Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Deborah Reichman appealed a judgment that granted Plaintiff-Appellee McKenzie County a prescriptive easement for a road that crosses her land in McKenzie County and dismissed her counterclaim for inverse condemnation. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting a prescriptive easement for the road because the court failed to correctly calculate the 20-year period for a prescriptive easement backward from when McKenzie County began the lawsuit in 2006. She argued the County did not clearly and convincingly establish adverse use during that period because the adjacent landowners, including her predecessors in interest, blocked the road for their ranching operations and any public use of the road was not continuous and uninterrupted. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err and affirmed its decisions on the issues Defendant raised on appeal.

Petitioner-Appellant Spence Koenig appealed a district court's judgment that affirmed the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend his driving privileges for ninety-one days. Petitioner was pulled over by a state trooper for speeding and for expired tabs. Petitioner agreed to perform a field sobriety test and failed it. The trooper told Petitioner's girlfriend that Petitioner would be released when someone over eighteen years old came to pick Petitioner up. Petitioner argued he was denied an opportunity to obtain an independent sobriety test after he made sufficient arrangements for one because he was held in custody for over three hours with no attempt or offer to transport him to the hospital for the additional test. Petitioner asserted that "the responsibility of securing [his] right to an independent blood test became that of law enforcement holding him in custody[,]" when it became apparent his ride was not coming. Finding that the officers did not have a duty to transport Petitioner to the hospital to obtain the independent test, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department's decision.

"G.K.S." appealed a district court order finding G.K.S. chemically dependent and a person requiring treatment and that ordered him to undergo treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital for up to 90 days. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed G.K.S.'s appeal as moot because the court's involuntary commitment order was vacated.

"W.J.C.A." appealed district court orders for involuntary mental health treatment and medication. The orders committed W.J.C.A. to the North Dakota State Hospital for up to ninety days and allowed the State Hospital to treat him with medication during that time. In her petition, the probation officer stated W.J.C.A. was "making suicidal threats to his sisters along with leaving bizarre and rambling messages that threaten peopl[e]'s lives and appear out of touch with reality." The probation officer added W.J.C.A. had left such messages to "various [l]aw enforcement agencies" and "various people in the community[,]" asserting W.J.C.A. was "a danger to himself and others[.]" Upon review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence to support its orders.

Plaintiffs Lee Brandvold, Steve Bigelow, Dwight Johnson, Nikki Johansen, and Bruce Peterson (collectively "Brandvold") appealed a district court judgment dismissing their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. In 2009, the school board of the District voted to close the elementary school located in Ryder as part of an overarching reorganization plan. In February 2010, Brandvold filed a petition in district court alleging that the reorganization process had been tainted by fraud because the Berthold Public School District had not disclosed during its reorganization process information about certain outstanding debts it owed on lease-purchase transactions. Brandvold sought a declaration that the reorganization was invalid and that the District be dissolved and the former districts be reinstated. Brandvold also sought an injunction prohibiting the District from closing any school within the District. The District moved for judgment on the pleadings for Brandvold's failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. On appeal, Brandvold challenged only the dismissal of the request for declaratory relief, not the dismissal of the request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the alleged irregularities in the reorganization process were rendered moot by the completion of a District-wide election: "[c]onstruing the petition in the light most favorable to Brandvold and accepting the allegations in the petition as true, we conclude no justiciable controversy was presented and the district court did not err in dismissing the petition ."

R.G., father of A.L., appealed a juvenile court order confirming a judicial referee's decision to terminate his parental rights to four minor children. In 2003, R.G. was placed on criminal probation, and in March 2009, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year prison term. In September 2009, R.G.'s four children involved in this action were all less than four years old and were residing with their mother when the children were taken into protective custody by Benson County Social Services and placed in foster care after the mother left the children with relatives and did not return. In May 2010, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of R.G. and the mother. In August 2010, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights and also found the children were deprived as to R.G., but the evidence was not sufficient to terminate his parental rights. The juvenile court stated R.G. was anticipating being paroled in January 2011 with release to a halfway house for three to four months. The court also stated R.G.'s early release was contingent upon his completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program. After a hearing, a judicial referee terminated R.G.'s parental rights to the four children, finding R.G. was not granted his early parole as anticipated because he had not yet completed his drug and alcohol treatment program due to his conduct in the prison facility. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in finding the children were deprived, and did not abuse its discretion in terminating R.G.'s parental rights.

