Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the Oklahoma Tax Code to require municipalities to contract with the State of Oklahoma through the Oklahoma Tax Commission to assess, collect and enforce municipal taxes. Prior to the amendment becoming effective, the City of Tulsa contracted with a private company to collect municipal taxes. On August 19, 2010, Tulsa filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the District Court of Oklahoma County to challenge the statute's constitutionality. The trial court found the statute unconstitutional. The State appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court held that the amendments requiring the Commission to collect municipal sales and use taxes do not unconstitutionally impair Tulsa's obligation of contracts or infringe its inherent powers granted by the Constitution or the City's charter.

Claimant Kelly Mowdy filed a workers' compensation claim after a spider bit him. Claimant worked as a floor hand for Petitioner Nomac Drilling, LLC when he noticed two red bumps on his knee. He reported the bumps to his supervisor, who seemed unconcerned about the injury. Over the course of a few days, the bumps grew swollen, infected, turned dark red and purple, and would later be diagnosed as an abscessed spider bite in which methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) cultures were found. Claimant underwent surgery to remove dead and infected tissue. Nomac denied Claimant's injury was the result of his employment. The case was tried, and testimony revealed that Claimant's living arrangements while working for Nomac were in a heavily wooded area that "was not real clean, not real kept up." A big hole underneath his bed lead all the way to the outdoors. The Workers' Compensation Court found Claimant's testimony was credible and persuasive. The court concluded that the incident was the predominant cause of Claimant's right leg injury, and awarded Claimant TTD benefits. Nomac appealed to the three-judge panel. The panel sustained the award. The Court of Civil Appeals, however, vacated the award and ordered the claim dismissed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "an appellate court must sustain the Workers' Compensation Court's decision where there is any competent evidence supporting the decision. Claimant's expert medical report [was] not defective, and there [was] sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment."

The Oklahoma Tax Commission assessed corporate income taxes against Vermont Corporation Scioto Insurance Company for 2001 through 2005, based on payments Scioto received from the use of Scioto's intellectual property by Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma. In response, Scioto protested these assessments on the ground that it did not contract with the Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma for use of the property in question and did not conduct any business whatsoever in Oklahoma. The Tax Commission denied Scioto's protest and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court previously granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, reversed the Tax Commission's denial of Scioto's protest and remanded the case with instructions to sustain Scioto's protest.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the first-impression question of whether a bail bondsman's failure to timely pay the order and judgment of forfeiture within ninety-one (91) days after receipt of notice prevents the bondsman from seeking remitter of forfeiture proceeds after returning Defendant to custody pursuant to section 1332(D)(2). Here, the bondsman paid the judgment of forfeiture on the ninety-second day after receipt of notice of forfeiture. The trial judge conducted a hearing at which she granted the bondsman's motion for remitter, ordered return of the money deposited and vacated the order and judgment of forfeiture. The State appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: the deposit of the face amount of the bond by the ninety-first day after notice of forfeiture, as required by 59 O.S. Supp. 2008 sec. 1332(D)(1) is a condition precedent to seeking the relief of remitter provided by section 1332 (D)(2).

Senator Jim Wilson filed suit in an attempt to have the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 declared invalid after the Supreme Court rejected his attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional. In an earlier case, the Senator attached the Act as invalid because it "failed to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible preserve[d] the factors of 'compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests.'" In his petition in this case, he made "verbatim the same allegations as he did in [his earlier case]." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly dismissed Senator Wilson's petition because he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because his claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion having been adjudicated against him in "Wilson I." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal.

