Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Danni Lynch appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her action against The New Public School District No. 8 for breach of contract, damage to professional reputation, intentional infliction of emotional harm and negligent infliction of emotional harm. Appellant had taught fifth grade classes at Stony Creek school for eighteen years. In 2008, she was informed she would be transferred to Round Prairie school to teach second grade. She sent a letter to the District's superintendent asking why she was being transferred. The District responded that the decision to transfer her was made "to promote the best interests of the students" and that the decision would not be changed. Appellant did not show on the first day she was to teach second grade; the District construed Appellant's letter explaining why she was a no-show as a resignation. Appellant then filed suit against the District. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Appellant was not entitled to a notice of nonrenewal; (2) the District did not violate its grievance procedures; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to compel discovery. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Appellant Robert Johnson appealed a district court's judgment affirming an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision that North Dakota Workforce Safety Insurance (WSI) was not liable for his right shoulder condition, and that he had a retained earnings capacity of $290.00 per week. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "a reasoning mind" reasonably could have found Appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his right shoulder pain was substantially accelerated or substantially worsened by his work injury and vocational training, and that WSI proved Appellant had a retained earnings capacity of $290.00 per week. Accordingly, the Court affirmed WSI's judgment.

The Dakota Resource Council (DRC) appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) order. DRC argued: (1) the PSC's decision was not in accordance with the law; and, (2) the PSC's conclusions of law and order were not supported by its findings of fact. In 2008, Falkirk Mining Company filed an application with the PSC requesting revision of a surface mining permit. Falkirk proposed changing the postmining use of 428 acres of land from agricultural and industrial use to recreational use. The purpose of the revision was to facilitate the transfer of approximately 730 acres of land from Falkirk to the North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT). NDDOT planned to use the land as mitigation acres to eliminate "no mow" areas within the rights-of-way of the state highway system in McLean County. PSC granted the revision subject to the right of adversely affected parties to request a formal hearing. DRC asserted 86 acres located in noncontiguous parcels throughout the proposed wildlife management area should remain designated for agricultural use. Game and Fish planned to allow local farmers to grow crops on the 86 acres, harvesting 70 percent and leaving the remaining 30 percent standing as food for wildlife. McLean County, NDDOT and Game and Fish petitioned to intervene. The PSC then held a public hearing. The PSC affirmed its conditional approval of the revision to Falkirk's permit. DRC appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the PSC's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “[w]hen considered together, the PSC's findings of fact do not indicate its decision to grant the revision was based on the desire to facilitate the land transfer agreement rather than on consideration of the higher and better use of the land. ... The PSC's conclusions and order affirming its decision granting the revision to recreational use were supported by its findings of fact.”

Appellant Beverly Fetzer appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) order denying her request for benefits. While walking down a hallway on her employer's premises and during work hours, Appellant thought she heard someone call her name. Turning in response, she caught her foot and fell, fracturing her left hip and wrist. No cause of the fall was apparent. Appellant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with WSI, and WSI denied her claim. Appellant submitted a request for reconsideration; WSI issued an order consistent with its prior decision, determining Appellant’s injury "occurred in the course of, but did not arise out of" her employment. WSI added, "Mere walking, without more, is not an activity that is sufficiently linked to Claimant's employment so that the injury can be deemed to have arisen from employment." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “If merely being at work was sufficient to show causation, the legislature need not have required the 'arising out of' test." Appellant was unable to prove a causal connection between her employment and injury.

Petitioner Fred M. Hector, Jr. appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the Fargo Board of City Commissioners' decision to approve special assessments against his property. In his appeal to the district court, Petitioner alleged at least 34 errors existed in the proceedings for the special assessments. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued the total amount assessed for an improvement project was improperly calculated and should have been based on the City's true costs for the project, the method used to determine the amount assessed against his property was improper, the Assessment Commission failed to comply with certain statutory requirements and the City Commission failed to properly review the Assessment Commission's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner was given an opportunity to appear and speak at an October, 2009 City Commission hearing. He also submitted written objections to the City Commission. The City Commission heard Petitioner’s objections and they questioned the City's attorney, the Special Assessment Coordinator, and the City Auditor. The Court concluded the City Commission complied with the statutory requirements for review of the assessments by the Special Assessment Commission. Furthermore, the Court considered all the other arguments Petitioner raised, and concluded they were without merit.

Petitioner Thomas Moore appealed a judgment that dismissed his claim for medical expenses incurred by his son, M.M., in their personal injury action against Fargo Public School District No. 1 and Eugenia Hart. In May 2004, M.M., a 15-year-old student at Discovery Middle School in Fargo, was seriously injured while practicing a bike stunt in the school auditorium in preparation for '60s Day, part of the curriculum for Hart's history class. Moore and M.M. brought a personal injury action against the District and Hart. The district court dismissed the action against the District as a matter of law, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred in ruling the recreational use immunity statutes barred the action against the District and erred in excluding certain evidence from the jury in the action against Hart, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. On remand, Hart settled, and the case was tried to the jury only against the District. At the close of the evidence, the district court rejected the District's request to include a line on the special verdict form for apportioning fault to Petitioner, concluding there was no evidence from which a jury could find him was at fault. The jury returned a verdict allocating 30 percent fault to "Eugenia Hart and any other employee of the Fargo Public School District" and 70 percent fault to M.M. The jury awarded Petitioner $285,000 for past economic damages based on M.M.'s medical expenses incurred while he was a minor. Because M.M.'s fault was greater than the fault of the District, the court entered judgment dismissing the action and awarding costs in favor of the District. The court also denied Moore's request to have judgment entered in his favor for $85,500, representing 30 percent of the $285,000 awarded by the jury for M.M.'s past medical expenses. Following the majority rule, the court concluded "a child's negligence should be considered in determining the extent of a parent's recovery against a third party for medical expenses paid." Because Petitioner's claim for past economic damages derived from M.M.'s injuries, and M.M. was denied recovery under North Dakota's modified comparative fault laws, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly dismissed Petitioner's claim for medical expenses.