Defendant Ben Simons appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order of the Department of Human Services which found that he had abused his two-year-old child and that services were required. Defendant and his wife Traci required their children to always respond to a parent in a respectful manner and to use the phrases "yes, sir" or "yes, ma'am." In 2009, while the Simons family was attending church, their two-year-old child refused to use the phrases "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am" when responding to his parents. Defendant took the child outside and swatted him twice on his bottom. When they went back inside, Traci Simons was able to get the child to say "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am." Later that evening, after returning home, the child again refused to respond to Defendant with "yes, sir." Defendant took the child to an upstairs bedroom and explained to him that he would be spanked if he did not say "yes, sir." When the child continued his refusal, Defendant placed him over his knee and struck him on his buttocks three times with a wooden backscratcher. The child was wearing pants and a diaper. Defendant then hugged and consoled the child for approximately fifteen minutes, explained the consequences if he refused to say "yes, sir," and emphasized to the child that he needed to show respect to his parents. He then gave the child the opportunity to say "yes, sir," and the child again refused. Defendant repeated the three swats with the wooden backscratcher, and again consoled and spoke with the child for approximately fifteen minutes. Two days later, Stark County Social Services received a report of suspected child abuse regarding the child. A social worker investigated the report and observed the bruises on the child's buttocks. Upon completion of the investigation, Stark County Social Services found the child was an abused child and issued a "services required" finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department's findings that Defendant had inflicted bodily injury upon the child and used unreasonable force were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions governing child abuse were not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.

Petitioner Toni Weeks appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a decision by Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) that reduced her disability benefits. Petitioner was injured at work after being exposed to anhydrous ammonia while employed by Dakota Gasification Company, in Beulah, North Dakota. In 2009, WSI received confirmation that on November 1, 2009, Weeks' social security disability benefits would convert to social security retirement benefits. WSI issued a notice of intention to discontinue or reduce benefits, in which Petitioner was informed that her permanent total disability benefits would end on October 31, 2009, and she would receive an "additional benefit payable" beginning November 1, 2009. Petitioner requested reconsideration. In November 2009, WSI issued an order denying Petitioner further disability benefits after October 31, 2009. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because Petitioner failed to adequately brief her argument that WSI's reduction of her wage loss benefits violated equal protection under the federal and state constitutions, the Supreme Court declined to address her argument and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Respondent-Appellant Larry Rubey appealed a district court order committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. After a March 2010 preliminary hearing, the court found probable cause that Respondent was a sexually dangerous individual and transferred him to the North Dakota State Hospital for an evaluation. The court also appointed an independent expert after Respondent's request for an independent evaluation. The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was a sexually dangerous individual and committed him to the care, custody, and control of the executive director of the Department of Human Services. Respondent raised multiple issues on appeal, the sum of which was that the court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence, and that and the court did not address whether he had difficulty in controlling his behavior. On the basis of the Supreme Court's review of the record, the Court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the district court's decision that Respondent was a sexually dangerous individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct who has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.

In 1996 the State sued Defendant Troy Wolff, seeking to establish his paternity and obtain a child support order after the mother and child began receiving public assistance. The court also established a child support obligation for Defendant. The mother was given custody of the child. In 1999 Defendant and the mother stipulated to a reduction of Defendant's child support obligation, and an amended judgment was entered incorporating the stipulation. The State was a party to the action and signed the 1999 stipulation. In January 2009, Defendant and the mother entered into another stipulation pertaining to custody and visitation, and they agreed to modify the child support obligation. The parties agreed that Defendant would no longer have a support obligation to the mother, and that Defendant would not seek support from the mother. The court entered a second amended judgment incorporating the new stipulation. In October 2009, the State moved to vacate the second amended judgment, arguing that it was a party to the action and did not agree to the new stipulation. Defendant argued on appeal that the judicial referee did not have jurisdiction to issue the order to vacate the second amended judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State was a real party in interest and had standing, the second amended judgment contains unenforceable provisions, and the court did not err in vacating the second amended judgment.