The City Council of Tulsa decided to encourage the initiation of new direct nonstop airline service to business centers on the East and West coasts, and voted to approve a Memorandum between the Tulsa Industrial Authority (TIA) and the City which would convey certain real property (Property) for that purpose. The transfer would allow TIA to mortgage the Property to the Bank of Oklahoma (BOK) in support of a non-recourse loan so that TIA could, in turn, make an aggregate loan (Great Plains Loan) to Great Plains Airlines, Inc. (Great Plains). This transfer would allow the Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust (TAIT) to enter into a Support Agreement, pursuant to which TIA, in the event of a default would have the option of selling the Property to TAIT under the direction of the BOK. Upon exercise of such option, the TIA would sell, transfer and convey the property to TAIT to satisfy the outstanding loan balance. Great Plains subsequently defaulted under the terms of the Great Plains Loan, and left a balance owed to the Bank. Ultimately TAIT did not purchase the Property. TIA and the Bank sued TAIT. TAIT alleged the Support Agreement was unlawful and an unenforceable contract because TAIT could not purchase the Great Plains Loan and Property by reason that all of TAIT's funds were airport revenues and such purchases would violate the FAA Revenue Use Policy. To resolve the matter, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement which provided the City would pay BOK. The City and its Mayor asked the trial court to determine that the settlement agreement was a lawful contract executed by the City, and the settlement payment made pursuant to the settlement agreement was a lawful expenditure of public funds. Taxpayers intervened, and asked the trial court to determine that the payment of money to the Bank of Oklahoma pursuant to the settlement agreement was an illegal transfer of public funds made pursuant to an unlawful settlement agreement. In granting the City's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the settlement agreement was a lawful and the settlement payment was a lawful expenditure of funds. Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded the settlement was not based on a contract, but rather under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment to the City of Tulsa, and as such, the City had authority to enter into the Settlement Agreement. However, the Court found that the unjust enrichment claim was unviable and the Statute of Limitations would have barred the unjust enrichment claim against the City. The Court remanded the matter back to the District Court to direct the repayment of the settlement funds from BOK back to the City of Tulsa.

Petitioner State Senator Jim Wilson sought review of the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011, pursuant to Section 11C, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Petitioner alleged the Act does not comply with the apportionment formula in Section 9A, Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. Specifically, Petitioner alleged the Act does not pass constitutional muster because it "fails to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible provide for compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests." Senator Wilson did not explicitly identify every district in the Redistricting Act that he contended was not in compliance with Section 9A but claimed that he identified such districts by the maps provided in the appendix of his petition. Upon review of the arguments submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner failed to show that the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 does not comply with the provisions of Section 9A of the Oklahoma Constitution.

The Oklahoma Publishing Company (The Oklahoman) and World Publishing Company (Tulsa World) (collectively, Publishers), filed open records requests with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of State Finance (OSF). Both the Oklahoman and Tulsa World sought to release of birth dates of all state employees. In addition, the Tulsa World requested employee identification numbers. The Oklahoma Public Employees Association (OPEA) filed two suits against OPM and OSF requesting declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to bar the release of employees' birth dates. The second suit also sought to bar employee identification numbers from disclosure. The district court consolidated the cases. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. Relying on an opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General, the trial court sustained OPEA's and OPM's motions. It ordered that the state agencies be given sixty daysâ notice to report their decisions on whether disclosure of date of birth requests would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; whether public access could be denied to employee identification numbers; and that legislative staff records were exempt from disclosure under the Oklahoma Open Records Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Oklahoma law already contains a non-exclusive list of examples of information that if released, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of State employees' personal privacy. As guidance, the Court held that where a claim of invasion of privacy is made, courts should use a case-by-case balancing test to determine whether personal information is subject to release. If significant privacy interests are at stake while the public's interest in the disclosed information is minimal, release of that information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Plaintiff Matthew Hamrick sued Oklahoma for wrongs he allegedly suffered during his employment with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. Plaintiff initially asserted seven claims against the State, grounded on both federal and state law. Plaintiff later dismissed all of the state law claims except his claim for unpaid wages under the Protection of Labor Act. Throughout his service as an investigator, Plaintiffâs employment status was that of a full time "unclassified" state employee. During Plaintiffâs tenure with OCME, the agency's scheduling required that its investigators work day shifts in the office, overnight "on call" shifts, and weekend "on call" shifts on a rotating basis. During the time in question, an investigator's scheduled office hours combined with the hours the investigator was scheduled to be "on call" commonly exceeded forty hours in a week. Plaintiff contended that OCME's "on-call" system was onerous and that he should have been compensated for all time he was "on-call." Citing the absence of precedential authority on the rights of unclassified state employees to pursue a claim for unpaid wages, Plaintiff and the State jointly requested the federal court to certify a question of law to determine the applicability of section 165.9 to such a wage claim. The federal court granted the parties' request and remanded the case to the Supreme Court to answer whether an unclassified state employee who alleges his employer failed to pay him wages has a private right of action under section 165.9 of the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that an unclassified state employee can bring an action under sections 165.7(G) and 165.9 of the Protection of Labor Act to recover all wages, including overtime, that were due but not paid on one or more regular paydays as provided by section 165.2. Furthermore, the Court held that an unclassified state employee cannot recover liquidated damages as provided in section 165.3 based on any such unpaid wages, and therefore the language in section 165.9 allowing recovery of liquidated damages does not apply to an action brought by an unclassified state employee.