Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This direct appeal concerned the Commonwealth Court's jurisdiction over a suit brought by public school employees for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Office of Open Records, seeking to protect the employees' home addresses from disclosure under the Right to Know Law. Due to concerns surrounding the potential disclosure of school employees' names and home addresses under the recently enacted Right-to-Know Law (RTKL), the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) sought guidance from the Office of Open Records (OOR) in the form of an advisory opinion. The OOR, however, dismissed the request as moot, as it had already issued final determinations directing the release of public records containing school employees' home addresses. Subsequently, numerous RTKL requests were filed with school districts across Pennsylvania, seeking disclosure of the names and home addresses of school employees. Upon discovering that many school districts had not challenged, or would not challenge, the release of such information, PSEA filed a petition for review against the OOR in the Commonwealth Court, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the disclosure of school employees' names and home addresses and a declaration that such information is exempt from disclosure under the RTKL. PSEA appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Commonwealth Court erred by refusing to exercise its original jurisdiction over their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. "Plainly, the RTKL, as presently implemented by the OOR, does not provide public school employees with a reliable administrative or judicial method by which to seek redress for action that they believe violates the statutory scheme and/or their constitutional rights. In these unique circumstances, [the Supreme Court had] no difficulty in concluding that it is just and proper for the OOR to be haled into court to address core and colorable issues connected with such treatment at the behest of affected persons and their associations." The Commonwealth Court's decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Penna. State Education Assn v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the propriety of resolutions adopted by two school boards that reduce the compensation rates for elected tax collectors in an effort to adopt alternative collection methods. "[The Supreme Court] recognize[d] the difficulties faced by the School Boards in periods of financial uncertainty, but it is beyond the boards' power to transform the local tax collection system by reducing compensation levels to such a degree that the elected Tax Collectors are unable to fulfill their responsibilities; such systematic change must come from the Legislature." The Court reversed the ruling of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Telly v. Pennridge School Dist." on Justia Law

Mason-Dixon Resorts, L.P. made a direct appeal to the Supreme Court to challenge a Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board decision that awarded a Category Slot Machine 3 slot machine license to intervenor Woodlands Fayette, L.L.C. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]e have no doubt that there may have been other applicants for this remaining Category 3 license, including appellant, whose facilities may not have been appropriate for the award of a license. Our task, however, is not to determine for ourselves which of the facilities was the best one, but instead to pass upon the specific claims raised, under the standard review established by the Act. . . . finding no error warranting relief, we affirm the Board's Order." View "Mason-Dixon Resorts v. PA Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal from a Commonwealth Court order which set aside the nomination petition of Andrew Gales as a Democratic Candidate for Pennsylvania State Representative in the 57th Legislative District. On April 4, 2012, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court, directed that the candidate’s name be printed on the April 24, 2012 primary election ballot, and indicated that an opinion would follow. The Court released its rationale for that order, and held that the Election Code does not prohibit an elector from signing a nomination petition using an obvious diminutive form of his or her first name, rather than the formal first name that appears on the elector’s voter registration card.

At issue in this direct appeal to the Supreme Court was a statutory prerequisite to the obligation of the Insurance Department to defend certain medical professional liability actions asserted against health care providers, and to the requirement for payment of claims asserted in such actions from the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund. Specifically, resolution of the appeal turned on when, under the governing statute, a "claim" is "made" outside a specified four-year time period. On June 4, 2007, Joanna Ziv filed a praecipe for a writ of summons naming Appellant Phillip Yussen, M.D. and other medical providers as defendants. A complaint was filed on August 2, 2007, alleging medical negligence last occurring on July 7, 2003. Appellant’s primary insurer, Pennsylvania Healthcare Providers Insurance Exchange, requested that the claim be accorded Section 715 status by the Insurance Department. The Department denied such request, however, on the basis that the claim had been made less than four years after the alleged malpractice. Appellant initially challenged this determination in the administrative setting, and a hearing ensued. Before the examiner, Appellant argued that, consistent with the policy definition of a "claim," the date on which a claim is made for purposes of Section 715 cannot precede the date on which notice is provided to the insured. Appellee, on the other hand, contended that a claim is made when it is first asserted, instituted, or comes into existence - including upon the tender of a demand or the commencement of a legal action - and that notice to the insured or insurer is not a necessary prerequisite. In this regard, Appellee Medical Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund highlighted that Section 715 does require "notice" of the claim to trigger the provider's obligation to report the claim to the Fund within 180 days, but the statute does not contain such an express notice component in delineating the four-year requirement. The Commonwealth Court sustained exceptions to the hearing examiner's recommendation lodged by Appellee and entered judgment in its favor. In its review, the Supreme Court found "claim" and "made" as used in Section 715 ambiguous. The Court determined that for purposes of Section 715, the mere filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons does not suffice to make a claim, at least in absence of some notice or demand communicated to those from whom damages are sought. The Court remanded the case for entry of judgment in Appellant's favor.

