Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was appointed as the village of New Miami fiscal officer. Later the mayor discovered that Appellant failed to properly perform his duties as village fiscal officer, and the village council passed a resolution terminating Appellant's employment as fiscal officer without cause. The mayor subsequently appointed Appellee as the new village fiscal officer. Approximately three years later Appellant filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of quo warranto ousting Appellee from the office of fiscal officer and reinstating him to the office. The court of appeals denied the writ and awarded Appellee reasonable attorney fees and expenses. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment denying the writ of quo warranto and most of the challenged rulings on various motions in the case, holding that the court of appeals properly held that Appellant could not establish either that the office of village fiscal order was being unlawfully held by Appellee or that Appellant was entitled to the office; and (2) reversed the judgment awarding reasonable attorney fees and expenses, holding that the court of appeals erred in imposing sanctions under Ohio R. Civ. P. 11 without holding an evidentiary hearing. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Ebbing v. Ricketts" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Progressive Plastics, Inc. (PPI) challenged the tax commissioner's decision to increase PPI's personal property tax assessments for 2004 and 2005. In amending the assessments, the commissioner recomputed the value of PPI's inventory based on the FIFO (first in, first out) accounting method rather than the LIFO (last in, first out) method, which PPI had used on its books. The board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed the commissioner's amended assessments, finding that collateral estoppel barred PPI's FIFO/LIFO claim on the grounds that the issue had already been litigated and decided against PPI in the tax-year 2003 proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BTA incorrectly determined that collateral estoppel applied to PPI's appeal for the 2004 and 2005 tax years; and (2) the BTA erred by upholding the commissioner's assessments at issue here, as the substitution of FIFO for LIFO was impermissible under the circumstances of this case. View "Progressive Plastics, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

This case involved the interplay between a municipality's expedited type-2 annexation of real property located within a township pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 709.023 and the municipality's tax-increment finding (TIF) created pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5709.40 to encourage development of that property. The Supreme Court held that although a township continues to receive tax revenue on property that a municipality annexes through an expedited type-2 process under section 709.023, the municipality may adopt a TIF plan under 5709.40 that temporarily exempts from city and township property taxes a portion of the improvements made to the annexed property to encourage the annexed property's economic development. In so doing, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sugarcreek Twp. v. City of Centerville" on Justia Law

Appellant unsuccessfully sought postretirement total disability compensation (TTC). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application after finding that she had voluntarily abandoned the work force when she took disability retirement for a condition that was unrelated to her workplace injury. The court of appeals agreed and denied Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals pursuant to State ex rel. Corman v. Allied Holdings, Inc. and State ex rel. Pierron v. Indus. Comm'n, holding that the Commission did not did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reinstate TTC, as Appellant voluntarily removed herself from the work force by taking disability retirement because she still had the physical ability to work. View "State ex rel. Rouan v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an application for permanent total disability (PTD). The Industrial Commission of Ohio found Appellant was capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment and denied her request for PTD. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's allowed conditions did not foreclose sustained remunerative employment was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to view Appellant's rehabilitation efforts favorably; and (3) the Commission did not improperly factor the economic climate into the PTD equation. View "State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Bay Mechanical & Electrical Corporation, a specialty mechanical contractor, challenged a sales-tax assessment issued by the tax commissioner with respect to Bay's purchase of allegedly taxable employment services. During the audit period, Bay purchased the services from two entities. Bay treated the personnel supplied by the entities as "permanent-assignment" employees, and therefore regarded the attendant employment services as exempt pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(JJ)(3). The commissioner denied the exemption on the ground that the evidence offered by Bay was insufficient to prove entitlement to the exemption. The board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it upheld the tax commissioner's sales-tax assessment against Bay because the contracts and testimony offered by Bay did not satisfy the one-year and permanent-assignment criteria of section 5739.01(JJ)(3). View "Bay Mech. & Elec. Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

LTC Properties, Inc., which owned a congregate care assisted-living facility in Licking County, contested the tax-year 2007 valuation of its property as found by the auditor, as retained by the Licking County Board of Revision, and as affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). On the merits, LTC contended (1) the auditor overvalued its property by predicating his cost-based valuation on the cost schedule for nursing homes and private hospitals rather than on the cost schedule for apartment buildings with twenty to thirty-nine rental units; and (2) the BTA erred by denying LTC's request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA's decision to affirm the County's use of the nursing home / private hospital cost schedule as a starting point in performing a cost valuation of LTC's assisted-living facility was neither unreasonable nor unlawful; and (2) the BTA did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance. View "LTC Props., Inc. v. Licking County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant, a classified civil-service employee, filed a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the Miami County Sheriff's Office and Sheriff Charles Cox, to reinstate him pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 145.362 to his previous deputy-sheriff position and salary or to a similar position and salary and to award him back pay and benefits. The court of appeals held that Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of a civil-service appeal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR) from the sheriff's office's refusal to perform the requested actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) classified civil-service employees like Appellant have an adequate remedy by administrative appeal to SPBR from an employer's refusal to reinstate them to their salaries and former positions; and (2) Appellant waived his claim that the collective-bargaining agreement between the sheriff's office and the employee union prevented him from instituting an appeal to SPBR. View "State ex rel. Byers v. Sheriff'Âs Office" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a private sanitary landfill is a public utility that is exempt from township zoning regulations pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code. 519.211. The trial court concluded that the private landfill was a public utility not subject to the zoning restrictions of the township. The court of appeals held that the landfill was entitled to the trial court's declaration that it was a public utility for purposes of section 519.211. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a privately owned sanitary landfill cannot be a common-law public utility exempt from township zoning when there is no public regulation or oversight of its rates and charges, no statutory or regulatory requirement that all solid waste delivered to the landfill be accepted for disposal, and no right of the public to demand and receive its services; and (2) thus, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's declaration that the landfill was a public utility for purposes of section 519.211. Remanded. View "Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp." on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Five years later, Employee was fired for violating the company's attendance policy. Employee's termination was later the basis for the Industrial Commission of Ohio's denial of his request for temporary total disability compensation (TTC). The Commission found that Employee's discharge amounted to a voluntary abandonment because it was consequence of behavior that Employee willingly undertook. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the deliberate misconduct necessary to support a finding of voluntary abandonment could not be imputed to Employee. The Supreme Court affirmed and issued a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and returned the cause to it for further consideration, as the hearing officer did not carefully examine the totality of the circumstances in finding that a simple allegation of misconduct existed to preclude temporary total disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Hoover Universal, Inc." on Justia Law