Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Petitioner Theresa Maxwell suffered an injury to her knee while working for her Employer, Respondent Sprint PCS. She promptly notified her Employer and timely filed a CC-Form-3 with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Employer admitted Petitioner's injury to her knee was compensable, and she had surgery to repair a tendon in her knee. Petitioner also received temporary total disability benefits from February 6, 2014, until February 24, 2014. After reaching maximum medical improvement on July 2, 2014, she returned to her pre-injury position with her employer earning her pre-injury wages. Later that year, Petitioner filed a request for a contested hearing on the issue of permanent partial disability. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner sustained 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the injury to her knee and that the rate of compensation was $323.00 for a total award of $2,261.00. However, because she returned to her pre-injury position and pay, the ALJ ordered the award of benefits be deferred at a rate of $323.00 beginning July 2, 2014, for every week Petitioner worked in her pre-injury or equivalent job. Petitioner appealed the order, and the Workers' Compensation Commission sitting en banc affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that scheduled members are exempt from the AMA Guides under the AWCA. The Court also held that the permanent partial disability deferral provision of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 45(C)(5) was an unconstitutional violation of due process under Art. 2, section 7.51 Sections 45(C)(5)(a-e) were invalid and stricken. The deferral of permanent partial disability benefits to a subclass of injured workers under 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 46(C) was an unconstitutional special law under Art. 5, sec. 59.52. Only that portion of Section 46(C) that made the deferral provision applicable to injuries to the body as a whole or "other cases" was invalid. Any definitional provisions found in 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 section 2, as were deemed invalid to the extent they were inconsistent with the Court's opinion with regard to this matter. On remand, the Commission, through its ALJs, were mandated to take all action necessary to implement the pronouncement made by this case. View "Maxwell v. Sprint PCS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Reynolds sued the Defendants-appellees, Mary Fallin, Governor of the State of Oklahoma; Ken Miller, Treasurer of the State of Oklahoma; Preston Doerflinger, State Director of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services and various unnamed state attorneys for their alleged involvement with the three general appropriation bills. The state moved to dismiss the case which was later granted by the district court. Reynolds' principle argument on appeal was that three types of sections in the challenged general appropriation bills were substantive laws and did not constitute appropriations and were as a result, unconstitutional. Reynolds challenged the "TRANSFER" sections of the general appropriation bills that transferred money from one fund to the Special Cash Fund of the State Treasury. He also challenged sections of the three general appropriation bills that provided authorization to transfer money from one fund to another and those that provide authorization to expend money. Having found no merit as to any of Reynolds' assertions of unconstitutionality, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the district court's granting of Appellees' motion to dismiss. View "Reynolds v. Fallin" on Justia Law

In 2007, a paramedic supervisor, defendant Ethan Barstow collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff-appellee Elizabeth Gowens resulting in damage to both vehicles and injury to Gowens. At the time of the collision, Barstow worked as a paramedic supervisor for the defendant-appellant EMSSTAT, which is a division of the defendant-appellant Norman Regional Hospital Authority, a public trust d/b/a Norman Regional Hospital (collectively, NRH). NRH was a political subdivision for purposes of the Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA). Gowens initially sued Barstow and the City of Norman ex rel. EMSSTAT for her injuries. Both Barstow and the City of Norman were later dismissed from the lawsuit. Central to this case was the intersection where the accident occurred, described as being "almost a five-way intersection" with no stop sign and a hill. At the close of the evidence, NRH moved for a directed verdict which the trial court overruled. In its order, the trial court found : (1) Barstow was an employee of NRH and was acting in that capacity when driving through the intersection; (2) Barstow was responding to a call for service and more likely than not had his lights and siren on while driving; (3) the fact that he most likely used his lights and sirens did not provide blanket protection under 47 O.S. 11-1062; (4) the unusual layout of the intersection required a heightened use of care by all; (5) in this situation Barstow's high rate of speed did endanger the life and property of Gowens; and (6) Mr. Barstow was a cause of the accident. The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that an entity covered under the GTCA, was immune from reckless acts committed by its emergency vehicle drivers and also such drivers, and therefore their employers, could not be held liable for mere negligence. The Supreme Court vacated the COCA's opinion, affirmed the trial court's decision and addressed other issues properly raised on appeal which were not addressed by the COCA. View "Gowens v. Barstow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellees filed wage claim actions before the Oklahoma Department of Labor (ODOL), alleging their employer had refused to pay their wages for a substantial period of time. The Department of Labor ruled in favor of claimants and ordered employer to pay the wages owed. After an appeal to the district court which affirmed the order of the Department of Labor, the Employers-appellants appealed. The two issues raised on appeal were: (1) whether ODOL erred when it allowed Appellee-wage claimant Christopher Holland's joinder of multiple employers in a single wage claim; and (2) whether the ODOL court erred in prohibiting Appellants/Employers from presenting evidence at the Administrative Hearing. The Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the district court. View "Agrawal v. Ok. