Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2002, Appellee Beverly Roethlein, an Allentown taxpayer, filed a class action complaint against Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd., and Michelle Portnoff, Esquire (the firm's sole shareholder) seeking recovery for unjust enrichment and violations of Section 502 of Act 6, Pennsylvania’s Loan Interest and Protection Law. Portnoff serves as a private tax collector for various municipalities and school districts, and had contracts with 22 municipalities to represent them in the collection of delinquent real estate taxes. Taxpayers would be charged $150 for the opening of a file and preparation of a demand letter; $150 for the filing of a lien and preparation of a second letter; and $150 for preparation and filing of a writ of scire facias. The contracts required the municipalities to enact an ordinance or resolution authorizing Portnoff to impose legal fees upon the delinquent taxpayer. From the time a file was sent to her for collection, Portnoff began charging 10% interest on the principal. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Loan Interest and Protection Law provided taxpayers with a cause of action to challenge costs imposed for the collection of delinquent taxes or to seek damages and attorneys’ fees for improperly-imposed costs. Furthermore, at issue was whether Section 7103 of the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act authorized a municipality to recover the administrative costs it incurs in collecting delinquent taxes. After review, the Court concluded that Act 6 does not provide a cause of action for claims which do not involve the loan or use of money. Furthermore, the Court concluded Section 7103 of the MCTLA allows a municipality to recover fees it pays to a third-party tax collector for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Roethlein v. Portnoff Law Assoc." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare (DPW) and the Wyoming County Human Services appealed a Commonwealth Court order reversing DPW’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ order refusing to expunge an indicated report of child sexual abuse relating to a father’s alleged abuse of his four-year-old daughter. The questions before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the admissibility of a videotape of the daughter’s allegations under the relevant hearsay exception for child victims and, if admissible, whether that videotape constituted the requisite substantial evidence for denying the father’s request to expunge. Upon careful review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the father in this case waived any challenge to the admissibility of the videotape by failing to object before the Administrative Law Judge both when he was unrepresented on the first day of the hearing and when he was represented by counsel on the second day of the hearing. Furthermore, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s determination that DPW failed to present substantial evidence to support the indicated report of sexual abuse under the Child Protective Services Law. View "R.A. v. DPW & Wyoming County Human Services" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether certain property in Cumberland County, which was owned by the City of Philadelphia as trustee of the Stephen Girard Trust and leased by the Board of Directors of City Trusts to the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, was subject to local real estate taxation in Cumberland County. The trial court held that the property was both immune and exempt from local real estate taxation. The Commonwealth Court reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the trial court’s order on grounds of tax immunity. View "City of Philadelphia v. Cumberland Cty Brd Assess Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether: (1) the repeal of an ordinance mooted any challenges to that ordinance; (2) whether the Commonwealth Court may issue an opinion on the merits of certain issues where it subsequently remands the case for a determination of mootness on another issue; and (3) whether parties to a hearing can continue a challenge to a zoning ordinance once the original challenger has withdrawn. Because “parties to a hearing” are distinct from “party appellants,” unless the former have taken steps to become party appellants, the Supreme Court found they cannot continue the challenge. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court’s decision permitting parties to the hearing to continue the challenge brought by the original party appellant was reversed, and the attempted challenge was dismissed. View "Stuckley v. ZHB of Newtown Twp." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the limits of the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) authority to allocate costs associated with a rail-highway crossing project. The Commonwealth Court held that the Commission could not allocate costs to a transportation utility that regularly uses a railroad-crossing site and does not own real estate or properties there. The Commission and Intervenors argued that the PUC has broad discretion not only to determine the allocation of costs to "concerned parties," but also to determine which parties are "concerned" in the first instance. Counterbalancing the Commission's and Intervenors' remarks about equities, Norfolk Southern Railway questioned why it should contribute to the remediation of deteriorating infrastructure over which it had no control. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a transportation utility need not own facilities at a rail-highway crossing to be a concerned party for purposes of the PUC's cost-allocation jurisdiction and authority, at least where the utility conducts regular operations at the crossing and may enforce an easement-based right of way. View "Norfolk Southern Railway v. PUC" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the constitutionality of legislation mandating a one-time transfer of money from the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund to Pennsylvania's General Fund. The Commonwealth faced a budget impasse for the 2009-10 fiscal year that lasted approximately 100 days. An interim budget was passed, and impasse was resolved when the Governor approved a supplemental appropriations bill, as well as implementing legislation making amendments to Pennsylvania's Fiscal Code. One of Act provisions designed to balance the budget directed that $100 million be transferred from the MCARE Fund to the General Fund. Appellees sought a declaration that: (1) the transfer of $100 million from the MCARE Fund to the General Fund extinguished vested rights or constituted an illegal taking in violation of the due process guarantees contained the Commonwealth and federal constitutions; and (2) the transfer violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Concerned that the Commonwealth might effectuate the transfer and dissipate the funds, Appellees filed an application for preliminary injunctive relief (a temporary restraining order). After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the October 2009 amendment to the Fiscal Code transferring $100 million from the MCARE Fund to the General Fund implicated the providers' due process rights, but that the question of whether the legislation was finally unconstitutional requires further factual development. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order granting summary relief. View "Geisinger Health System, et al v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Mother and Appellant/Cross-Appellee Lisa Kinney Lindstrom sought a ruling as to the number of "occurrences" for which the MCARE Fund is liable based on allegations that her physician failed to diagnose discrete in utero infections suffered by her twins, which caused severe injuries to both children. The Commonwealth Court granted summary judgment in favor of the MCARE Fund, holding that the physician's failure to diagnose Mother's infection constituted the single cause of the children's injuries, and, therefore, there was a single occurrence, limiting MCARE coverage to the statutory limit of one payment of $1 million. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth Court erred by granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the children's injuries arose from the physician's failure to diagnose a single infection, or whether the children's injuries resulted from the physician's failure to diagnose multiple infections from different organisms that infected each child in utero at different times. View "Kinney-Lindstrom v. MCARE Fund" on Justia Law

Petitioners claimed that Article V, Section 16(b) of the state charter was unconstitutional. They argued that section 16(b) deprived them of their inherent right to be free of age-based discrimination, particularly because the section mandates that jurists retire the year they turn 70 years old. In prior decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Article V, Section 16(b) was not so irrational as to be considered unconstitutional. The Court denied petitioners' application for relief and dismissed the case with prejudice. View "Friedman v. Corbett" on Justia Law

Appellee Young's Sales & Service submitted a claim with Appellant Underground Storage Indemnification Fund for reimbursement of remediation costs it incurred following the release of certain regulated chemicals stored in underground tanks on its property. The claim was denied, and Appellee appealed. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Commonwealth Court correctly held that section 706(2) of the Storage Tank Spill Prevention Act applied on a per tank basis. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it did not. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the Board's order denying Appellee's claim. View "Young's Sales & Service v. Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board" on Justia Law

Petitioners Senior Judges John Driscoll and Sandra Moss, and Judges Joseph O'Keefe and Arthur Tilson sought to nullify the mandatory retirement provision applicable to judicial officers as enumerated in the Pennsylvania Constitution. The judges argued that they were elected and then retained to ten-year judicial terms, and that enforcement of the constitutional provision would require them to retire against their will prior to the expiration of those terms. While the Supreme Court recognized "colorable merit" to petitioners' argument that a constitutional amendment may impinge on rights otherwise recognized in the Constitution itself, the Court nevertheless found petitioners did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and remanded their case back to the Commonwealth Court to be dismissed. View "Driscoll v. Corbett" on Justia Law