Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees owned a 166-acre farm in Lower Makefield Township. On December 6, 1996, Lower Maker Township condemned the property in order to build a public golf course. Appellees filed preliminary objections challenging the validity of using eminent domain for such a purpose. That issue was eventually appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which found the taking was for a legitimate public use. As the parties were unable to agree on damages, the matter proceeded to a jury trial for a calculation of the property's value. The trial lasted six days, and a total of 11 witnesses were called, one of whom was appellee Chester Dalgewicz. Mr. Dalgewicz testified regarding the farm's history and the interest shown by several developers in purchasing the property, and described some of the offers received both before and after the property was condemned, including a 1995 agreement of sale with Ryland Homes for $5.1 million, and a 1998 sales agreement with Toll Brothers for $7 million, contingent upon the condemnation being overturned. During Mr. Dalgewicz's testimony, he described a December, 1998 written offer from Pulte Homes, Inc., including a $8 million offer price; the offer letter was also introduced into evidence. The Township objected arguing the offer was inadmissible as it did not result in a sales agreement and any testimony concerning the offer price would be irrelevant and prejudicial. The Township appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's ruling that testimony regarding a bona fide offer and the underlying offer letter itself could be introduced into evidence in a condemnation valuation trial. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Lower Maker Township v. Lands of Chester Dalgewicz" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted 24 Pa.C.S. 8507(e) to require that the Public School Employees' Retirement System nomination of benefits form be completed in its entirely in the member/decedent's own hand in order to effectuate a valid change of beneficiary. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court erred, and held that the Board correctly determined that under the facts of this case, section 8507(e) allowed for distribution of retirement benefits at issue to the appellant. View "Snizaski v. Public School Employees' Retirement Board" on Justia Law

Appellees filed an original-jurisdiction petition for review challenging recent changes to the Department of Public Welfare's practices and policies in determining appropriate reimbursement of county expenditures for out-of-home, child-welfare placement services. According to the petition, the reimbursement scheme as published in the Code, Department regulations, and in previous administrative practices, embodied a needs-based budgeting process supplemented by compliance review via intermittent auditing of county and service provider records by the state agency. Appellees contended however, that DPW through a series of recent administrative bulletins, had unilaterally and inappropriately substituted a restrictive, statewide rate-setting process in place of the prior regime. Appellees lodged substantive and procedural challenges, claiming that the changes effected by the bulletins were ultra vires and unconstitutional, or, alternatively, that DPW had failed to comply with mandatory regulatory-review procedures designed to ensure a meaningful opportunity for public participation and independent regulatory oversight. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did not err in concluding that the bulletins contained procedurally invalid legislative regulations. View "NW Youth Svcs. v. Dept. Pub. Welfare " on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the "interaction" of the attorney-client privilege and the Right-to-Know Law, Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. secs. 67.101-67.3104 ("RTKL"). In 2010, Associated Press member Marc Levy sent two written requests to the Senate’s Right to Know Officer seeking "all bills, contracts and payment records related to the hiring of any outside lawyer or law firm to represent Sen. Robert J. Mellow beginning Jan. 1, 2009" and the same documents related to "any current or former employee of the Senate Democratic caucus beginning Jan. 1, 2009." The requests came a few days after the media reported that federal authorities executed search warrants on Senator Mellow's home and office as part of a grand jury investigation. After review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that client identities are not protected by the attorney-client privilege, but adopted specified exceptions to this general rule. The Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's determination that general descriptions of legal services included in attorney invoices are not covered by the umbrella of the attorney-client privilege but that specific descriptions that would reveal attorney-client communications are protected. Furthermore, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and overturned its decision in "Signature Information Solutions, LLC. v. Aston Township," (995 A.2d 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)), to the extent it determined that any reasons for denial not raised in the initial written denial of a RTKL request were waived and could not be raised at a later stage of the RTKL process. View "Levy v. Senate of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the "contours" of the Board of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction pertaining to procurement litigation against state agencies. