Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The German Village Society (GVS) filed an application for exemption of real property. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27(C), the school board became a party to the proceedings before the tax commission and to any appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). After the tax commissioner denied GVS's application, GVS appealed to the BTA but did not serve the school board with its notice of appeal. BTA reversed the decision of the tax commissioner and granted the exemption but did not transmit its decision to the school board. The tax commissioner then issued a determination giving effect to the BTA's decision. The school board filed a notice of appeal from the tax commissioner's order, asserting that the BTA's decision was void ab initio because the school board was not named or notified as to the existence of the appeal. The BTA held that because the period for appeal from its decision had expired, it did not have jurisdiction to address the validity of its earlier decision. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA's holding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief to the school board, vacated the BTA's decision along with the tax commissioner's related order, and remanded.

Appellant Raleigh Striker filed a pro se complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel a clerk of the municipal court to provide access to requested court records. After the complaint was filed the clerk provided Striker with three of the four requested records. Striker then secured counsel and filed a motion for an award of statutory damages and attorneys fees. The court of appeals denied the writ, finding the claim was moot as Striker admitted the clerk had provided three of the four requested records and the evidence showed the parties agreed the fourth item was not a public record. Striker appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that although there was a dispute as to whether the parties agreed the fourth record existed, Striker obtained a copy of the record by the time the mandamus complaint was filed, thus rendering his claim moot; and (2) because Striker's public-records mandamus claims lacked merit, the court of appeals did not err in denying his request for statutory damages and attorneys fees.

The Public Utilities Commission allowed two electric power operating companies to adjust their economic-development cost-recovery riders and recover additional revenues. Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) sought a rehearing, which the commission denied. IEU appealed the order, arguing that the commission approved the rate increase without reviewing its reasonableness. The Supreme Court found the order prejudiced IEU because some of IEU's members paid higher rates as a result of the order. The Court then affirmed, holding that IEU failed to meet its burden to identify a legal problem with the order. Because the Court presumes that orders are reasonable, IEU must upset that presumption, and IEU did little more than disagree with the order, giving the Court no reason to reverse.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission approved a âprogram portfolio planâ proposed by Appellee American Electric Power (SEP). The plan contained a variety of programs designed to increase energy efficiency and reduce peak demands on AEPâs system. Appellant Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) challenged the PUCâs approval of the plan to the district court, arguing that the plan was too costly, was not energy-efficient, and did not meet the requirements imposed under the applicable state laws. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that IEUâs challenges âall lack merit.â The Court affirmed the lower courtâs and PUCâs decisions approving the plan.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approved âreasonable arrangementsâ between American Electric Power Company (AEP) and two manufacturing firms, Ormet Primary Aluminum (Ormet) and Eramet Marietta, Inc. (Eramet). The arrangements gave substantial price discounts on electric service. The PUC approved the arrangements and allowed AEP to collect from other customers most of the revenue foregone to the discounts. Ormet asked the commission to approve an arrangement linking Ormetâs electric rate to the market price of aluminum; Eramet asked for a fixed discounted rate. The PUC held public hearings to consider the manufacturersâ applications, and numerous parties intervened, including Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU). Disagreements regarding both applications centered on the amount of the discount and who should pay for it. The PUC issued orders permitting discounted rates to the manufacturers, but the PUCâs plan was not exactly what AEP had proposed. AEP appealed the PUCâs decision, arguing that the discounts do not allow the power company to recoup its losses from the plan discounts. The Supreme Court found that state law âaffirmatively gives the commissionânot the utilitiesâfinal say over arrangementsâ like the ones decided for Ormet and Eramet. The Court affirmed the PUCâs decisions regarding the manufacturing companiesâ arrangements.

