Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc., a not-for-profit religious entity related to the Bobov Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn, appealed a Commonwealth Court ruling, asking that the Supreme Court find it is an "institution of a purely public charity" under Article VIII, sec. 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and entitled to exemption from real estate taxes. Appellant operated a summer camp in Pike County, Pennsylvania. Pike County denied Appellant's exemption request, finding that occasional use of Appellant's recreational and dining facilities by Pike County residents was insufficient to prove Appellant was a purely public charity. The Court allowed this appeal to determine if it must defer to the General Assembly's statutory definition of that term. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding its prior jurisprudence set the constitutional minimum for exemption from taxes; the legislation may codify what was intended to be exempted, but it cannot lessen the constitutional minimums by broadening the definition of "purely public charity" in the statute.

The Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction over this matter as a sua sponte exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the proper forum for adjudicating appeals from the suspension of the certification of an official emission inspection mechanic under section 4726(c) of the Vehicle Code. Appellant Maher Ahmed Mohamed was a certified emission inspector by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (PennDOT). In 2007, a Quality Assurance Officer for PennDOT (Auditor), conducted a records audit at Keystone. The Auditor’s report concluded that Appellant performed faulty emission inspections on four vehicles by connecting the emission equipment to a vehicle other than the one being tested in order to obtain a passing result. The report further indicated that two of the vehicles tested and the vehicle used to obtain the passing results were owned by taxicab companies partly owned by Appellant. The Auditor also found that Appellant falsified the records of the four tested vehicles. Appellant failed to appear at a subsequent agency hearing to answer the charges against him, and the Auditor provided the only testimony by presenting the findings of his report. PennDOT sent Appellant an order notifying him that his certification as an official emission inspector was suspended. Instead of following the directions in the order regarding the filing of an appeal, Appellant filed a petition for review from PennDOT's suspension order in the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court affirmed PennDOT's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court: "it may be the established practice to file appeals under section 4726(c) in the courts of common pleas; however, such practice remains inconsistent with . . . statutory language. While the Commonwealth Court potentially may have been correct in concluding that the General Assembly intended to enact something different from the actual text of section 933 [of the Administrative Agency Law], the Commonwealth Court was without authority to correct an omission and, therefore, violated established legal principles by disregarding the clear statutory language." Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for PennDOT to conduct an administrative hearing on the question of Appellant's suspension in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Agency Law.

The Supreme Court addressed an Application for Relief in an Election Code matter, over which it retained limited jurisdiction following a remand on October 4, 2010. The issue involved the effect of the District Court's decision in "Morrill v. Weaver," (224 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). In "Morrill," Section 2911(d) of the Election Code (25 P.S. 2600 et seq.), which the federal court construed as imposing a district residency requirement for affiants circulating nomination papers violated the First Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined the Commonwealth from enforcing the statutory provision, and the Commonwealth did not appeal that decision. The question of the constitutionality of Section 2911(d) and the effect of Morrill arose in connection with a challenge to the nomination paper submitted by Carl Stevenson as an independent candidate for the office of State Representative in Pennsylvania’s 134th Legislative District in the 2010 general election. Michael Gibson and Robert Mader filed a petition to set aside in the Commonwealth Court, raising both signature challenges and a global challenge to Stevenson’s nomination paper. The objectors' global challenge alleged that signatures on three pages of the nomination paper were invalid because the circulator of those pages resided outside the 134th Legislative District, in supposed violation of Section 2911(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth and the Secretary are bound by the district court decision in "Morrill" and may not enforce Section 2911(d) as written.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether deputy sheriffs of second class counties were "police officers" for collective barganing purposes under "Act 111." The Commonwealth Court determined they are not after hearing the Allegheny County Deputy Sheriffs' Association filed a petition with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) seeking to represent the deputies employed by Allegheny County. The Association twice before had attempted to attain this same objective, only to fail before the PLRB and the Commonwealth Court. However, following those decisions, the General Assembly amended the Crimes Code in 1995, and then the Municipal Police Education and Training Law (MPETL) in 1996, to define deputy sheriffs in a second-class county (i.e., the Deputy Sheriffs) as police officers. Concluding that the aforesaid legislative action was not dispositive of the issue, the PLRB hearing examiner here determined that the Deputy Sheriffs were not "police officers" as contemplated by Act 111 because he found that their primary duties were not those of typical police officers, but rather were those directly related to the operation of the courts. "[The Supreme Court's] inquiry with respect to the question accepted for review ends with the recognition that the General Assembly expressly defined -- and thus authorized -- deputy sheriffs of counties of the second class to be police officers. . . . Thus, the PLRB’s and Commonwealth Court’s application of a judicially and administratively created test to examine whether the Deputy Sheriffs are police officers, after they have been defined as such by the General Assembly, was erroneous."

The central issue in this case focused on whether the term "compensation" as used in Section 314(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, includes medical benefits as well as wage loss benefits. Claimant Quila Givner suffered a work-related injury in 1998 while working for Appellant Giant Eagle, Inc. She received workers' compensation benefits that were calculated for partial disability. In 2007, Giant Eagle filed a suspension petition pursuant to Section 314(a), alleging that Claimant had failed to attend a physical examination that it scheduled. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) suspended Claimant's wage loss benefits because of her failure to submit to the examination, but Giant Eagle appealed to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), contending that the WCJ had erred by suspending only wage loss benefits and not medical expense benefits too. The WCAB rejected Employer’s argument, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "compensation" must include medical benefits as well as wage loss benefits under Section 314(a). However, the Court held that "compensation," as used in Section 314(a) need not always include medical expenses, and accordingly affirmed the Commonwealth Court.

