendant admitted to the officer that he had no insurance. Defendant pled guilty to both offenses in municipal court, and signed and dated an acknowledgement indicating he had been informed of and understood his rights. Several years later, Defendant filed this appeal, alleging his conviction was based on evidence obtained from an unlawful arrest. The Supreme Court held that post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1 was not available in municipal courts in North Dakota. The Court concluded the judgment was void and directed the municipal court to dismiss Defendant's application.

Empower the Taxpayer, Charlene Nelson, and Robert Hale (collectively "Empower") appealed an order dismissing their request for injunctive relief against numerous state and local government officials and other entities. Empower supported North Dakota Initiated Constitutional Measure 2 to abolish property taxes which is on the June 2012 primary election ballot. In February 2012, Empower brought this action seeking injunctive relief against the defendants to prohibit them from, among other things, "advocating any position on Measure 2" and to declare them "no longer eligible to run for public office." Empower alleged the officials and entities had violated provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act by distributing false and misleading information about the effect of Measure 2. The district court dismissed the action, concluding "Empower lacks standing to bring this claim as the Corrupt Practices Act is a criminal law, the Defendants' actions did not violate Empower's legal rights, and the legislature did not imply a private right of action" for violation of the Act's provisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Empower failed to establish that there was a private right of action to enforce provisions of the North Dakota Corrupt Practices Act.

Dakota Resource Council ("the Council") appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Stark County Board of County Commissioners ("the Board") decision approving a zoning change for certain land from agricultural to industrial and authorized nine conditional uses for the property. The Board and Great Northern Project Development ("Great Northern") cross-appealed. Great Northern planned to construct and operate a coal gasification facility on a tract of land in Stark County. Great Northern's planned 8,100 acre complex would include a coal gasification plant, chemical fertilizer plant, electrical power plant, coal mine, solid waste landfill, and facilities for manufacture and storage of hazardous, explosive, and odorous products. Great Northern submitted an application to the Stark County Zoning Commission ("the Commission") to change the zoning of the land from agricultural to industrial and to allow nine conditional uses of the land. The Commission scheduled a hearing on the application and sent notice of the hearing by certified mail to all persons who owned land within 200 feet of the boundaries of the proposed rezoned tract. Following the hearing, the Commission voted to recommend that the Board approve the application, conditioned upon Great Northern obtaining all necessary local, state, and federal permits or approvals. The Board subsequently approved the application to rezone the property from agricultural to industrial and approved the requested conditional uses. The Council, Neighbors United, and several individuals who owned land near the rezoned tract appealed the Board's decision to the district court. The district court initially determined that the Council, Neighbors United, and the individual landowners had standing to challenge the Board's decision, but the district court affirmed on the merits the Board's decision to rezone the property and allow the conditional uses. In their cross-appeal, the Board and Great Northern contended the Council lacked standing to appeal the Board's decision to the district court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Council had standing to appeal the Board's decision and the Board did not misinterpret or misapply its zoning ordinance.