Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Corporate taxpayer Raytheon Company's 2012 income tax return was due on March 15, 2013. Raytheon filed its return on September 27, 2013, after securing an authorized extension of the deadline. Raytheon later discovered that the return overstated the company's annual income based upon the inadvertent inclusion of Arizona property sales. The company filed an amended 2012 return on September 27, 2016, claiming a refund of $321,444.00. The Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the refund claim, reasoning taxpayer submitted its demand more than three years after paying the taxes. An administrative law judge found the claimed refund was time barred under 68 O.S.2011, section 2373, and the Commissioners affirmed this finding. The company appealed, and after review the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, finding the taxpayer timely brought the claim for refund, having paid taxes to the Oklahoma Tax Commission upon filing its amended original return with a proper extension. View "In the matter of the Income Tax Protest of Raytheon Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Magnum Energy, Inc. appealed a Board of Adjustment for the City of Norman (Board) decision denying Plaintiff's application for a variance from the City's business licensing requirement that oil and gas operators maintain two million dollars in umbrella liability coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor, finding that the requirement conflicted with State law and was therefore unenforceable. The Board appealed the trial court's order; the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the order, finding no conflict between the requirement and State law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the requirement conflicted with 52 O.S.Supp.2015 section 137.1, rendering the requirement invalid and unenforceable. View "Magnum Energy v. Bd. of Adjustment for the City of Norman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellees Ronda Owens, Darryl Hubbard, Selena Freymiller, Shanika Crowley, Valerie Killman, Michael Lee Pitts, Ebony Warrior, John Ball, Michelle Bullock, Logan Bellew, Sondia Bell, Tumeeka Baker, and Jay Reid (collectively "Citizens") filed the underlying lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Citizens claimed that Oklahoma Governor J. Kevin Stitt and Defendant-appellant Shelley Zumwalt, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, acted without authority and violated 40 O.S.2011 section 4-313 of the Oklahoma Employment Security Act by terminating agreements with the U.S. Department of Labor to administer COVID-related unemployment programs. The trial court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Zumwalt to immediately reinstate and administer the programs. Zumwalt appealed, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court stayed the trial court's order pending appeal. The Supreme Court found 40 O.S. 4-313 did not create a private right of action and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction. View "Owens, et al. v. Zumwalt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Craig Immel, Terry Young, Herb Beattie, and Ray Pearcey (collectively, "Taxpayers"), sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants-appellees, Tulsa Public Facilities Authority (TPFA) and the City of Tulsa (City), could not sell 8.8 acres of park land to a private developer for the construction of a commercial shopping center because the land was held in a public trust expressly as a park for the people. All parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the TPFA and the City's joint motion for summary judgment as to all claims. Taxpayers appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held: (1) Taxpayers had standing; (2) the TPFA and the City could not sell the 8.8 acres of park land to a private developer for construction of a commercial shopping center because the land was indeed held in a public trust for the people, unless it was abandoned and/or was no longer fit for its intended use as a public park; (3) there were disputed material facts as to whether the TPFA and the City lawfully abandoned the 8.8 acres of park land; and (4) there were disputed material facts as to whether the expenditure met the public purpose requirement under the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court's order granting the TPFA and the City's joint motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Immel et al. v. Tulsa Public Facilities Authority" on Justia Law

A physician's professional conduct was examined by the Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision. During the disciplinary proceeding a stipulated protective order was entered by the Board. The professional complaint against the physician was dismissed, and approximately two years later the physician requested the Board modify its protective order to allow the physician to use three documents in a different legal proceeding. The Board refused, and the physician appealed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: (1) the stipulated blanket protective order making all documents in the administrative proceeding subject to the order and prohibiting their use in any other legal proceeding was contrary to the public policy expressed by the Oklahoma Open Records Act and the Oklahoma Discovery Code; and (2) the physician's claim seeking access to the initial report of misconduct was not properly before the Court. View "State ex rel. Okla. St. Bd. of Medical Licensure & Supervision v. Rivero" on Justia Law

Petitioners the Oklahoma State Medical Association, Oklahoma Dental Association, the Oklahoma Osteopathic Association, the Oklahoma Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc., and Oklahoma Chapter American Academy of Pediatrics, Inc., asked the Oklahoma Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to declare the actions of Respondents Kevin Corbett, CEO of the Oklahoma Health Care Authority and the State of Oklahoma ex rel. the Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA), to implementing a new managed care program known as SoonerSelect, was not statutorily authorized and that such actions were therefore ultra vires. In the alternative, if the Supreme Court finds statutory authorization existed, Petitioners sought a declaration that Respondents violated the non-delegation doctrine. Petitioners also asked the Supreme Court to invalidate the Respondents' actions, including the request for proposal (RFP) and contract awards, because the Respondents failed to promulgate administrative rules to govern their implementation in violation of 75 O.S. 2011, sections 302(D) and (E). Finally, the Petitioners asserted the SoonerSelect program would require mandatory enrollment in violation of article II, Section 37(B) of the Oklahoma Constitution. The Petitioners requested the Supreme Court issue a writ of prohibition barring the Respondents from implementing SoonerSelect until such time as the Oklahoma Legislature has conferred the necessary authority. In the alternative, if the Court found such authority already existed in statute, then Petitioners requested the Court issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Respondents to promulgate administrative rules governing the SoonerSelect program prior to further implementation of the program. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioners' assertion that the Legislature did not authorize the creation of the SoonerSelect program. It therefore did not find it necessary to engage in a thorough examination of the statutes to determine if there was a non-delegation doctrine violation. The OHCA did not promulgate any rules governing SoonerSelect for to review in order to weigh such a determination. To this end, the Court granted Petitioners declaratory relief; the Court deemed writs of mandamus or probation inappropriate. View "Oklahoma State Medical Association et al. v. Corbett" on Justia Law