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Petitioner-claimant Jeanette Ball sought permanent total disability benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund. The Workers' Compensation Court held that a "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with the adjudication of an on-the-job injury could be combined with the adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 sec. 171 and awarded Petitioner permanent total disability benefits. The Fund appealed, and a three-judge panel reversed. Claimant then appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the panel. After its review, the Supreme Court held that an employee must be a physically impaired person as defined by the applicable statute before he or she can seek benefits from the Fund. A "Crumby" finding of preexisting disability made simultaneously with an adjudication of an on-the-job injury could not be combined with such adjudicated injury to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp 2005 sec. 171. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ball v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund" on Justia Law

The Tulsa County Assessor assessed ad valorem taxes on portions of real property owned by the respondent-appellees (and taxpayers) William Warren Medical Research Center and Montereau, Inc. The taxpayers challenged the assessment and the County Board of Equalization determined that the properties were not taxable. The Assessor appealed to the Tulsa County District Court which found in favor of the taxpayers. The Assessor again appealed but the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal because the Assessor was not represented by the district attorney, nor the State Attorney General. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that county assessors may employ counsel to represent them in court proceedings including appeals from the Board of Equalization. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to the Court of Civil Appeals to address the merits of the appeal. View "Yazel v. William K. Warren Medical Research Center" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a transfer of real property between affiliated business entities constituted a "sale" for purposes of the Documentary Stamp Tax Act. Defendants Homesales, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and EMC Mortgage, LLC, f/k/a EMC Mortgage Corporation appealed an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Murray County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Murray County, Oklahoma and Johnston County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Johnston County, Oklahoma (the Counties). Chase filed four foreclosure cases and was the successful bidder at each sheriff's sale. Therefore, Chase was entitled to a sheriff's deed to each of the properties. However, Chase did not take title. Instead, sheriff's deeds were granted to Chase's affiliated entities. The deeds were recorded with the respective county clerks. The grantees noted on the conveyances that the deeds were exempt from documentary taxes. No documentary taxes were paid. The Counties contended the conveyances involved in this case were not exempt and filed suit to collect the applicable documentary taxes. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Counties finding that the conveyances were not exempt from the DSTA, and that the Counties could sue to enforce the provisions of the DSTA and collect the documentary taxes that were not paid on these transactions. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the Counties were not authorized to prosecute violations of the DSTA. The Counties did have standing to challenge the exemptions from the documentary tax claimed for these conveyances. The Court reversed the order granting partial summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Murray County v. Homesales, Inc." on Justia Law

The Attorney General (AG) brought suit against Native Wholesale Supply alleging violations of the Oklahoma Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. In 1998, four of the largest tobacco product manufacturers and forty-six states entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) to settle litigation brought by the states to recoup health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In 1999, the Legislature required tobacco product manufacturers who do not join the MSA and whose cigarettes were sold in Oklahoma to make annual payments into escrow accounts to cover health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In August of 2006, the AG removed both Seneca brand cigarettes and their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., from the AG's directory. In 2007 and 2008, Native Wholesale Supply (NWS) caused Seneca cigarettes to be brought into Oklahoma knowing that the tobacco product manufacturer did not comply with the Escrow Statute or the Complementary Act and that the Seneca cigarette manufacturer and Seneca cigarettes were not on the AG's directory. In May of 2008, Oklahoma Attorney General Drew Edmondson, sought disgorgement and payment to the State of all gross proceeds realized by NWS from the sale of contraband Seneca cigarettes in violation of the Complementary Act. NWS removed the case to federal court asserting complete federal preemption of this state-law suit because NWS "is chartered by the Sac and Fox Nation, is wholly owned by a member of the Seneca Nation, and conducts business on Indian land with Native Americans." The federal court concluded the case was improperly removed and remanded it to the state court. The state district court then granted NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The AG appealed the subject matter jurisdiction dismissal and NWS counter-appealed the personal jurisdiction ruling. The Supreme Court held that the State has personal jurisdiction over NWS based on the Company's purposeful availment of the Oklahoma cigarette marketplace and