Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Sheppard was injured while working for Employer. After Sheppard retired, he filed an application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, which a staff hearing officer granted. Employer filed a request for reconsideration on the basis that the staff hearing officer’s order contained mistakes of fact and law. After a hearing, the Industrial Commission issued an order confirming that the staff hearing officer’s order contained a clear mistake of law and denying the underlying request for PTD compensation. Sheppard filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion when it exercised continuing jurisdiction and denied PTD compensation. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding (1) the staff hearing officer’s mistake of law was sufficient for the Commission to invoke its continuing jurisdiction; and (2) once the Commission properly invoked its continuing jurisdiction, it had authority to reconsider the issue of PTD compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the staff hearing officer made a mistake of law justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) the Commission’s continuing jurisdiction vested it with authority to issue a new order denying PTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Sheppard v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Robert Corlew was an employee of Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. when he was injured while working. Honda’s long-term-disability insurance carrier eventually determined that Corlew was not eligible for ongoing disability benefits because he was capable of gainful employment outside of Honda. Corlew subsequently retired because there was no position available at Honda. One year later, Corlew underwent surgery on his wrist. The Industrial Commission awarded temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation to be paid during Corlew’s postsurgical recovery, concluding that Corlew had not voluntarily retired or abandoned the workforce. The court of appeals denied Honda’s request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Corlew’s retirement was due to his industrial injury, and thus was involuntary, and that there was no evidence that Corlew had abandoned the entire workforce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Corlew was eligible for TTD compensation even though he suffered no economic loss that could be directly attributed to his industrial injury. View "State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted a declaration of candidacy to run in the May 6, 2014 primary for an elected position on the Democratic Party State Central Committee and, along with the declaration, submitted a nominating petition containing nine total signatures. The Franklin County Board of Elections rejected Appellant’s declaration because, according to the Board’s judgment, Appellant did not submit five valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. After Appellant unsuccessfully appealed, Appellant filed a complaint for writ of mandamus with the court of appeals. The court denied the writ. The Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered the Board to add Appellant’s name to the May 6, 2014 primary ballot, holding that the Board abused its discretion in determining that the nominating petition did not contain five valid signatures. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured when he fell from a ladder as he was working on a billboard in the course and scope of his employment with Employer. Appellant sought an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that Employer had violated several safety rules, resulting in his injury. The Industrial Commission denied the award. Appellant subsequently filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals, requesting that the Commission be ordered to grant him the VSSR award. The magistrate of the court of appeals and a three-judge panel determined that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission (1) properly considered evidence of the industry standards in determining whether Appellant’s ladder and harness equipment complied with the law; (2) correctly concluded that a hook ladder, when properly secured, can be part of a billboard structure; and (3) properly considered Appellant’s negligence in deciding to deny a VSSR award. View "State ex rel. Richmond v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2005, real property owned by Roger and Sharon Barkoff was sold for $1.4 million. In 2008, after performing the reappraisal that the law required every six years, the Summit County Fiscal Officer determined the value of the property to be $902,320. The Akron City School District Board of Education challenged the assessment, asserting that the 2005 sale price should be adopted as the value of the property. The Summit County Board of Revision retained the fiscal officer’s value. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed, concluding that the Barkoffs had not rebutted the presumption that the sale was within a reasonable time before the tax-lien date, therefore adopting the $1.4 million sale price from 2005 as the value of the property for tax year 2008. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s application of the recency presumption, holding that when a property has been the subject of the reappraisal that occurs every six years, a sale that occurred more than twenty-four months before the lien date should not be presumed recent if a different value has been determined for that lien date as part of the reappraisal, and thus no presumption arises that the sale price reflects the property’s value. View "Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Summit County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant injured her lower back while working for Employer, who was self-insured. Later that year, Employer discharged Appellant for violating the company’s absenteeism policy and failing to accept the light-duty work offered. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, concluding that Appellant had abandoned her employment and that the abandonment barred payment of TTD compensation. Three and a half years after the denial of benefits, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for TTD benefits, as her conduct had amounted to a voluntary abandonment of employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for compensation, as the Commission’s order was supported by the evidence. View "State ex rel. Jacobs v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Buckeye Energy Brokers, a certified provider of competitive retail electric service a competitive retail natural-gas service, filed an amended complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio against Palmer Energy Company, an energy-management and consulting firm. Buckeye claimed that Palmer, one of its alleged competitors, violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.08 and 4929.20 by acting without a certificate as a broker in arranging for the supply of competitive retail electric and natural-gas services in Ohio. The Commission held that Buckeye failed to prove its allegations, concluding that Palmer had provided services to clients as a consultant, not as a broker. The Supreme Court dismissed Buckeye’s appeal without reaching the merits, holding that Buckeye failed to show that it suffered prejudice or harm from the Commission’s orders. View "In re Complaint of Buckeye Energy Brokers v. Palmer Energy Co." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Supreme Court ousted George Maier as sheriff of Stark County based on Maier’s failure to meet the employment qualifications. Maier subsequently went back to work full-time for Harrison County as a deputy sheriff. The Stark County Democratic Central Committee believed this employment cured the defect in Maier’s qualifications and again appointed him Stark County Sheriff. Thereafter, Maier submitted an application to be a candidate for sheriff in the May 6, 2014 Democratic primary election. Relator filed a protest with the Stark County Board of Elections (“BOE”), claiming that Maier remained unqualified to be a candidate for sheriff. The BOE’s hearing on the protest resulted in a tie vote. Secretary of State Jon Husted broke the tie in favor of denying the protest. Relator filed this action in prohibition to order the BOE and Husted to remove a BOE member for purposes of this protest for alleged bias and to order Husted to remove Maier from the primary ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that neither Husted nor the BOE had the clear authority to remove a board of elections member for bias and because Husted did not abuse his discretion in allowing Maier to remain on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Balas-Bratton v. Husted" on Justia Law

In February 2013, the police chief of the Akron Police Department appointed Charles Brown as “acting chief of police,” a temporary assignment by the chief of police to administer the division of police during his absence. Relators, six of the nine police department captains who claimed that they were qualified to hold the positions of deputy police chief and acting police chief, sought a writ of quo warranto seeking to oust Brown from the positions of de facto deputy chief and acting chief of police. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Brown could not be ousted from the office of acting chief of police because there was no such office within the police command, and quo warranto does not lie to remove someone from a temporary assignment; and (2) because Brown did not hold the office of deputy chief or claim to be a deputy chief, he was not a de facto deputy chief for purposes of a quo warranto action, and therefore, he could not be ousted from that office. View "Calvaruso v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to several victims as part of his sentence for a criminal conviction. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking public records, claiming that despite several requests, Appellee failed to provide him with certified copies of the victim-loss statement for each victim. The court of appeals issued an alternative writ ordering Appellee to respond to the complaint, to which Appellee responded that she was not and had ever been in possession of the documents Appellant was seeking. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition because Appellant failed to file the documentation required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25 with his petition and because he failed to show that the victim-loss statements that he requested existed. View "State ex rel. Gooden v. Kagel" on Justia Law