Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Oklahoma Publishing Company (The Oklahoman) and World Publishing Company (Tulsa World) (collectively, Publishers), filed open records requests with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of State Finance (OSF). Both the Oklahoman and Tulsa World sought to release of birth dates of all state employees. In addition, the Tulsa World requested employee identification numbers. The Oklahoma Public Employees Association (OPEA) filed two suits against OPM and OSF requesting declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to bar the release of employees' birth dates. The second suit also sought to bar employee identification numbers from disclosure. The district court consolidated the cases. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. Relying on an opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General, the trial court sustained OPEA's and OPM's motions. It ordered that the state agencies be given sixty daysâ notice to report their decisions on whether disclosure of date of birth requests would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; whether public access could be denied to employee identification numbers; and that legislative staff records were exempt from disclosure under the Oklahoma Open Records Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Oklahoma law already contains a non-exclusive list of examples of information that if released, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of State employees' personal privacy. As guidance, the Court held that where a claim of invasion of privacy is made, courts should use a case-by-case balancing test to determine whether personal information is subject to release. If significant privacy interests are at stake while the public's interest in the disclosed information is minimal, release of that information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Plaintiff Matthew Hamrick sued Oklahoma for wrongs he allegedly suffered during his employment with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. Plaintiff initially asserted seven claims against the State, grounded on both federal and state law. Plaintiff later dismissed all of the state law claims except his claim for unpaid wages under the Protection of Labor Act. Throughout his service as an investigator, Plaintiffâs employment status was that of a full time "unclassified" state employee. During Plaintiffâs tenure with OCME, the agency's scheduling required that its investigators work day shifts in the office, overnight "on call" shifts, and weekend "on call" shifts on a rotating basis. During the time in question, an investigator's scheduled office hours combined with the hours the investigator was scheduled to be "on call" commonly exceeded forty hours in a week. Plaintiff contended that OCME's "on-call" system was onerous and that he should have been compensated for all time he was "on-call." Citing the absence of precedential authority on the rights of unclassified state employees to pursue a claim for unpaid wages, Plaintiff and the State jointly requested the federal court to certify a question of law to determine the applicability of section 165.9 to such a wage claim. The federal court granted the parties' request and remanded the case to the Supreme Court to answer whether an unclassified state employee who alleges his employer failed to pay him wages has a private right of action under section 165.9 of the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that an unclassified state employee can bring an action under sections 165.7(G) and 165.9 of the Protection of Labor Act to recover all wages, including overtime, that were due but not paid on one or more regular paydays as provided by section 165.2. Furthermore, the Court held that an unclassified state employee cannot recover liquidated damages as provided in section 165.3 based on any such unpaid wages, and therefore the language in section 165.9 allowing recovery of liquidated damages does not apply to an action brought by an unclassified state employee.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Thomas filed suit in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that H.B.1804, the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizens Protection Act of 2007, was unconstitutional. Plaintiff sued Brad Henry, Governor of Oklahoma, and the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue. The trial judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial judge partially granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that part of the Act violated the single-subject rule. The trial judge severed that portion from the remainder of H.B.1804 and held that the remainder of H.B.1804 did not violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions urged by the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed and Defendant filed a counter-appeal, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the Act. Upon careful consideration of the arguments by both sides, and of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's assessment that H.B.1804 does not otherwise violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions as urged by Plaintiff. The Court declined "to concern itself with a statute's propriety, desirability, wisdom or its practicality as a working proposition; such questions are plainly and definitely established by fundamental law as functions of the legislative branch of government." The Court affirmed the trial court's holding for all but one section of H.B.1804, and remanded the case for further consideration.

Plaintiff Pamela Casey filed a petition for divorce in 2003. The district court entered a decree of dissolution and divided the marital property. Defendant William Casey appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the lower court to adjust the division of the marital property. The trial judge remembered hearing an earlier case involving Plaintiff when he worked at the Garvin County district attorneyâs office. In that case, Defendantâs new wife sought a protective order against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was charged with felony malicious injury to property. The judge recused himself from hearing that case. The charges were eventually dropped. The judge still felt strongly about the disposition of that earlier case, but he felt he could be objective enough to hear Plaintiffâs divorce case and divide the marital property as ordered by the appellate court. Plaintiffâs divorce counsel asked the judge to recuse himself again, and the judge refused. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to step aside. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that âbased on the facts and circumstances in this case, and in fairness and justice to the Plaintiff, the trial judge was obligated to recuse.â The Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

If funds are available, the Educational Leadership Oklahoma Act (Act) provides for bonuses to eligible teachers who attain national certification. In the past, the State Board of Education provided the full amount of bonuses and any additional amounts necessary to cover the payroll withholding taxes on the bonuses. In 2010, the Board didnât pay the withholding taxes. Teachers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board should have paid the withholding taxes on their bonuses. The trial court found that because the School District was not liable for the bonus payments under the Act, the State Department of Education was, and payment of the bonuses was conditioned on the availability of funds to pay them from State. The court determined that the School District was required to use some of the allocated bonus money from the State to fund the Districtâs tax obligations. Furthermore, the court concluded that the Teachers sued the wrong party by suing the School District, so that it could not enter a judgment in their favor. Accordingly, district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the Teachers were State employees, and State was responsible for paying employer withholding taxes for the bonuses, the School District had to pay them. However, the Court found that the State did not have enough money to pay both the bonuses and the withholding taxâit only had enough to pay the bonuses. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision to dismiss the case.