Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the county auditor assigned a value of approximately $5 million to certain property located in the Mason City School District. The former owner of the property subsequently filed a valuation complaint seeking a reduction from the auditor’s valuation. The Warren County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value. The Mason City School District Board of Education appealed. After a hearing, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) raised the value of the property, concluding that the 2006 sale price of $5,350,000 was the value of the property as of 2008. After the BTA hearing and before the BTA issued its decision, Squire Hill Properties II, LLC acquired the property. Squire Hill appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) under the circumstances, the BTA was not required to give Squire Hill notice of the BTR hearing; but (2) the BTA erred by not properly considering the finding of the BOR that the 2006 sale was not recent in regard to the tax-lien date. Remanded. View "Mason City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Warren County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 4921.25, which grants the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) authority to regulate towing companies as “for-hire motor carriers.” The City of Cleveland filed an action seeking a declaration that the statute violated the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio Constitution because it was a general law that displaced municipal tow truck ordinances. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, determining that the statute was a general law that does not violate the Constitution by infringing on the City’s home rule authority. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the statute was not a general law and therefore unconstitutionally attempted to limit municipal home-rule authority. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the second sentence of the statute violates the Home Rule Amendment by prohibiting the “licensing, registering, or regulation” of entities that tow motor vehicles and so will be severed; but (2) the first sentence of the statute is a general law. View "Cleveland v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained a work-related injury and collected temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on her claim for certain injuries. Appellant later filed an application to add a psychological condition to her claim, at the same time requesting TTD compensation as a result of the condition. A hearing officer approved the additional condition but denied TTD compensation. Appellant subsequently filed another request for TTD compensation. A staff hearing officer awarded TTD compensation. The full Industrial Commission granted reconsideration and denied Appellant’s request for compensation, concluding that Appellant had voluntarily abandoned the entire workforce, and thus the claimed period of disability was not caused by the allowed conditions. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant’s lack of earnings was not due to her psychological condition and that her failure to seek other employment was evidence she had voluntarily abandoned the workforce. View "State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

On October 11, 2013, the Ohio Department of Medicaid (Department) submitted an application to the Ohio Controlling Board (Board) for an increase in its appropriation authority from the accounts holding federal Medicaid funds. The Board approved the Department's request on October 21, 2013, the effect of which was to provide medical services to Group VIII members under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The following day, Relators filed a request for writ of mandamus. Relators claimed that the Board violated Ohio Rev. Code 127.17, which provides that the Board shall take no action which does not carry out the legislative intent of the general assembly, by approving the Department's request for increased appropriation authority for the Hospital Care Assurance Match Fund. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that Relators failed to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of the Board to undo the authorization of the expenditure of additional federal funds to provide medical insurance for Group VIII members. View "State ex rel. Cleveland Right to Life v. State of Ohio Controlling Bd." on Justia Law

The Power Siting Board issued a certificate to Black Fork Wind Energy, LLC to construct a proposed wind farm in Richland and Crawford counties. Appellants, who lived near or within the boundaries of the project area, appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board violated their right to procedural due process by prohibiting Appellants from cross-examining Board staff members and by "prohibiting the presentation of evidence" at the evidentiary hearing on the application to site the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to sustain their burden of showing that the Board's order was unlawful or unreasonable. View "In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working as a truck driver for Employer. Employee's claim was allowed for the injuries. The next year, Employee returned to work. Two days later, Employer terminated Employee for violating written work rules. A staff hearing officer later denied temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, determining that Employee's termination was a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation for TTD. The court of appeals concluded that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining that Employee was ineligible for TTD compensation based upon his termination from Employer and granted mandamus relief to Employee. The Supreme Court (1) reversed, holding that the Commission's order did not meet the standards of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm'n because the court did not specifically state the evidence relied upon or explain the reason behind its decision that Employee had voluntarily abandoned his employment with Employer; and (2) returned the matter to the Commission to issue a new order stating the evidence relied upon and explaining its reasoning consistent with Noll. View "State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants requested a tax refund from the City of Worthington in connection with municipal income tax they paid on stock-option income earned from 2005 through 2007, as reported on Form 1040, Schedule C of their federal income tax return. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of Appellants' refund based on its view that Ohio Rev. Code 718.01 governed the case because the City's definition of net profits in former Worthington Codified Ordinance 1701.15, which defined net profit for purposes of the City's income tax for an individual taxpayer "as the individual's profit, other than amounts required to be reported on schedule C," contravened the statutory definition of net profits set forth in section 718.01(A)(7). The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the City to refund the municipal taxes paid by Appellants on Schedule C during the tax years at issue, holding that the decision of the BTA was unreasonable and unlawful because the General Assembly did not exercise its power to limit or restrict the municipal power of taxation through section 718.01, and therefore, the statutory provisions at issue did not preclude the refund. View "Gesler v. City of Worthington Income Tax Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Appellant, who worked for Employer, filed a workers' compensation claim that was allowed for hypersensitivity pneumonitis and hypersensitivity-induced reactive upper-airway disease. Claimant returned to work, but after his symptoms returned, he stopped working in 2004. In 2005, a staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied Appellant's request for temporary total disability compensation, concluding that Appellant's smoking-related disease caused his exacerbated symptoms. In 2007, a staff hearing officer awarded Appellant permanent total disability compensation. Employer filed a complaint for mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because the Commission had conclusively established in 2005 that the exacerbation of Appellant's symptoms that forced him to stop working in 2004 was caused by smoking, not by the allowed conditions in his claim, the Commission erred by determining that Appellant's decision to stop working was not a voluntary abandonment of the workforce. View "State ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a 33,000-square-foot residential lot in 1974 that was adjacent to another lot owned by Plaintiffs upon which they had built their residence. In 2004, the village of Ottowa Hills denied Plaintiffs' request for a variance seeking to have the vacant lot declared a "buildable" lot because the zoning code at that time included a requirement that no structure could be built on a lot smaller than 35,000 square feet. This new size restriction was enacted in 1978. At the time Plaintiffs purchased the lot, the minimum buildable lot size was 15,000 square feet. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed the village's decision to the Ottawa Hills Zoning Commission. The trial court upheld the Commission's decision, concluding that there was no regulatory taking. The court of appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court determined that a taking had not occurred because Plaintiffs had not taken any affirmative steps to build a house on the lot. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the analysis that is applicable to determining whether a variance should have been granted in this case, the appropriate result would have been to grant the variance. Remanded. View "Boice v. Village of Ottawa Hills" on Justia Law

Appellant purchased telephone and other telecommunications services from (intervening) Appellee at wholesale rates and resold the services to end-user consumers at retail rates. Appellant filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission (PUCO) alleging that Appellee had overcharged for its services and submitted inaccurate billing invoices to Appellant, among other things. PUCO denied the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to submit sufficient credible evidence that Appellee had refused to issue credits for valid billing disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to carry its burden on appeal of demonstrating that PUCO's orders were unreasonable or unlawful. View "OHIOTELNET.COM, INC. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law