had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit. NWS filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and listed three states in the proceeding as having claims similar to Oklahoma's lodged against it. The three states jointly moved to lift the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay and directed that "information produced by [NWS] during discovery in the bankruptcy case shall be treated by the States as satisfying any request for such information in the State Litigation." The information NWS turned over to Oklahoma included documents showing the cigarette sales and shipping transactions between NWS and Muscogee Creek Nation Tobacco Wholesale and Bowen Wholesale from 2006 to 2010. The state district court case proceeded; and the AG moved for summary judgment. The district court sustained the AG's motion for summary judgment, denied NWS' cross-motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of Oklahoma. The district court denied NWS' motion for new trial. NWS appealed the summary judgment and denial of a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Oklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court centered on the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction against the Defendant-Appellant, the Oklahoma Military Department ("Department"), and the trial court's order overruling the Department's motion for new trial and to vacate the temporary injunction. The trial court temporarily restrained and enjoined the Department from making pay increases conditioned upon leaving the classified service. In 2011, 44 O.S. 2011, section 21.1 was amended to require personnel appointed as state employees in the Department to be in the unclassified service and to provide additional leave flexibility. To coincide with this amendment, the Department issued new policies on hiring, promotions and salary administration. The new policy references 74 O.S. 2011, section 840-4.2 (C), which provides existing classified employees may remain in the classified service when a classified position has been placed in the unclassified service. Section 7 of the new policy indicates this choice is only applicable to permanent classified employees. It also provided that permanent classified employees may choose to move to the unclassified service after submitting a written resignation from their classified position. Any future vacancies will be filled exclusively in the unclassified service. In late August 2012 a series of e-mails by the Department were sent detailing which classified employees would be eligible for a raise. The e-mails indicate a performance-based adjustment would be granted to those permanent classified employees who had received "exceeds standards" on their annual personal progress report. However, an additional condition excluded from the raise all permanent classified employees who did not elect to resign from the classified service and enter the unclassified service. These classified employees were required to submit their resignation letters by August 30, 2012, in order to accept the offer. Plaintiff-Appellee, the Oklahoma Public Employees Association ("OPEA"), on behalf of some of the Department's affected permanent and probationary classified employees, filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restraining and enjoining the Department from conditioning pay increases on declassification of permanent classified employees. The Court did, however, reverse the trial court's order as far as this provision of the order was applicable to probationary classified employees. The Court held that there was not the same protection to probationary classified employees as there was for permanent classified employees and the Department's actions concerning the probationary classified employee. The second provision of the trial court order enjoined the Department from: "[making] (2) an employee's raise or pay increase based solely upon such employee's status as a classified or unclassified employee." The meaning of this part of the order, the Supreme Court found, was unclear. The Supreme Court reversed this part of the trial court's order insofar as this provision could be interpreted to restrain and enjoin the Department from granting pay increases authorized by law. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Department's motion for new trial and to vacate the temporary order. View "Oklahoma Public Employees Assoc. v. Oklahoma Military Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Department of Transportation ("ODOT"), filed a condemnation proceeding against Lamar Advertising of Oklahoma Inc., and Lamar Central Outdoor, Inc., for the removal of an outdoor advertising sign and the acquisition of Lamar's leasehold interest associated with the sign. ODOT previously acquired the real property on which the sign was located as part of a highway improvement project and, as such, the sign needed to be removed. Lamar erected the sign on the underlying property pursuant to a written lease agreement with the owners of the land. Lamar removed the sign but kept it. ODOT argued that the sign was a trade fixture and that trade fixtures were personal property. As such, ODOT claims Lamar was only entitled to the depreciated reproduction costs of the sign or the costs associated with the sign's relocation. Furthermore, ODOT argued that Lamar's method of valuation improperly allowed for the recovery of lost business income and profits. Lamar argued that regardless of whether the sign is personal or real property, the only criteria was fair market value of the sign and its related interests. Lamar valued its property interests at $429,000 while ODOT valued the property significantly less (roughly $60,000). At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding Lamar $206,000 in just compensation for its interests. Lamar filed a motion for new trial and a motion to reconsider, both of which the trial court denied. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that there was competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury as to the amount of damages awarded Lamar. As such, the Court found no grounds for reversing the judgment of the lower court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Transportaion v. Lamar Advertising of Oklahoma, Inc. " on Justia Law