In 1985, the Board of Commissioners of Lackawanna County formed the Multi-Purpose Stadium Authority of Lackawanna County. The Stadium Authority subsequently acquired a minor league baseball team, now the "SWB Yankees." Capital was raised via bonds and other public financing, the Authority constructed the Lackawanna County Stadium, now known as PNC Field to serve as the home field for the franchise. From 1989 to 2006, the Authority managed all projects at the Stadium, including the day-to-day operations of the team. The Authority eventually consummated a management agreement with Mandalay Baseball Properties, LLC, a private entity, which vested Mandalay with the overall management and control of the day-to-day operations of the baseball club and the Stadium. Under the contract, Appellant SWB Yankees, LLC became the sole and exclusive manager of all baseball operations and other entertainment activities and events conducted at the Stadium. Gretchen Wintermantel, a reporter for the Scranton Times Tribune (collectively “Appellees”), submitted a request to the Stadium Authority seeking “access to and copies of all names and the bids submitted to [Appellant] for a concessionaire contract at [the Stadium].” Appellees invoked the Right-to-Know Law, which generally provides for access to “public records,” of a Commonwealth or local agency. The Stadium Authority’s solicitor denied the request, stating that the Authority did not possess such information, and that it was not performing a governmental function on behalf of the Stadium Authority. Appellees appealed to the Office of Open Records, taking the position that any action by Appellant as the Stadium Authority’s agent is public business. In its opinion, the court of common pleas initially rejected Appellant’s argument that the bids for a concessionaire contract were not “records” for purposes of the Right-to-Know Law, since Appellees’ request was phrased broadly such that it might be read as subsuming intangible information. After Appellant lodged an appeal, the Commonwealth Court issued its decision in "East Stroudsburg University Foundation v. OOR," (995 A.2d 496 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)) determining that “all contracts that governmental entities enter into with private contractors necessarily carry out a ‘governmental function’ [for purposes of Section 506(d)(1)] --because the government always acts as the government.” Having reviewed the relevant statutory scheme, the parties’ arguments, and the record, the Supreme Court agreed with the appeals officer, the court of common pleas, and the Commonwealth Court that the disclosure of any written concessionaire bids is required per Section 506(d)(1) of the Right-to-Know Law.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Appellant Six L's Packing Company and its claims administrator Broadspire Services, Inc. bore liability for workers' compensation benefits as a statutory employer of an injured truck driver employed as an independent contractor. Appellant owns and leases various farms and distribution and processing facilities in North America. Claimant suffered injuries in a vehicle accident on a Pennsylvania roadway while transporting Appellant’s tomatoes between a warehouse in Pennsylvania and a processing facility in Maryland. Appellant submitted evidence to establish that it did not own trucks or employ drivers, but, rather, utilized independent contractors to supply transportation services. Appellant thus took the position that it was not Claimant’s employer. The WCJ found Appellant liable for payment of workers' compensation benefits. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed on essentially the same reasoning as that of the WCJ. In its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court, recognizing "a degree of ambiguity inherent in the overall scheme for statutory employer liability, arising out of differences in the definitions for “contractor” as used in various provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA); the idiosyncratic conception of subcontracting fashioned in Section 302(a) [of the Act]; the substantial overlap between Sections 302(a) and (b); and the apparent differences in the depiction of the concept of statutory employment as between the Act’s liability and immunity provisions. Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, however, and employing the principle of liberal construction in furtherance of the Act’s remedial purposes, [the Court found] it to be plain enough that the Legislature meant to require persons (including entities) contracting with others to perform work which is a regular or recurrent part of their businesses to assure that the employees of those others are covered by workers’ compensation insurance, on pain of assuming secondary liability for benefits payment upon a default."

