Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 12 (2014). Because the Supreme Court concluded that the ballot title did not 4 substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2), it referred it to the Attorney General for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 11 (2014). Among them, petitioners advanced a host of arguments asserting various inadequacies of the ballot title. After careful review, the Supreme Court found the ballot title did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2). Therefore, the Court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Buehler v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services revoked a contractor's eligibility to provide home delivered meals to Medicaid clients because the contractor breached its contract with the department by failing to comply with certain food preparation and delivery standards. The contractor, Homestyle Direct, objected to the revocation, arguing that the standards in the contract were not enforceable because they should have been promulgated as administrative rules. The department rejected those arguments, concluding that whether the standards could have been promulgated as administrative rules was irrelevant to their enforceability as terms of a contract. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the department could not enforce unpromulgated rules as terms of a contract. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and reversed its decision. The Court affirmed the final order of the department. View "Homestyle Direct, LLC v. DHS" on Justia Law

The petitioners in this case sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 9 (2014). They argued the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 9, if adopted by the voters, would amend provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Upon review of the ballot title, the Supreme Court concluded that the proposed ballot title did not contain a concise and impartial summary of not more than 125 words that summarized the proposed measure and its effects. Furthermore, the Court found that the proposed summary of the initiative did not disclose that employees who were not members of the union but who were members of the bargaining unit would receive representation without cost. Accordingly the title was referred back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Towers v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a taxpayer could satisfy its obligation to "pay annually to the state" the $75,000 corporate minimum tax under ORS 3 317.090(2), by claiming on its corporate excise tax return a $75,000 "Business Energy Tax Credit" (BETC) under ORS 315.354. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer, Con-Way, could satisfy its tax liability under ORS 317.090(2) by claiming a BETC on its return. The Department of Revenue (department) appealed, arguing that the Tax Court's conclusion was inconsistent with ORS 317.090(2), on the ground that a tax credit cannot be used to pay or otherwise satisfy the minimum tax imposed under ORS 2 317.090(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Con-Way Inc. & Affiliates v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

In 2007, the decedent allegedly sustained personal injuries while disembarking from a bus operated by [defendant]. Decedent died a year later from causes unrelated to the bus accident. In 2009, more than two years, but less than three years, after the bus incident -- plaintiff, decedent's personal representative, filed a complaint alleging that [defendant] had negligently injured decedent and sought damages for the alleged personal injuries. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff's survival action against a public body should have been brought within two years or three years of the alleged injury. One of two statutes provided the applicable statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that ORS 30.075(1) was the governing statute that triggered a two-year limitation period of ORS 30.275(9). View "Bell v. Tri-Met" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was the appeal of a final order of the Energy Facility Siting Council that approved an amended site certificate for construction of a wind energy facility. Specifically, the issue was whether, in approving the amended site certificate, the council correctly declined to require compliance with a recently adopted county ordinance requiring a two-mile setback between wind turbines and rural residences pursuant to ORS 469.401(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the council did not err in not requiring compliance with the ordinance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the council did not err in denying petitioners' requests for a contested case proceeding. Therefore the council's final order approving the amended site certificate was affirmed. View "Blue Mountain Alliance v. Energy Facility Siting" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the scope of Clackamas County's contractual obligation to provide health insurance benefits to command officer retirees of the County Sheriff's Office. A contract between the county and command officers, including Plaintiff Neil James, required the county to use a particular fund to pay for a certain level of benefits to command officers after they retired. The contract added that the obligation to pay benefits was "contingent upon the availability of sufficient funding in said fund to pay for the same." After plaintiff retired, the cost of insurance premiums increased to the point where the fund was and would for the foreseeable future continue to be insufficient to pay for the benefits required. The county entered into a new contract with certain union employees to provide lesser benefits from a more stable fund, and plaintiff (a retired officer, not a union employee) also was provided those lesser benefits. Plaintiff brought an action against the county, asserting breach of contract. He maintained that the first contract required the county to pay him full health insurance benefits and argued that the contingency provision did not apply because of the creation of the new fund, which had sufficient money to pay for those benefits. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the new fund was the product of a contract that was separate and independent from the earlier contract. Because the prior fund was insufficient to provide the agreed level of benefits, the county did not breach its contractual obligation to provide that level of benefits. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "James v. Clackamas County" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court. They arose from an action for personal injury brought in federal district court against defendant Christopher Boyle and his employer, the City of Beaverton, for injuries that plaintiff Jean Howell suffered in an automobile collision with a police car that defendant Boyle drove. A jury found that plaintiff and Boyle were equally at fault and that plaintiff's damages totaled approximately $1 million. The trial court reduced the award by half, in accordance with the jury's findings of comparative fault. Defendants then moved to reduce the award further, to the $200,000 limit of the then-current Oregon Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the application of the statutory limitation would have violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants appealed, and the Ninth Circuit certified the following questions: (1) is plaintiff's negligence action constitutionally protected under the Oregon Constitution's remedy clause irrespective of the jury's finding of comparative negligence?; and (2) if plaintiff's action is protected, is $200,000 an unconstitutional emasculated remedy despite the jury's finding of comparative negligence? The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the second question only, because its answer was dispositive: "[e]ven assuming for the sake of argument that, under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff's negligence action is constitutionally protected by Article I, section 10, the $200,000 limitation on her recovery is constitutionally permissible. Under this court's case law, the constitution requires that any remedy that remains after the imposition of a modern limitation on it be 'substantial.' In this case, the $200,000 judgment that plaintiff received satisfies that constitutional requirement." View "Howell v. Boyle" on Justia Law

The primary question in this case was whether the Oregon Department of Revenue properly classified income resulting from the sale of Crystal Communication's assets as "business income." Crystal operated as a multistate business providing wireless cellular telecommunications services and, in the relevant tax years, sold its assets related to those services. It reported the gain from the asset sale as "nonbusiness income" and allocated that gain to Florida, its state of commercial domicile. On audit, the department reclassified the gain as apportionable "business income." Crystal challenged the reclassification, and the Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of the department and entered judgment accordingly. Crystal appealed to this court. Finding no error in the classification, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law