Appellant Fairfield City Schools (Fairfield) sought reimbursement for a total disability compensation award given to one of its employees. Edward Carpenter, Jr. had hypertension since 1995. In 2002, he injured his back while at work. Mr. Carpenterâs injury resulted in a considerable amount of disability compensation. In 2008, Fairfield requested handicap reimbursement from the Ohio Bureau of Workersâ Compensation for at least part of the disability payments it made to Mr. Carpenter. Fairfieldâs application alleged that Mr. Carpenterâs pre-existing hypertension is a cardiac disease that delayed his recovery from back surgery, contributing to prolonged disability payments. The Bureau rejected Fairfieldâs application as âinsufficient to establish cardiac disease as a pre-existing condition.â Fairfield appealed the Bureauâs decision multiple times. With every appeal, Fairfield added additional doctorâs reports and Bureau datasheets to support its argument that hypertension is a cardiac disease. The court of appeals eventually denied Fairfieldâs appeal and application for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court found that the Bureau had exclusive authority to weigh the evidence Fairfield submitted, and the Bureau could find Fairfieldâs evidence insufficient to prove hypertension was a cardiac disease. Fairfield appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed with the Bureauâs and appellate courtâs decisions. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs judgment.

The criminal prosecution of the Appellees in this case arose from conduct that allegedly occurred during the election recount of the November, 2004 presidential election. Appellee Jacqueline Maiden was the coordinator for the elections board, and Appellees Kathleen Dreamer and Rosie Grier were the manager and assistant manager, respectively, of the board's Ballot Department. Maiden was in charge of preparing the board's staff for the recount, and Dreamer and Grier were involved in organizing and conducting the recount. In December, 2004, the board met and certified the recount results. During that meeting, information was disclosed that suggested that personnel might not have conducted the recount in accordance with Ohio law. The board did not launch an investigation and did not refer the matter to the prosecutor. In August, 2005, a grand jury was convened, and indicted Dreamer and Grier on election-law violations regarding the recount. The elections board agreed that it would pay the legal fees and expenses of Dreamer, Maiden and Grier in all matters related to their criminal cases if they were not convicted of criminal conduct. In January, 2007, a jury tried Dreamer, Maiden and Grier. Grier was found not guilty on all charges, and the charges against Dreamer and Maiden were eventually dismissed. In 2009, Appellees filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the prosecutor and commissioners to appoint an independent counsel and to order the commissioners to pay for their legal expenses. The appellate court granted Appellees' the writ, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the writ was available to "county officers" under the applicable state law under which Appellees sought relief. Appellees were "employees" and not "officers." Accordingly, the Court held that the appellate court erred by granting Appellees the writ of mandamus.

Josephine Centorbi died intestate in 2007. At the time of her death, Ms. Centorbi received Medicaid benefits. Ms. Centorbiâs sister, Dianne Fiorille administered the estate, and acting without counsel, applied to relieve the estate from administration. When she filed the application, Ms. Fiorille did not check the box on the form to attest that the decedent was over 55 years old and received Medicaid assistance. In addition, as administrator, Ms. Fiorille failed to file some other forms necessary to notify both the probate court and the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS) of the decedentâs death. The probate court granted Ms. Fiorilleâs application to relieve the estate from administration on the same day it was filed. Two years later, ODJFS learned of Ms. Centorbiâs death. It filed an application to vacate the probate courtâs order, but its application was denied. The probate court held that because Ms. Fiorille indicated that no notice was required (in the form of the omitted check box), ODJFSâs application was time barred. The appellate court affirmed the probate courtâs decision. The Supreme Court found that failing to check the box on the initial relief-from-administration form tolled the statute of limitations. Without the check, the Medicaid program had not been officially notified of the decedentâs death. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings.

In 2008, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 221, which substantially revised the regulation of electric service in Ohio. The cost of electric power generation increased significantly. Faced with a lack of competition, rising electricity prices and unfavorable market-based rates, the commission and utilities responded with various rate plans not expressly contemplated by statute. The state legislature revised its bill to address areas of concern with electric markets, in particular, it established new standards to govern generation rates. This appeal stems from a proceeding in which the Ohio Public Utilities Commission authorized new generation rates for the American Electric Power operating companies (AEP) Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company. AEP applied for an "electric security plan" instead of a market-rate offer. Appellants, the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised 13 propositions of law in its suit all relating to purchase of electricity. The Supreme Court found that the commission committed reversible error on three of the thirteen grounds, and affirmed the commission's ruling on all other issues. The case was then remanded to the commission for resolution of three issues: (1) the commission unlawfully granted a retroactive rate increase, but the OCC is not entitled to a refund; (2) in approving a provider-of-last-resort (POLR), the commission relied on a justification lacking any record support; and (3) the commission erred in determining that electric security plans (ESPs) may include items not specifically authorized by statute.