The issue before the Supreme Court was the proper method of calculating an hourly-wage claimant's average weekly wage under Section 309 of the Workers’ Compensation Act where the specific loss claimant suffered an initial incident, changed employers, and later suffered a work-related injury caused by the initial incident. Claimant Janice Weber-Brown worked for Appellant Lancaster General Hospital as a licensed practical nurse. In 1980, while cleaning the tracheotomy of a patient who was infected with the herpes simplex virus (HSV), the patient coughed, causing sputum to spray in Claimant’s left eye. Approximately two weeks after the incident, Claimant’s eye became swollen and infected, and Claimant believed she contracted HSV. Claimant left the employ of Lancaster General in 1985 for reasons unrelated to the eye incident. At that time, she earned $8 per hour and worked full-time. In the years following her departure from the hospital, Claimant’s eye became infected several more times. Each time, her symptoms subsided with treatment, and Claimant did not miss any work with her other employers due to her eye infections. In October 2006, however, Claimant’s eye again became infected and, this time, her infection did not respond to treatment. By February 2007, Claimant lost the vision in her left eye, and, in May 2007, she underwent a cornea transplant. The transplant did not improve her vision, and, as a result of her blindness, she was not able to return to work. At that time, Claimant earned $21 per hour. Lancaster General denied Claimant's allegations that she contracted HSV while working for the hospital, and challenged her claim that she be paid based on her then-current wage with her new employer. The WCJ determined Claimant suffered a work-related injury and held that the hospital pay Claimant's wage set at $21 per hour. Lancaster General appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCJ correctly held that the Claimant's weekly wage should have been based on her 2007 wages with her new employer, as those wages were earned with that employer at the time Claimant suffered her work-related injury.

The Supreme Court granted allocatur in this case to consider the Superior Court's application of the standard of review and to evaluate the relevance of a parent's incarceration to a trial court's decision to terminate a father's parental rights. G.P. (Father), then nineteen, and B.D. (Mother), then approximately seventeen, were involved in an intimate relationship prior to Father's incarceration in December 2004 for the shooting death of his stepfather. While Father was incarcerated, S.P. (Child) was born in May 2005. After Child’s birth, Mother took her to visit Father several times while he was incarcerated at the county prison awaiting trial. In December 2005, Child was declared dependent, when Mother tested positive for THC, a chemical found in marijuana, and was involved in a domestic assault in the presence of Child. Following the declaration of Child’s dependency, Mother and Child apparently moved between several foster homes and Child’s grandmother’s home. In 2007, Child and Youth Services (CYS) filed an emergency shelter petition on behalf of Child when it could not ensure Child's safety. In 2008, Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child. At a hearing, testimony was presented that revealed Child suffered from developmental delays and was possibly autistic. A year later at another hearing, CYS moved to terminate Father's parental rights. As applied to this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in reversing the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights: "the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that “the conditions and causes of the incapacity . . . [could not] or [would] not be remedied” by Father."

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the validity of a single unified tax assessment of both a tract of land, and the buildings of a shopping center, movie theater, and restaurant located on the land. The land was owned by Appellant Tech One Associates, and the buildings and surrounding improvements to the land were constructed and owned by a second entity, "Terra Century Associates" (Lessee). Upon review, Appellees the Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, the Borough of West Mifflin, and the West Mifflin Area School District correctly treated the land, the buildings, and the improvements to the land as real estate subject to taxation under Section 201(a) of the Commonwealth's General County Assessment Law. Further, the Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts that its previous decision in "In re Appeal of Marple Springfield Center, Inc," (607 A.2d 708 (1992)) did not preclude the valuation of real estate owned as a leasehold interest, and that the market value for the land, buildings, and improvements determined at trial accurately reflected the "economic reality" of the impact of the long-term lease between Appellant and its lessee.