Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A truck driver (Driver) was injured in 2005 in a traffic accident for which he was cited. Because it was his third moving violation in one year, Driver was dropped from his employer's liability insurance policy, and consequently, the employer fired him. The Industrial Commission initially concluded that Driver was not eligible for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation because his discharge was a voluntary abandonment of employment. A year later, a staff hearing officer approved a request for TTD compensation, concluding that Driver's discharge was not voluntary abandonment under the recently decided State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm'n. The Commission invalidated the hearing officer's decision. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to award benefits or to reconsider the denial of benefits in accordance with Gross. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Driver was discharged for the same misconduct that caused his industrial injury, the discharge was not tantamount to a voluntary abandonment of employment that precludes TTD compensation; and (2) the Commission abused its discretion when it reconsidered the order on the basis of res judicata. View "State ex rel. Haddox v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the 2007 tax-year valuation of six properties owned by Appellant. Appellant filed six valuation complaints regarding the properties. The county board of revision (BOR) retained the auditor's valuation for five parcels and ordered a reduction for one. On appeal, the board of tax appeals (BTA) concluded (1) in the case of the one parcel, the complaint's failure to state an actual dollar amount of value reduction was a jurisdictional defect, and thus the case was remanded to the BOR for dismissal; and (2) with respect to the other five parcels, the evidence offered by Appellant was insufficient to find a value different from that determined by the BOR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA properly ordered dismissal of Appellant's appeal of the case of the one parcel; and (2) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the BOR's valuation with respect to the other parcels. View "Shinkle v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Cincinnati Community Kollel, an educational institution for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 4709.121(A)(2), sought exemptions for three residential apartment buildings based on the claim that the properties were being used in furtherance of its educational purposes. The statute provides that real property belonging to an educational institution is exempt from taxation if it is made available under the direction of the institution for use in furtherance of or incidental to its educational purposes and not with a view to profit. The tax commissioner denied the exemptions, and the board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA applied the wrong legal standard and failed to cite reliable and probative evidence to support its decision. Remanded to the BTA to review the evidence submitted in this case and determine whether the subject property was used in furtherance of the kollel's educational purposes. View "Cincinnati Cmty. Kollel v. Levin" on Justia Law

After a portion of an oil and gas lease's interest was assigned to Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the Ohio Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (Division) issued a permit to Chesapeake to drill an oil and gas well on the lease property. Summitcrest, Inc., who originally entered into the lease with the assignor, appealed to the Oil and Gas Commission (Commission). The Division filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the issuance of permits to drill oil and gas wells did not constitute an appealable order. Chesapeake joined in the Division's motion to dismiss. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss. Chesapeake filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Commission from exercising further jurisdiction in the appeal and to vacate the Commission's actions in the appeal. The Commission subsequently heard the appeal and affirmed the issuance of the drilling permit. Thereafter, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the prohibition case based on mootness, which the Supreme Court denied. The Supreme Court then granted the writ, holding that the Commission patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the appeal from the Division's issuance of the permit. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Oil & Gas Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellants, contractors and engineers, filed a declaratory judgment action against Appellee, the tax commissioner of Ohio, seeking a judgment declaring that the Ohio commercial activity tax (CAT), as it related to motor-vehicle-fuel sales, violated Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a. The trial court granted summary judgment for the tax commissioner. The appellate court affirmed, applying the rationale of Ohio Grocers Ass'n v. Levin, concluding that the background and history of Section 5a did not support the contention that the CAT was a tax "relating to" motor vehicle fuel sales. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expenditure of the CAT revenue that was derived from motor-vehicle-fuel sales were "related to" fuels used for propelling motor vehicles on a highway, within the meaning of Section 5a, and consequently, the excise tax violated the Ohio Constitution to the extent that the revenue raised was used for purposes other than those specified in Section 5a. View "Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Shelly Company, an Ohio corporation engaged in the business of surfacing roads, owned several subsidiaries, including appellants Shelly Materials, Inc. and Allied Corporation (collectively, Shelly). The hot-mix asphalt facilities were regulated by the Ohio EPA pursuant to air-pollution-control permits issued to Shelly. In July 2007, the State filed suit against Shelly, alleging that the companies had violated state law and Ohio's federally approved plan for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of air-quality standards as required by the federal Clean Air Act. The court found for the state on some, but not all, claims for relief, and issued a civil penalty. At issue on appeal was the proper method of calculating the civil penalty to be levied against the industrial facility with the terms of its air-pollution-control permit. The appellate court concluded that according to the terms of the permit, the penalty was to be calculated from the initial date of noncompliance until the facility demonstrated that it no longer violated the permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court reached the proper conclusion in this matter. View "State ex rel. Ohio Attorney Gen. v. Shelly Holding Co." on Justia Law

On October 10, 2011 the board of revision issued a decision ordering reductions in the valuation of property owed by a county club. The local school district board of education (school board) attempted to appeal that decision to the board of tax appeals (BTA) by sending the appropriate notices by certified mail on October 14, 2011. That same day, the country club physically presented its notices of appeal to the common pleas court and the BOR. The school board argued that it had filed its appeal first because it placed its notices in the mail earlier on October 14 than the country club had filed its appeals at the courthouse and the BOR. The BTA ruled that the country club had filed its appeal first, determining that the time of the mailing was immaterial and that the probative force of the school board evidence of the time of mailing was questionable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in determining that the school board had not proven the time when its notice of appeal was mailed, it properly held that the country club's filing in the common pleas court had priority for jurisdictional purposes. View "Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Hamilton County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellees filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code 4509.05(A) and asserting that the amended statute violated Ohio Const. art XII, 5a. The statute provided that the registrar of motor vehicles shall collect a certified abstract with respect to any person's motor vehicle accidents and record of convictions for violation of motor vehicle laws. In addition, the statute directed the registrar to collect for each abstract a five dollar fee. The trial court agreed and granted injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, concluding that sixty percent of the five dollar fee collected under section 4509.0 as amended was money relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways in Ohio, but such funds were not being 'expended' consistent with the specific purposes enumerated in Article XII, Section 5a. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the money derived from certified abstracts was related to the process of certification, not to the registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways. View "Ohio Trucking Ass'n v. Charles" on Justia Law

Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law