Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether Hamilton Township, a limited-home-rule township, was authorized under Ohio law to impose its system of impact fees upon applicants for zoning certificates for new construction or redevelopment within its unincorporated areas. Appellants, several development companies, brought this action against Appellees, the Township and its trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages, alleging that the impact fees were contrary to Ohio law and were unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Township, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the impact fees charged by the Township in this case constituted taxes; and (2) since those taxes were not authorized by general law, the Township was unauthorized to impose them pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 504.04(A)(1).

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) issued several notices of violations of the Smoke Free Act to Appellants, a privately owned bar and its CEO. ODH subsequently filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief ordering Appellants to comply with the Smoke Free Act. Appellants filed a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief against ODH and a cross-claim against the attorney general, alleging that the Smoke Free Act operated in violation of Appellants' constitutional rights, that the Act was invalid as applied to them, and that ODH engaged in rulemaking that exceeded its authority. The trial court held that ODH had exceeded its authority in implementing a policy of strict liability for violations of the Act by issuing fines regardless of whether Appellants were at fault and denied ODH's request for a permanent injunction. The court of appeals reversed and granted a permanent injunction to ODH. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and could not use declaratory judgment to vacate final orders, the previous violations of the Act were res judicata; and (2) the Act was a valid exercise of the state's police power and did not amount to a regulatory taking.

After Employee, an electrician, received a work-related injury, Employee sought additional workers' compensation benefits, alleging that Employer committed a violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), which proximately caused his industrial injury. The requirement in question directs employers to supply protective apparatus to employees working on specified electrical equipment. A staff hearing officer (SHO) for the Industrial Commission of Ohio granted Employee's VSSR application after finding that Employer had violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-12(A). Employer filed a complaint in mandamus, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in finding a VSSR. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer violated section 4123:1-5-12(A) because it did not supply Employee with protective equipment for the main breaker cabinet Employer worked on when he was injured.

Appellee, AT&T Communications of Ohio, applied to the City of Cleveland for an income-tax refund for 1999 through 2002. Appellant, the City's income-tax administrator, denied AT&T's appeal in all respects, (1) dismissing AT&T's application for the refund for 1999 after finding that the statute of limitations on the request for a refund had expired, and (2) determining that any refund AT&T was claiming for 2000 through 2002 was offset in part by its other tax obligations. The board of income tax review reversed in part, determining that AT&T should receive the entire refund requested for the tax years 2000 through 2002. AT&T appealed. The court of common pleas reversed and entered judgment in favor of the administrator regarding AT&T's refund for 2000 through 2002. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court's judgment, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error because the administrator did not file a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the administrator failed to perfect a separate appeal in the court of common pleas, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error.

This personal-property-tax case came to the Supreme Court for the second time on appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). For tax year 2002, HealthSouth Corporation claimed that as a result of massive accounting fraud, it reported fictitious personal-property assets at its facilities in various Ohio taxing districts. HealthSouth subsequently filed an application for final assessment for 2002 in order to obtain from the tax commissioner a new assessment that would reduce the taxable value in various taxing districts by removing fictitious assets. The BTA reversed the commissioner's refusal to grant a reassessment, and the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for the BTA to complete its fact-finding. On remand, the BTA found that HealthSouth established that the denial of its refund request was improper and remanded to the commissioner for a determination of a reduced tax assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in its determination.

County Commissioners passed a resolution establishing an early retirement incentive plan (ERIP). The resolution made the plan available to all employees of Commissioners except for the sanitary engineering division. A few days before passage of the resolution, some employees of the division filed a grievance regarding eligibility for the retirement plan. None of them were members of Union, a bargaining unit of employees who worked for the sanitary engineering division, but at least four Union members attended the hearing. The county administrator determined that the division employees were not permitted to participate in the retirement plan. Union filed a taxpayer action against Commissioners, on behalf of all union-member division employees, seeking a declaration that the ERIP was in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 145.297. The trial court agreed and held for Union. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Union lacked standing to bring a taxpayer action against Commissioners, and to the extent that Union had standing in its own right, Union failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; and (2) therefore, the issue of whether Commissioners' ERIP was in violation of section 145.297 was moot.

David Barno, a temporary worker on a construction project, alleged that he was injured as a result of Ruscilli Construction Company's violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR) pertaining to floor openings on construction sites. After a workers' compensation claim was allowed, Barno filed an application for additional compensation with Industrial Commission of Ohio, alleging a violation of Ohio Admin. Code 4123:1-3-04(D). A Commission staff hearing officer (SHO) found that Ruscilli had violated section 4123:1-3-04(D)(1). The court of appeals vacated the SHO's order and remanded the cause to the Commission, finding that the order misinterpreted the applicable safety requirement and that it was based on significant mistakes of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SHO's order contained at least four major errors involving both law and fact, and therefore, the order was premised in findings that lacked evidentiary support.

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. sought to recover over $30 million for the costs of restoring its system following the destruction caused by Hurricane Ike. The Public Utilities Commission allowed Duke to recover roughly half that amount, finding that several of Duke's requests lacked adequate supporting evidence. Duke appealed, raising five propositions of law, all variations on the theme that the Commission's order lacked record support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's finding reducing the amount that Duke could recover because it found substantial problems with the supporting evidence was confirmed by the record; and (2) each of Duke's arguments lacked merit.

After she was told in advance that her contract for employment would not be renewed, Stacey Carna, the principal of an elementary school, requested a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract. Without meeting with Carna, the board voted not to renew Carna's contract. The common pleas court denied Carna's subsequent request for mandamus relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that after an administrator has been informed that her contract will not be renewed, upon the administrator's request for a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract, Ohio Rev. Code 3319.02(D)(4) requires the board to meet in executive session with the administrator to discuss the reasons for nonrenewal. Remanded.

While receiving permanent total disability compensation, Appellant Donald McNea's was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated McNea's benefits after finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while receiving those benefits. McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court found no abuse of discretion had occurred and denied the writ. McNea appealed, challenging the Commission's finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative work while receiving benefits, a determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid during that period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in characterizing McNea's remunerative employment as sustained, and the Commission did not violate McNea's due process rights by terminating his benefits while he was in prison.