Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Melvin Mertz appealed a district court order affirming the decision by the City of Elgin ("Elgin") that denied his application for a permit to build a fence on the edge of his property. Plaintiff argued Elgin's interpretation of its ordinances was arbitrary and unreasonable. Elgin's city attorney opined the fence violated city ordinances that prohibited a structure from being built within seven feet of the lot line along a side yard. Elgin's city council denied Plaintiff's application based upon the city attorney's opinion. The district court affirmed the denial by Elgin's city council, stating the interpretation and application of the ordinances was reasonable. Upon review, Supreme Court found that Elgin's interpretation of the ordinances was reasonable, and the city council's denial of Plaintiff's permit application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court order that affirmed the decision by the Elgin city council.

Defendant Charles Blunt appealed a district court order that denied his motion for a new trial. He argued the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the State violated procedural discovery rules. Defendant was the Executive Director of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") from 2004 to 2007. The State Auditor's Office conducted a performance review of WSI in 2006, and the Auditor's report questioned the use of public funds at WSI. As a result of the Auditor's report, Defendant was charged with two counts of misapplication of entrusted property in violation of state law. State rules of procedure hold that if the State fails to disclose certain discoverable information to a criminal defendant, the trial court has discretion in applying a remedy when a violation of the rule has been shown. Without a showing of an abuse of the court's discretion, the issue is not appealable. Although the Supreme Court concluded the State likely violated the discovery rules, a careful review of the entire record reflected that the information contained in the undisclosed documents was contained in other documents provided to Defendant. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Defendant did not establish he was prejudiced by the violations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial.

The Department of Human Services appealed a judgment reversing the Department's calculations of Appellees David and Sarah Kaspari's monthly recipient liabilities for their nursing home costs. In 1996, the Kasparis conveyed approximately 561 acres of farmland to their son and daughter-in-law. The Kasparis retained a life estate in the farmland and leased their interest in the land to a third-party tenant. The Kasparis exercised their water rights and constructed irrigation equipment on the land, which was paid for with a series of loans secured by mortgages on the land. The new loans were combined with an existing mortgage on the land. After the irrigation equipment was placed on the land, the Kasparis received increased rental payments for the irrigated land. In April 2009, the Kasparis entered a nursing home and thereafter applied to Social Services for Medicaid for their nursing home care. After an initial determination by Social Services and a subsequent administrative hearing, the Department decided the Kasparis were eligible for benefits and calculated their respective recipient liabilities without allowing deductions for their payments for interest on the mortgage. The district court reversed and remanded the case for recalculation of the Kasparis' respective monthly recipient liabilities, concluding deductions for their payments of mortgage interest and real estate taxes should be considered. The Department argued to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in construing Medicaid regulations to allow the Kasparis to reduce their monthly recipient liabilities for nursing home care by their payments for mortgage interest and for real estate taxes relating to their life estate interest in the farmland. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in construing the Medicaid regulations. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to reinstate the Department's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathleen Godon appealed the district court's judgment dismissing her complaint for breach of contract against the Defendant-Appellee Kindred Public School District. Plaintiff entered into a teaching contract with the School District for the 2008-2009 school year. In addition to the teaching contract, Plaintiffâs employment was subject to a professional negotiation agreement between the Kindred School Board and the Kindred Education Association. This more extensive agreement provides other terms of employment, including the base salary for a teacher in the District and the types and amounts of leave a teacher receives. The agreement did not provide for unpaid leave, but before the start of the school year, Plaintiff asked the District administration to allow her to take a week off work for travel. The District approved her request but required that she take unpaid leave for the days she could not apply personal leave. Plaintiff agreed to these terms. When school was not scheduled to be in session because of spring break, the District held school to make up for a storm day cancellation. Plaintiff did not work that day. While Plaintiff was away, the District cancelled school to allow employees and students to respond to imminent flooding in the Red River and Sheyenne River valleys. The District paid all teachers who did not request leave for this period as if school had been in session. Of four teachers who had previously requested and were granted leave during the flood cancellation period, only Plaintiff challenged the District's decision and filed a grievance. She claimed she should have been paid like all other teachers in the District who did not teach during the flood period. The District denied her grievance. Plaintiff brought suit in district court, alleging the District breached her teaching contract and violated her equal protection rights under the North Dakota Constitution. The district court ruled in favor of the District, finding that Plaintiffâs teaching contract was amended when the District granted her request for leave to travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held Plaintiff's arguments as without merit. The Court affirmed the District and the district court's decisions.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lesa Kensmoe appealed a district court order granting F/S Manufacturing a renewal by affidavit of its 1998 judgment against her. In 1998, F/S Manufacturing obtained a default judgment in the amount of $450,894.78 against Appellant. In 2008, F/S Manufacturing's judgment against Plaintiff was cancelled of record. On March 8, 2010, almost two years after the 1998 judgment was cancelled, F/S Manufacturing filed an affidavit attempting to renew the judgment. After being informed the judgment could not be renewed because it had expired, F/S Manufacturing filed a motion requesting that the district court order the clerk of court to renew the judgment by affidavit. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order, finding that North Dakota law did not permit a cancelled judgment's renewal after the prescribed statute of limitations.

