Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal of a real-property-valuation case, the city school district board of education challenged a decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA) that affirmed the county board of revision's (BOR) adoption of a sale price as the value of the property at issue for tax year 2007. The school board argued in part that the BOR lacked jurisdiction because the valuation complaint had been signed and submitted by the property owner's spouse, who was not a lawyer. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA's decision, holding (1) the filing of a valuation complaint by the owner's spouse validly invokes the BOR's jurisdiction; and (2) the record furnished a sufficient basis to support the BTA's finding. View "Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

When a complaint has been filed that contests the county auditor's valuation of a particular parcel, as it was in this case, and when that complaint asks for a value increase or reduction of $17,500 or more, Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(B) requires that the auditor give notice of the complaint within thirty days of the last day for filing valuation complaints. At issue in this appeal was whether that notification is a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the board of revision, and if so, whether the thirty-day deadline itself is jurisdictional. The Supreme Court held (1) under section 5715.19(B), the notification itself is jurisdictional, but the thirty-day requirement is not; and (2) thus, the original failure of the auditor in this case to give notice was cured when the notice was later given after remand by the court of common pleas. Because the court of appeals held the contrary, the Court reversed its decision. View "2200 Carnegie, LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

This appeal presented issues regarding the scope of a workers' compensation appeal in common pleas court pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. Specifically, the appeal concerned whether, in that proceeding to determine a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund, the court was limited to considering those issues that were specifically determined by the Industrial Commission below, or whether the de novo nature of the proceeding obligated the claimant to present and the court to consider all the evidence necessary for determining the claimant's right to participate. The court of appeals rejected the claimant's claim that the trial court erred in placing the burden on him to establish any injury-relatedness or causation in his section 4123.512 appeal because those issues were not considered in the administrative rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the de novo nature of a section 4123.512 appeal proceeding puts in issue all elements of a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund. View "Bennett v. Adm'r, Bureau of Workers Comp." on Justia Law

Two public utilities (the companies) were wholly owned subsidiaries of appellant FirstEnergy Corporation. Appellees were residential customers of the companies. The customers filed a class-action complaint against FirstEnergy and the companies in the county court of common pleas. The complaint raised four causes of action: declaratory judgment, breach of contract, fraud, and injunctive relief. The trial court granted FirstEnergy's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects except with regard to the customers' fraud claim. The appellate court determined on two separate grounds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the fraud claim and remanded that claim to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) the customers' fraud claim was not a pure tort action, but rather, was a claim that the companies were overcharging the customers for electric service; and (2) because the complaint was challenging the rates charged for utility service, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. View "DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

This was an original action challenging the decennial apportionment of districts in the General Assembly. At issue was whether the 2011 apportionment plan adopted by the apportionment board (Respondents) complied with Ohio Const. art. XI, 7 and 11. The Supreme Court denied Relators' request for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that Relators failed to adduce sufficient, credible proof to rebut the presumed constitutionality accorded the 2011 apportionment plan by establishing that the plan was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, Relators were not entitled to a declaration that the 2011 apportionment plan was unconstitutional or a prohibitory injunction to prevent elections from being conducted in accordance with that plan. View "Wilson v. Kasich" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determined whether Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a permits the use of motor vehicle and gas tax (MVGT) funds to pay those costs of a county's joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. The Supreme Court concluded that Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a authorizes the use of MVGT funds to pay a county's cost of participating in a joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. In so holding, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded. View "Stockberger v. Henry" on Justia Law

This workers' compensation case came before the Supreme Court on an appeal of right from the court of appeals' judgment granting Claimant a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its August 6, 2009 order. Appellants, Industrial Commission and Claimant's employer, sought to reinstate the August 6 order, which vacated a previously allowed claim for temporary total disability compensation on the grounds that a later statement by Claimant's examining physician had repudiated that same physician's earlier certifications that the disabling injury had not yet reached maximum medical improvement. On appeal, Claimant argued that the Commission lacked adequate grounds to exercise continuing jurisdiction, which it needed in order to invalidate the earlier order. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief, finding that the subsequent repudiating opinion of Claimant's examining physician could not be relied upon by the Commission to support the exercise of continuing jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in exercising continuing jurisdiction over this case. View "State ex rel. Knapp v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a conflict between the Third and Tenth District Courts of Appeals. The issue was whether after a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund has been established, a trial court abuses its discretion under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512(F) when it awards the claimant his or her costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund. The Court held (1) when a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund is established on appeal, section 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award the claimant his or her costs; (2) under section 4123.512, a trial court is not required to apportion costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition; and (3) accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by awarding costs under section 4123.512(F) when it reimburses a claimant for costs incurred on appeal without regard to the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. View "Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Reynoldsburg was a municipal corporation governed by a charter. Intervening appellee, Columbus Southern Power Company (CSP), was a public utility and provided electric power to the City and its residents. At issue in this case was whether the City or CSP bore the cost to relocate overhead power lines underground. Specifically, the City sought a ruling that its right-of-way ordinance requiring all overhead power lines to be relocated underground at the sole cost of the public utility took precedence over CSP's commission-approved tariff, which provided that municipalities shall pay the costs whenever they required CSP to relocate overhead electrical distribution lines underground, in this particular aspect. The City filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission, contending that its ordinance superseded CSP's tariff and that the tariff was unjust, unreasonable, and unlawful. The commission found in favor of CSP. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's orders, holding that the commission correctly found that the City was required to pay CSP's entire costs for relocating the power lines underground. View "In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg " on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, the county board of commissioners and the county board of elections, to hold a special election before January 1, 2013 to elect a judge for the newly created county municipal court for a one-year term in 2013. The court of appeals granted the writ to compel the special election. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to granting the special election and instead held that Appellants established their entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees to conduct the November 6, 2012 election for the two part-time judgeships for the county court; (2) granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to accept the filed petitions and conduct the November 6, 2012 election for the judges of the county court; and (3) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as the court held that the pertinent legislation was unconstitutional insofar as it appointed judges of the county court to the newly created county municipal court for 2013. View "State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law