Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, U-Store-It, L.P. acquired several self-storage facilities in Franklin County in a bulk purchase. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted the 2006 sale prices as the value of those properties for the 2006 tax year. U-Store-It appealed, arguing (1) the sale involved related parties and thus could not qualify as an arm’s-length transaction for purposes of valuing the properties; and (2) the sale prices could not be used because they included consideration paid for personal property as well as real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the 2006 sale prices as the value of the properties at issue. View "Hilliard City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant had been employed as a nurse with Progressive Parma Care, LLC since 1995. During her tenure at Parma Care, Appellant was disciplined on several occasions. On April 10, 2008, Appellant was injured at work. On April 16, 2008, the director of nursing terminated Appellant for cause. On April 21, 2008, a physician certified that Appellant was temporarily and totally disabled from all employment beginning on the date of her injury. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, concluding that Appellant’s discharge from employment for violating written workplace rules had been a voluntary abandonment, making Appellant ineligible for benefits, and that the medical evidence did not support Appellant’s claim that she had been temporarily and totally disabled at the time of her termination. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion when it denied her request for TTD compensation. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant compensation for TTD. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Indus. Comm'n " on Justia Law

Appellant purchased property in 2004 for $7.4 million. For the tax-year 2006, the County auditor set the value at $8 million. Appellant filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking a decrease in value to $5 million, an amount close to the sale price of the property in 2003. After a hearing, the BOR reduced the property value from $8 million to the 2004 sale price of $7.4 million. Appellant appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA upheld the $7.4 million sale price as the best evidence of value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA’s decision to adopt the $7.4 million sale price from 2004 as the property’s value for the tax-year 2006 was not unreasonable or unlawful. View "HIN, LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working for Employer. Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a dislocated left shoulder and a torn left rotator cuff, among other injuries. Appellant later requested compensation for the scheduled loss of use of his left upper extremity. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for benefits by relying on the report of Dr. D. Ann. Middaugh as evidence that Appellant had retained some use of his left arm. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission’s finding as an abuse of discretion. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that Dr. Middaugh’s report was some evidence upon which the Commission could rely to deny scheduled loss compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to an award for the scheduled loss of his left arm because (1) Dr. Middaugh’s findings were not consistent with her ultimate conclusion, and consequently, Dr. Middaugh’s report could not be some evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to deny an award for loss of use; and (2) the only other report submitted for consideration with Appellant’s loss-of-uses award stated that, for all practical purposes, Appellant had lost the function of his left arm. View "State ex rel. Wyrick v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

Appellant made a public-records request to the City of South Euclid. After the City failed to respond to the request for nearly six months, Appellant filed a claim for a writ of mandamus. The writ claim became moot when all the requested records were produced during the pendency of the mandamus action. Appellant claimed the she was entitled to statutory damages and attorney fees given that (1) the city delayed two months in providing any response to the request, and (2) the original production of documents was incomplete. The court of appeals denied both statutory damages and attorney fees, concluding that Appellant “failed to establish any viable public benefit.” The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeal’s denial of statutory damages, holding that in authorizing an award of such damages, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(1) does not condition that award on applying the public-benefit test; and (2) affirmed the denial of attorney fees but on other grounds, holding that the plain language of section 149.43(C)(2)(b) prohibited an award of attorney fees in this case. Remanded. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

Appellant made a public-records request to the City of South Euclid in care of the clerk of the city council. The clerk stated that he would forward the requested information, but because of an internal breakdown in communication, the City did not fulfill the request for nearly six months. Appellant filed a claim for a writ of mandamus, after which the oversight was discovered. The City subsequently provided the records responsive to Appellant’s request. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending that although the mandamus action was mooted by the production of records, she was entitled to a mandatory award of attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the motion for fees, concluding that Appellant had “failed to establish any viable public benefit.” The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) in considering the question of mandatory attorney fees, the court of appeals should have followed Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(2)(b) rather than looking to public benefit; and (2) because the court did not have to render a judgment ordering the City to produce the records within a reasonable time, Appellant was ineligible for mandatory attorney fees under section 149.43(C)(2)(b). View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

George Smith suffered an injury while working for Ohio State University. The Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed Smith’s claim for bilateral inguinal hernia. Tragically, Smith suffered brain damage resulting from postoperative complications from surgery to repair the hernia, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state. A doctor later concluded that Smith had bilateral vision and hearing loss caused by the loss of brain function. Smith sought additional scheduled awards for the loss of vision and hearing. However, no test could be performed to determine whether Smith suffered an actual loss of sight or hearing, and the medical evidence showed that Smith was unable to process sights and sounds because of damage to his brain, not because of any injury to his eyes or ears. The Industrial Commission denied Smith’s request for additional compensation based on the lack of any objective testing showing vision or hearing loss. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s denial of Smith’s claim, holding that the evidence supported a finding that Smith suffered from a loss of brain-stem function, a loss that has not been included in the schedule for compensation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission ("PUCO") approved of the first electric security plan of American Electric Power operating companies (collectively, “AEP”). The Supreme Court held that the Commission committed reversible error on three issues, including (1) approving the recovery of carrying costs associated with environmental investments without proper statutory authority, and (2) authorizing the provider-of-last-resort (“POLR”) charge without sufficient evidence. On remand, the Commission determined that the environmental-investment carrying costs were lawful but determined that the AEP had not presented evidence of its actual POLR costs and directed the company to deduct that charge from its tariff schedules. Following rehearing, the Office of Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) filed an appeal raising several challenges to the Commission’s remand orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Commission, holding that OCC and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s remand orders. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

The Village of Richfield petitioned in municipal court to unseal certain criminal records, claiming that the records were improperly sealed under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.52. Judge Kathryn Michael, the presiding judge of the municipal court, denied the motion to unseal the records. Richfield subsequently made a written request to the clerk of courts for the official criminal case records, claiming that because the records had not been properly sealed, they were public under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. The request was denied. Richfield then filed this action in mandamus, asserting that the records were sealed unlawfully. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Richfield improperly requested the court records under section 149.43 rather than Sup. Ct. R. 44 through 47, which control access to court records; and (2) even if Richfield had properly requested the records, Richfield had an adequate remedy at law of the denial of its motion to unseal the records, and therefore, Richfield could not satisfy the requirements of a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria" on Justia Law

Cheryl and John Gallenstein, Kentucky residents, purchased a boat in Indiana. The couple docked their boat in Indiana but chose Cincinnati as the hailing port. In 2003, the Division of Watercraft of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources issued a registration certificate to Cheryl. in 2005, the Ohio tax commissioner assessed a use tax, imposed a penalty, and assessed pre-assessment interest, determining that Cheryl’s use of the boat in Ohio, combined with her declaration of Cincinnati as the boat’s hailing port and her registration of the boat in Ohio created a nexus between the boat and Ohio and that she did not qualify for the transient use exception. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in affirming the commissioner’s use tax, penalty, and pre-assessment interest because Cheryl qualified for the transient use exception contained in Ohio Rev. Code 5741.02(C)(4). View "Gallenstein v. Testa" on Justia Law