Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Bismarck appealed from a district court order granting Defendant Daniel J. McCormick's post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal. In 2010, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence in violation of a Bismarck city ordinance. Defendant pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict. In 2011, Defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal because the City did not introduce the driving-under-the-influence ordinance into evidence. The City resisted, asserting Defendant was not surprised by the ordinance because the ordinance is almost identical to the statute prohibiting driving under the influence in the North Dakota Century Code. The City further asserted Defendant's post-trial motion was untimely because it was a motion that should have been made before trial. The district court granted Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court held that without a statutory requirement it was not permitted to take judicial notice of a city ordinance unless a copy of the ordinance was received into evidence or the parties stipulated to its admission into evidence. The court also determined McCormick's motion was timely because he argued the city failed on its burden of proof at trial, which was a motion he could not have argued before trial. Concluding that the district court erred in granting Defendant's judgment of acquittal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Bruce Roger Mills, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, appealed a judgment that dismissed his claims against the City of Grand Forks to recover the amount of fines and fees collected in the past for noncriminal traffic violations by the City exceeding the amount the City could legally impose under state law. The City cross-appealed that judgment. In 2004, a Grand Forks police officer cited Plaintiff with careless driving. Under Grand Forks City Code, the maximum fine for violation of a noncriminal offense was $1,000 "in the discretion of the court." Plaintiff pled not guilty and proceeded to trial in municipal court. Plaintiff was found guilty. The municipal court imposed against Plaintiff "a fine in the amount of $151 with $0 suspended" and a hearing fee of $15. Plaintiff appealed to district court for a new trial; the court affirmed the conviction and the fine and fees totaling $166. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, but on December 1, 2004, the Court dismissed the appeal because the district court judgment was "not appealable under N.D.C.C. 39-06.1-03(5)." On August 16, 2010, Plaintiff brought a "Class Action Complaint for Restitution" in state district court seeking the amount of monies paid to Grand Forks exceeding the state law limits for fines for similar state offenses. Plaintiff asserted the excess fines, fees and charges were "involuntary and void." The City argued Plaintiff's claims were precluded by both res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the prior federal court action, and by res judicata because Mills failed to challenge the City's fine scheme in the 2004 state court proceedings. Because the district court correctly ruled Plaintiff's claims were thus barred by res judicata, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Perius appealed a district court judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Appellee Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. In 2004, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver, Jacob Kessler. Plaintiff insured his vehicle with Nodak for basic no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist benefits. Nodak paid Plaintiff no-fault benefits as a result of the accident. Plaintiff did not seek further medical treatment until March 2005, when he saw a chiropractor. Plaintiff submitted the bills to Nodak for payment as no-fault benefits. After Plaintiff submitted to an independent medical examination, Nodak denied him payment for any medical treatment after December 31, 2004, concluding such treatment was unrelated to the accident. In 2007, Plaintiff brought suit against Kessler, alleging he negligently operated his motor vehicle and caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff also sued Nodak, alleging the company breached its insurance contract with him. Nodak denied liability, and asserted a cross-claim against Kessler regarding Plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim. Kessler did not answer the claims against him. In 2009, Nodak moved for summary judgment, arguing no competent, admissible evidence established his claimed injuries were caused by the accident. Plaintiff resisted the motion, and submitted the affidavits of two of his treatment providers who stated their belief that Plaintiff's injuries and treatment were due to the accident. The district court granted Nodak's motion for summary judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded, finding disputed issues of material fact existed. A trial was set on remand. Shortly after, Plaintiff sent Nodak amended responses to Nodak's interrogatories. Prior to trial, Nodak was informed of Plaintiff's intent to call a chiropractor, as an expert witness. Nodak filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the expert witness, alleging the expert was not properly disclosed.The district court granted Nodak's motion, but ordered the doctor would still be allowed to testify as a fact witness. The jury returned a verdict in Nodak's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff did not properly disclose his witness and that the district court did not abuse its discretion excluding the expert's testimony as a discovery sanction.