Appellant Richard Landrum appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of Appellee Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) which denied him benefits. Appellant received pain management care sporadically for a series of work related injuries stemming from 1990 until 2001. In 2001, Appellant began to see Dr. John Daugherty for pain from headaches, low back and leg problems and vision problems. In 2002, Dr. Daugherty prescribed Viagra to treat Defendant's sexual dysfunction. WSI questioned the Viagra prescription's connection to the 1990 work injury, and Dr. Daugherty sent WSI a letter indicating a causal connection between the work injury and Appellant's sexual dysfunction. WSI denied payment for the Viagra, ultimately issuing an order denying benefits for the Viagra. Appellant sought reconsideration of the order and requested a formal hearing, after which an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined WSI was not liable for the Viagra because another Workers' Compensation Commission already awarded benefits for the Viagra. In April of 2009, WSI determined Appellant's vision problems were not causally connected to the 1990 work injury. Accordingly, WSI refused to pay for treatment regarding Appellant's vision problems. Appellant asked WSI to reconsider this denial of benefits. In the meantime, after a review of Landrum's medical records by WSI's independent medical consultant, WSI also denied benefits concerning Landrum's headaches. An ALJ held a formal hearing where Dr. Peterson testified why Landrum's 1990 work injury was not the cause of his headaches and vision problems. Ultimately, the ALJ upheld WSI's decision denying payment for Appellant's treatment for his headaches and vision problems. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the ALJ's order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued WSI's 2009 denial of benefits for his headaches and vision problems is barred by administrative res judicata because WSI considered, or should have considered, these benefits during the proceeding in 2004 when WSI refused to pay for Viagra. The Supreme Court concluded that administrative res judicata did not bar WSI from denying further benefits and that a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that Appellant failed to prove his work injury was a substantial, contributing factor to his headaches and vision problems.

Petitioner Jonathan Kasowski appealed the revocation of his driving privileges by the North Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) and the district court judgment affirming the revocation. Petitionerâs privileges were revoked for four years after he refused to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. The basis of Petitionerâs argument centered on whether he was âunder arrestâ when officers asked that he submit for the test. When he was first pulled over by police, the officer asked whether Petitioner had been drinking, and told him ânot to lie.â Petitioner stated that he âwanted to speak to his attorney about that.â No test was conducted at that time. Petitioner was taken to jail, and âsaid something about not being able to get a hold of an attorney at that time of the night.â The arresting officer repeated the state implied consent advisory, and again Petitioner refused to take the sobriety test. An administrative hearing was held at the DOT, and the hearing officer concluded that Petitioner was not under arrest when he was told ânot to lie.â When at the jail, the hearing officer found that Petitioner decided against speaking with an attorney. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reasoned that even if Petitioner was effectively subjected to a de facto arrest when he was first questioned, the arresting officers reasonably understood that Petitioner decided against speaking to an attorney. Petitioner was not denied the reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. The Court affirmed the revocation of Petitionerâs driving privileges.