The Department of Public Welfare (DPW) and the Office of the Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed a Commonwealth Court order which granted summary judgment to Appellees the Pennsylvania Medical Society and its individual members, and the Hospital and Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania and its individual members. The court declared that the Commonwealth had an obligation under the Health Care Provider Retention Law (the Abatement Law) to transfer monies to the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund (MCARE Fund) in an amount necessary to fund dollar for dollar, all abatements of annual assessments granted to health care providers for the years 2003-2007. Upon review of the Commonwealth Court record, the Supreme Court held that the Abatement Law gave the Secretary of the Budget the discretion, but not the obligation, to transfer monies into the MCARE Fund in an amount up to the total amount of abatements granted. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Apellees had no statutory entitlement to the funds held in abatement, nor a vested right to them.

In twelve separate matters, Commonwealth citizens, acting singly or in groups, filed appeals from the Final Plan for legislative redistricting of the Commonwealth, which was devised by Appellee 2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission (the "LRC"), in response to the U.S. decennial census. Fourteen days after the appeals were filed, seven days after the matters were briefed, and two days after the appeals were argued, the Supreme Court issued its mandate in a per curiam order filed January 25, 2012. That order declared that the Final Plan was contrary to law under Article II, Section 17(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and with the directive in that constitutional provision, the Court remanded the matter to the LRC to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Appellees Germantown Cab Company and Sawink, Inc., received fines and suspensions for violations of regulations promulgated by the Philadelphia Parking Authority (the Authority or PPA), pertaining to driver licensure, currency of vehicle inspection, and tire tread wear. The companies pursued declaratory relief and appellate remedies, claiming that the Authority's regulations were invalid, since they were not filed with the Legislative Reference Bureau in accordance with the Commonwealth Documents Law, which is generally applicable to Commonwealth agencies. The Authority took the position that its regulations were proper, though they were not promulgated in accordance with the CDL, in light of the Authority's "unique local focus and consistent with provisions of its enabling legislation." The Commonwealth Court ultimately sustained the appeals, disagreeing with the Authority's arguments that, as "a unique hybrid agency with a local focus," it should be deemed exempt from statutory rulemaking procedures generally applicable to Commonwealth agencies. According to the court, the applicability of the CDL does not turn on an agency's particular focus; rather, it applies to "all agencies, past, present and future, regardless of their mission." Upon review of the applicable legal authorities and the parties' appellate briefs, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court in sustaining Appellees' appeals.

Brothers-Appellees Gerald and Louis Garzone are licensed funeral home directors in Philadelphia. They contracted with a business that sold human cadavers and harvested tissue for resale and medical use. The arrangement was undertaken without the knowledge or consent of the families of the deceased and continued through September 2005, at which point Michael Mastromarino, owner of Biomedical Tissue Services, learned that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was investigating him. Mastromarino advised Appellees to destroy their records days before FDA investigators arrived. A grand jury charged Appellees with 244 counts of theft by unlawful taking (of body parts), abuse of corpses, and various other charges. Appellees informed the Commonwealth that they intended to continue to trial, even knowing that all other codefendants intended to plead guilty and cooperate with the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth prepared for trial, but on the scheduled trial date, Appellees pleaded guilty to all charges. At sentencing, the Commonwealth asked if the court would "consider requiring the defendants to pay cost[s] of prosecution or a portion," arguing that its personnel had to devote extensive resources and hours to prepare for a long trial. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court may order a convicted offender to pay the costs of the Commonwealth (for the sum total of salaries of the attorneys, investigators and other officials involved in preparing for trial). The Superior Court vacated the trial court’s imposition of such costs. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court: "Although our reasoning does not track that of the panel below, we are in agreement with its central holding that, "[a]lthough the crimes in this case are particularly heinous, if the General Assembly intended to permit such recovery of regularly paid salaries of assistant district attorneys and detectives to be costs associated with the prosecution, the Legislature would have expressly done so."

Appellants the Piper Group filed a constitutional challenge to a 1996 zoning ordinance enacted by Bedminster Township. In support of this challenge, Piper relied on an opinion from the Supreme Court that had been announced six days earlier pertaining to the same ordinance, "C&M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Hearing Bd." In "C&M," the Court invalidated the Townshipâs ordinance because it contained certain requirements that unconstitutionally restricted a landownerâs development rights. Relying heavily on C&M, Piper identified those same constitutional defects and sought permission to develop its land at a significantly higher density than would have been permissible under the invalidated ordinance. The Board of Supervisors, the trial court, and the Commonwealth Court all rejected Piperâs proposed cure to the unconstitutionality and held that Piper could develop its land in accordance with the Townshipâs alternative amended ordinance which cured the constitutional defects in the 1996 ordinance as identified in C&M and allowed increased development, but not to the extent requested by Piper. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Piper argued that the lower courts improperly denied Piper the full relief it requested. Specifically, Piper argued that the decisions violated the Municipalities Planning Code (âMPCâ) and the âpending ordinance doctrineâ as set forth in "Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Warwick Twp.," (328 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1974)) and its progeny. The Court disagreed and therefore affirmed the lower courts' decisions.