Appellant Valerie Joy Tronnes appealed a judgment that affirmed the Job Service of North Dakota's decision to deny her claim for unemployment benefits. In 2002, Appellant began working part-time at the Wal-Mart Vision Center. In 2010, Appellant received her paycheck (via a debit-card style card), and purchased a few items at Wal-Mart's customer service center. The amount of the purchase was mistakenly credited to Appellant's account by a different employee rather than deducted, which resulted in a substantial benefit to Appellant. Appellant met with the vision center manager about the extra money on her card, but later testified she believed the amount to be correct. The store gave Appellant the option of resigning as a result of her spending the extra money, but believed the paid time off she was given ( a "D-day"-- so named to give Appellant a day to decide whether to remain employed at Wal-Mart) meant she would be fired soon. Store management negotiated a payment plan for Appellant to repay the amount she was credited and allowed her to return to work. Ultimately the "repayment plan" took the form of the store withholding Appellant's subsequent paychecks to cover the indebtedness. Appellant did not report to work after that payday, and subsequently filed for unemployment benefits. The Job Service determined Appellant was ineligible for benefits because she voluntarily quit her job. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence in the record supported the Job Service's denial of benefits to Appellant.

The Industrial Commission and Slawson Exploration Company appealed a district court judgment that reversed the Commission's assessment of a risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC. The issue in this case arose from a challenge to the validity of an invitation to participate in the cost of drilling a well which resulted in the Commission's assessment of a 200 percent risk penalty. Because the Supreme Court was unable to discern the basis for the Commission's decision, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the Commission for the preparation of findings that explain the reasons for its decision.

K.H. appealed juvenile court order that extended the placement of his daughter T.H. in the custody and control of Barnes County Social Services and an order that denied his motion to dismiss. On appeal, K.H. argued the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction, applied the wrong standard of proof in finding the child was deprived in 2008, erred in allowing his plea to the allegations of deprivation, the duration of the deprivation proceedings was excessive, and in finding the child continues to be deprived. Finding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiff-Appellant Bethany Johnson appealed an amended judgment that modified a California divorce judgment regarding custody of three children and awarded Defendant-Appellee Keith Johnson primary residential responsibility of the parties' seven children. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, holding that she forfeited and abandoned her appeal by disregarding the district court's order and judgment.

Appellant Edith Johnson appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dismissing her claim for benefits from Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI). On appeal, Appellant argued the ALJ improperly set aside the parties' stipulated specification of issues and abused its discretion by dismissing her claim for benefits as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: the ALJ dismissed the action as a sanction after Appellant refused to comply with WSI's discovery request and the ALJ's decision granting WSI's motion to compel discovery. In deciding to dismiss Appellant's claim, the ALJ noted Appellant did not offer a defense for failing to comply with discovery and made it clear that she would rather have the matter dismissed than comply with discovery. The ALJ found Appellant almost invited dismissal by failing to respond to WSI's motion for sanctions, moving to reconsider the order granting WSI's motion to compel, and submitting two proposed orders with one granting the motion to reconsider and the other granting WSI's motion to dismiss. "While the ALJ should not be guided solely by the parties' requests and must exercise its own judgment in determining an appropriate sanction, under the facts of this case [the Court] conclude[d] the ALJ did not abuse its discretion in dismissing [Appellant's] claim."

Plaintiff-Appellant Kara Lynn Langowski appeals from a summary judgment dismissing with prejudice her negligence action against Defendant-Appellee Charlene Altendorf. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendant struck her with a vehicle while she attempted to cross a street in Minto, North Dakota in 2004, causing her bodily injury. In 2010, Plaintiff sent the summons and complaint to "Roughrider Legal Support Services," a private process server, instructing it to serve both documents upon Defendant on or before August 21, 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, concluding Plaintiff did not begin her negligence action against Defendant within the six-year statute of limitations by delivering the summons and complaint to Defendant within that time.

Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher Osaba appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the administrative revocation of his driving privileges for one year following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded testimony was properly admitted to establish probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest, and affirmed the district court's decision.