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether such jurisdiction foreclosed original-jurisdiction proceedings in Commonwealth Court, challenging an Department of General Services' (DGS) cancellation of a request for proposals and request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The matter arose from a 2010 DGS request for proposals for the design, development, implementation, and maintenance of a computer control system to monitor slot machines at gaming venues across the Commonwealth. The plan was to replace an existing system which had been provided by Intervenor-Appellant, GTECH Corporation. GTECH and Appellee Scientific Games International, Inc. (SGI), each submitted proposals, and DGS selected SGI for the award and proceeded with contract negotiations. GTECH was informed that the contract had been awarded to SGI and submitted a protest. Two months later, DGS’s Deputy Secretary for Administration issued a final determination denying GTECH’s protest in material part, with prejudice. GTECH appealed the determination and requested, among other things, that the request for proposals be cancelled. Subsequently, DGS announced that it was canceling the request for proposals and sent a letter to SGI indicating "with little elaboration" that the cancelation was in the best interests of the Commonwealth. Subsequently, SGI commenced an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Departments of Revenue and General Services in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction and petitioned for a preliminary injunction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contractors, bidders, and offerors have limited recourse and remedies: "[r]elative to controversies in matters arising from procurement contracts with Commonwealth agencies, the Board of Claims retains exclusive jurisdiction (subject to all jurisdictional prerequisites), which is not to be supplanted by a court of law through an exercise of original jurisdiction. As to challenges to cancellations of solicitations asserted under Section 521 of the Procurement Code, the Legislature did not implement any waiver of sovereign immunity and afforded no remedy to aggrieved bidders and offerors which have not yet entered into an executed contract with a Commonwealth agency." View "Scientific Games Int'l v. GTech Corp." on Justia Law

Claimant Dorothy Robinson was a police officer for the City of Pittsburgh. In 1997, she sustained a work-related injury, and the City placed her on light-duty. In 2001, while traveling for treatment of her injury, Claimant was involved in an automobile accident in which she sustained new injuries. After the accident, Claimant did not return to her light-duty position nor was she offered any other light-duty work. In late 2004, Claimant received a disability pension. In connection with Claimant’s claim of entitlement to a disability pension, she was examined by three physicians who certified that Claimant was unable to perform her pre-injury job as a police officer. Nearly three years later, an independent medical examiner concluded that although Claimant was not fit to perform her prior job as a police officer, she could perform modified-duty work. The City filed a Petition to Suspend Compensation Benefits, asserting that Claimant was capable of working, "but has voluntarily removed herself from the work force as she has not looked for or sought employment in the general labor market." Claimant filed a response, denying the averments of the suspension petition and asserting that she remained attached to the workforce and had registered for work with the Pennsylvania Job Center. She further claimed that she was not presently working only because of the unavailability of work and because the City had eliminated her light-duty position. The Workers' Compensation Judge denied the suspension petition, concluding that Claimant had not voluntarily removed herself from the workforce. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned the assignment of the burden of proof when the employer sought to modify or suspend a claimant's benefits on the basis that the claimant had retired. The Commonwealth Court plurality devised a "totality of the circumstances" test and concluded that the City failed to show that the injured worker had voluntarily withdrawn from the workforce. The City appealed, but the Supreme Court concurred with the Commonwealth Court and affirmed. View "City of Pittsburgh v. WCAB (Robinson)" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter arose from direct appeal of an order that denied injunctive and declaratory relief by an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court regarding various constitutional challenges to a law enacted by the General Assembly known as "Act 108 of 2011." Specifically, it was alleged that Act 108 was violative of: (1) the "single subject rule" of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; (2) the separation of powers doctrine of Article V, Sections 1 and 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution establishing a unified judicial system supervised by the Supreme Court; and (3) the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under the void for vagueness doctrine. The Commonwealth Court, in a 4-3 decision, rejected the constitutional challenges and dismissed the action. After oral argument and consideration of the Commonwealth Court record, the Supreme Court concluded that with regard to the Article III, Section 3 single subject challenge, Act 108 was unconstitutional. Given this disposition, the Court did not consider the remaining arguments. View "PA State Ass'n of Jury Commissioners v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Appellant Glatfelter Pulpwood Company challenged the Commonwealth Court's affirmance of the Board of Finance and Revenue's determination that Appellant's gains from the sale of a tract of Delaware timberland be characterized as "business income," subject to taxation in Pennsylvania. Concluding that none of Appellant's issues raised on appeal entitled it to any relief, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court. View "Glatfelter Pulpwood Co. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the "voluntary layoff option" proviso ("VLO Proviso") contained in Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law ("UC Law"), permits employees to receive unemployment compensation benefits when they accept an early retirement plan offered pursuant to an employer-initiated workforce reduction. Upon application of our rules of statutory construction, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court and concluded that the UC Law does not preclude application of the VLO Proviso to early retirement plans offered pursuant to employer-initiated workforce reductions. View "Diehl v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Appellee Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) is considered an "arm" of the state which under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution would confer upon it sovereign immunity from lawsuits brought by injured employees. After review of the applicable statutory authority, the Supreme Court concluded that SEPTA could not be deemed an "arm" of the state, and thus is not entitled to sovereign immunity from suits under the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the Court reversed an order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth." on Justia Law