The North Dakota Attorney General, representing the State Board of Higher Education, petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and enjoin Secretary of State from placing a referendum measure on the June 2012 primary election ballot regarding 2011 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 580 ("Senate Bill 2370"). The submission of the referendum measure to the Secretary of State reinstated N.D.C.C. 15-10-46, which requires the University of North Dakota (UND) to use the "Fighting Sioux" nickname and logo for its intercollegiate athletic teams. A majority of the Court would have exercised its discretionary original jurisdiction and consider the underlying constitutional issue about the Board's authority over UND; two members of the Court concluded this was not an appropriate case in which to exercise its discretionary original jurisdiction. As a result, there were not enough members willing to decide the constitutional issue. The Court therefore did not address the constitutional issue presented, and declined to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum measure on the ballot.

The City of Bismarck appealed from a district court order granting Defendant Daniel J. McCormick's post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal. In 2010, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence in violation of a Bismarck city ordinance. Defendant pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict. In 2011, Defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal because the City did not introduce the driving-under-the-influence ordinance into evidence. The City resisted, asserting Defendant was not surprised by the ordinance because the ordinance is almost identical to the statute prohibiting driving under the influence in the North Dakota Century Code. The City further asserted Defendant's post-trial motion was untimely because it was a motion that should have been made before trial. The district court granted Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court held that without a statutory requirement it was not permitted to take judicial notice of a city ordinance unless a copy of the ordinance was received into evidence or the parties stipulated to its admission into evidence. The court also determined McCormick's motion was timely because he argued the city failed on its burden of proof at trial, which was a motion he could not have argued before trial. Concluding that the district court erred in granting Defendant's judgment of acquittal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Bruce Roger Mills, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, appealed a judgment that dismissed his claims against the City of Grand Forks to recover the amount of fines and fees collected in the past for noncriminal traffic violations by the City exceeding the amount the City could legally impose under state law. The City cross-appealed that judgment. In 2004, a Grand Forks police officer cited Plaintiff with careless driving. Under Grand Forks City Code, the maximum fine for violation of a noncriminal offense was $1,000 "in the discretion of the court." Plaintiff pled not guilty and proceeded to trial in municipal court. Plaintiff was found guilty. The municipal court imposed against Plaintiff "a fine in the amount of $151 with $0 suspended" and a hearing fee of $15. Plaintiff appealed to district court for a new trial; the court affirmed the conviction and the fine and fees totaling $166. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, but on December 1, 2004, the Court dismissed the appeal because the district court judgment was "not appealable under N.D.C.C. 39-06.1-03(5)." On August 16, 2010, Plaintiff brought a "Class Action Complaint for Restitution" in state district court seeking the amount of monies paid to Grand Forks exceeding the state law limits for fines for similar state offenses. Plaintiff asserted the excess fines, fees and charges were "involuntary and void." The City argued Plaintiff's claims were precluded by both res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the prior federal court action, and by res judicata because Mills failed to challenge the City's fine scheme in the 2004 state court proceedings. Because the district court correctly ruled Plaintiff's claims were thus barred by res judicata, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Perius appealed a district court judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Appellee Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. In 2004, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver, Jacob Kessler. Plaintiff insured his vehicle with Nodak for basic no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist benefits. Nodak paid Plaintiff no-fault benefits as a result of the accident. Plaintiff did not seek further medical treatment until March 2005, when he saw a chiropractor. Plaintiff submitted the bills to Nodak for payment as no-fault benefits. After Plaintiff submitted to an independent medical examination, Nodak denied him payment for any medical treatment after December 31, 2004, concluding such treatment was unrelated to the accident. In 2007, Plaintiff brought suit against Kessler, alleging he negligently operated his motor vehicle and caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff also sued Nodak, alleging the company breached its insurance contract with him. Nodak denied liability, and asserted a cross-claim against Kessler regarding Plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim. Kessler did not answer the claims against him. In 2009, Nodak moved for summary judgment, arguing no competent, admissible evidence established his claimed injuries were caused by the accident. Plaintiff resisted the motion, and submitted the affidavits of two of his treatment providers who stated their belief that Plaintiff's injuries and treatment were due to the accident. The district court granted Nodak's motion for summary judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded, finding disputed issues of material fact existed. A trial was set on remand. Shortly after, Plaintiff sent Nodak amended responses to Nodak's interrogatories. Prior to trial, Nodak was informed of Plaintiff's intent to call a chiropractor, as an expert witness. Nodak filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the expert witness, alleging the expert was not properly disclosed.The district court granted Nodak's motion, but ordered the doctor would still be allowed to testify as a fact witness. The jury returned a verdict in Nodak's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff did not properly disclose his witness and that the district court did not abuse its discretion excluding the expert's testimony as a discovery sanction.