Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants here were property owners who alleged that a foreign municipality rezoned land that lay in the municipality but that was adjacent to their property in another municipality for the benefit of private enterprise rather than public health. The complaint sought both a declaratory judgment, alleging violations of due process and equal protection, and a writ of mandamus, alleging a regulatory taking for which Appellants were entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded (1) Appellants had standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action, but Appellants' constitutional claims failed; and (2) Appellants' takings claim failed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the property owners lacked standing to bring their claims without distinguishing between the declaratory judgment and mandamus claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) consistent with the Court's holding in Clifton v. Blanchester, Appellants did not have standing to assert a mandamus claim for appropriation of land outside the territorial limits of municipality; but (2) Appellants did have standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances. View "Moore v. Middletown" on Justia Law

Real property owners (Owners) sued Appellant, the county engineer, complaining that their property had been flooded for several years and the water caused damage to their property. Owners alleged that the draining system was improperly designed, constructed, or installed and pleaded that the court require Appellant to upgrade the system to prevent future flooding. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the county engineer was immune from litigation under Ohio Rev. Code 2744, which addresses political-subdivision liability for torts. Owners appealed, arguing that the design, planning, or construction of a sewer system is a proprietary function, which is an exception to political subdivision immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because upgrading a storm-sewer system involves construction and design, such upgrading is a governmental, not a proprietary, function. View "Coleman v. Portage County Eng'r" on Justia Law

In this real-property-valution case, Owner sought to reverse the twenty percent increase in the value of his residential property that the auditor ordered for tax year 2007 as part of the sexennial reappraisal in that county. Owner did not attend the hearing before the board of revision (BOR). On appeal to the board of tax appeals (BTA), the BTA excluded Owner's testimony and two of his exhibits. It then held that Owner had not sustained his burden to show a value different from that found by the BOR. Owner appealed, arguing that he was not properly notified of the BOR hearing, that all the evidence he presented at the BTA hearing should have been considered by the BTA, and that he was entitled to a reduced valuation for tax year 2007. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA reasonably and lawfully upheld the county's valuation of Owner's property. View "Gaston v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant worked in the classified position of human-services hearing manager with the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS). In December 2004, Appellant was assigned additional duties. Appellant was not informed that the assumption of these duties would move his position to the unclassified service. In December 2005, ODJFS suspended Appellant for violations of the code of conduct and subsequently removed him from his position. Appellant appealed his removal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR), basing his appeal on Ohio Rev. Code 124.11(D), which grants state employees who move from classified positions to unclassified the positions the right to resume the classified position held before the appointment to the unclassified position. The SPBR found that Appellant was an unclassified employee when he was suspended and dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and its director to reinstate him to his previous classified position of human-services hearing manager or a substantially equal position, without the duties assigned to him in December 2004 that moved his position into the unclassified service. Remanded.

In 2008, Craig Ali was a police officer for appellant, the village of Oakwood. That spring, his department assigned him to perform traffic-control duties on a highway-construction project overseen by appellee, Kokosing Construction Company, Inc. Ali was injured while performing those duties. At issue was which entity was Ali's employer for purposes of his workers' compensation claim. A district hearing officer with the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Kokosing was Ali's employer at the time of injury. A staff hearing officer reversed, finding the correct employer was Oakwood Village. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commission, when confronted with two potential employers, may, but is not required to, use any of the State ex rel. Lord v. Daugherty and Fisher v. Mayfield factors it believes will assist analysis; (2) therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion by not directly discussing the three enumerated Lord/Fisher factors; and (3) the staff hearing officer's decision was supported by evidence in the record.

In this case, Appellants, Cincinnati Golf Management, Inc. (CGMI) and the City of Cincinnati, challenged a consumer's use-tax assessment issued by the tax commissioner against CGMI. The commissioner assessed tax with respect to purchases that the commissioner deemed to be taxable under the sales and use tax laws of Ohio. Appellants asserted that because CGMI made the purchases as an agent for the City, the purchases were exempt as sales to a political subdivision pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(1). Both the commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) found that CGMI, acting in its capacity as an independent contractor under the management agreement between it and the City, did not qualify as an agent of the City with respect to the sales at issue. Accordingly, the BTA upheld the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants' arrangements did not satisfy the elements of agency for purposes of section 5739.02(B)(1); and (2) purchases by CGMI did not constitute sales to the City under the sales tax law's definition of a sale.

In this case the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request by Appellant, Terrie Sizemore, a veterinarian, for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board, to reissue a 2007 adjudication order finding her guilty of misconduct and imposing fines. Sizemore contended that the original order was not in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 119.09, preventing her from pursuing an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) because the Board dismissed the charges against Sizemore, the mandamus claim was moot; (2) the Board have any duty to reissue its prior adjudication order finding Sizemore guilty of misconduct; and (3) Sizemore had an adequate remedy by way of a motion for contempt to raise her claim that the board violated the court of appeals mandate to reissue its adjudication order.

In this appeal, 1495 Jaeger LLC challenged the denial by the board of tax appeals (BTA) of a motion through which Jaeger sought to carry forward a stipulated value for tax year 2008 to subsequent tax years. On February 1, 2011, the BTA issued a dispositive order that adopted a property value that had been stipulated by the parties for the tax year 2008. On July 11, 2011, Jaeger filed its motion for an additional BTA order that would require that the stipulated value be carried forward through tax year 2011. The BTA denied Jaeger's motion on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction, reasoning that it lost jurisdiction when the thirty-day period for appealing its February 1 dispositional order expired. Jaeger appealed, arguing that the continuing-complaint provision of Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D) conferred jurisdiction on the BTA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to modify its decision after expiration of the thirty-day appeal period.

Appellee received temporary total disability compensation (TTC) for a period of a year and a half during which time Appellee also helped his wife with her business. Appellee was not paid for his services. Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio learned of these activities, determined that they constituted "work," and concluded that TTC should not have been paid. Accordingly, the TTC award was vacated and overpayment was declared. In addition, the Commission found McBee had committed fraud by submitting disability paperwork during the relevant time period, in which Appellee certified he was not working. The court of appeals overturned the finding of fraud after concluding that the evidence did not prove McBee knew that his unpaid activities for his wife's company constituted "work" for purposes of TTC eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that McBee knowingly misled the Commission because there was no evidence McBee knew his unpaid activities constituted work that would preclude TTC.

Appellant had an allowed workers' compensation claim arising from a 2002 injury. Appellant retired from Appellee a year later and never worked again. In 2009, the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) after finding, among other things, that Appellant had abandoned the work force for reasons unrelated to his injury. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying TTC. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not credibly assert that he had lost income due to his industrial injury, and therefore, the Commission did not err in denying TTC.