In 2017, Appellant Darlene Johnson, a school cafeteria worker for the Midwest City Del City Public Schools, fell in the school parking lot sustaining injuries. Immediately prior to this fall, Johnson had walked off the employer's facility onto an adjacent city street to take an authorized work break to smoke a cigarette. It is undisputed that (1) no injury occurred to Johnson while she was outside of the employer's facility premises, (2) Johnson was "clocked in" when she fell in the parking lot, and (3) her supervisor authorized her work break. It is further undisputed that the location where Johnson smoked her cigarette complied with the employer/school policy with regard to tobacco products. Appellant’s employer denied her claims for workers’ compensation, arguing Johnson was not in the course and scope of employment because her injuries did not occur "inside the employer's facility" within the meaning of 85A O.S.Supp.2013, section 2(13)(d). The administrative law judge awarded benefits to Johnson, finding that her accidental personal injuries occurred inside the employer's facility and arose in the course and scope of employment as defined by Section 2(13)(d). The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed this decision finding the administrative law judge misapplied the law and determined that Johnson was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of her injuries because the parking lot was not "inside the employer's facility." The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Commission. After its review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion, holding that the decision of the administrative law judge was neither against the clear weight of the evidence nor contrary to law and further that the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission was in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction and affected by other errors of law. View "Johnson v. Midwest City Del City Public Schools" on Justia Law

In December 2020, an Oklahoma district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fraternal Order of the Police, Bratcher/Miner Memorial Lodge, Lodge No. 122 on the Order's request for a declaratory judgment. After discussion of the city budget, and hearing from the public concerning possible reallocation of funds, City Council postponed adoption of the FYE 2021 Operating and Capital budgets until June 16th. At the special meeting, the first action occurred as stated on the agenda, and Council adopted the budget for the Norman Convention and Visitors Bureau. A councilmember then moved to adopt the FYE 2021 City of Norman Operating and Capital Budgets (city budget). But, instead of adopting or rejecting the city budget as listed on the agenda, Council proceeded to amend it numerous times. Eventually, Council passed the three disputed amendments in this case, "reallocating" $865,000 of funding. Plaintiff FOP argued that City violated the Open Meeting Act by enacting amendments at the special meeting that were not included on the posted agenda. City asserted that its posted agenda met the requirements of the Act because the budget affected by the disputed amendments was a subsidiary budget within the listed city budget. The question before the Oklahoma Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant-appellant City of Norman complied with the statutory notice requirements of the Open Meeting Act for its June 16, 2020 special meeting. The Supreme Court concluded City's agenda did not provide sufficient notice of the June 16, 2020 special meeting as required by the Open Meeting Act. We find that the language used in the agenda was deceptively vague and likely to mislead regarding the meeting, and was therefore a wilful violation of the Act. Due to City's failure to post a valid notice under the Open Meeting Act, City's amendment of the city budget and subsequent approval of the amended budget was invalid. The Court found no disputes as to any material facts, and Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Norman" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Harmon County, Oklahoma, filed an action against the Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma Self Insured Group (ACCO-SIG). ACCO-SIG sought to disqualify the Board's lawyers, alleging one of the Board's attorneys had a conflict of interest because he had previously represented ACCO-SIG in a substantially similar matter four years earlier. ACCO-SIG sought to have the lawyer, and his entire law firm, disqualified from representing the Board. After the trial court held a disqualification hearing, it denied ACCO-SIG's request to disqualify. ACCO-SIG appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that under the facts presented, disqualification was not required. View "Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Assoc. of County Comm'rs of Okla Self-Insured Grp." on Justia Law

Property owners (taxpayers) appealed ad valorem tax assessments made during 2012-2015 to the Tulsa County District Court after their appeals to the Tulsa County Board of Equalization were denied. Taxpayers were successful in the District Court appeal by showing one parcel of property was exempt and a second parcel partially exempt from ad valorem taxation. The District Court determined the amounts of the tax refund and stated the Tulsa County Treasurer "pay the Petitioners interest on such amounts as allowed by law." The Tulsa County Assessor appealed, but the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held the general postjudgment statute, 12 O.S. section 727.1, did not apply to taxpayers' ad valorem tax protest appeal, and the procedure for interest on taxpayers' protested tax payments was provided by the ad valorem statute, 68 O.S. section 2884. View "In the Matter of the Assessments for Tax Year 2012" on Justia Law