Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Indian Rocks Property Owners Association, Inc. developed rules and regulations that were recorded as protective covenants running with the land in a development in Salem Township, Wayne County. Appellees John and Regina Glatfelter purchased a lot within the Indian Rocks community. John died in 1990 leaving Regina as the sole owner of the lot. The lot sat vacant until 2003 when the Glatfelters' son David began constructing a foundation. The Association initially inspected and approved the excavation, but late that year informed the Glatfelters that the work was substandard and inadequate pursuant to the covenants. The Glatfelters were ordered to cease construction until a new plan was approved. The Glatfelters agreed to stop work until they submitted a new application for construction in conformance with the covenants, but they failed to comply with the agreement. The Association brought suit to enforce the covenants, which the trial court approved and entered into its order. Since that suit, the Commonwealth amended the Construction Code to exempt "recreational cabins" from its requirements. Adopting the Construction Code, the Association passed a resolution refusing to recognize the recreational cabin exemption. When the Glatfelters sought to use the changed Construction Code to their advantage, the Association argued that its refusal to recognize the Code's changed cabin exemption did not apply to the Glatfelters' construction project. The trial court granted the Association's contempt petition against the Glatfelters. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Glatfelters stipulated that they would comply with the Association's rules prior to the change in the Code. As such, they were bound to the terms of the stipulation when completing their construction project: "the Glatfelters cannot use the recreational cabin exemption as a trump card to bypass the rules and regulations to which they agreed. ⦠Our holding is premised entirely on the Glatfelters' failure to obtain the Association's approval regarding the intended structure." The Court did not address the validity of the Association's resolution refusing the adopt the recreational cabin exemption.

The State Ethics Commission (Commission) appealed from an order of the Commonwealth Court that reversed the Commission's findings that Appellee Kenneth Kistler had violated two provisions of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (Act). Appellee was a member of the Carbon-Lehigh Intermediate Unit's (CLIU) board of directors from 1998 to 2002. As chairman of the building committee, Appellee was charged with pursuing the board's interests in various construction projects. Appellee also owned two building supply businesses. In late 1999, the board explored the possibility of constructing a garage in which to house its buses. The project's architect contacted Appellee as possible supplier for the project. Subsequently, Appellee resigned from his position with CLIU as a possible conflict-of-interest. At a board meeting, the solicitor for the CLIU opined that Appellee could "properly participate" in construction of the garage, but that he should abstain from any votes relating to that project. More projects were planned, and Appellee's businesses were again considered as suppliers. By this time, Appellee had withdrawn completely from participation with the CLIU's building committee. In 2004, the Commission notified Appellee that he was being investigated for possible violations of the Ethics Act. The Commission thereafter concluded that Appellee unintentionally violated the Act three times. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Commissionâs decision. In its interpretation of the Ethics Act, the court found no evidence that Appellee's participation in the building committee's discussions lead to the committee's choosing his private businesses for its building projects. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted the Ethics Act and affirmed its decision.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court consolidated four cases to decide whether adopted children whose adoptions were procured through a state-licensed private agency in the 1990s were eligible to receive adoption assistance subsidies retroactive to the dates of the childrenâs adoptions and prospectively through their eighteenth birthdays. The childrenâs attorneys successfully argued to the Commonwealth Court that the adopted children were eligible for subsidies pursuant to the Pennsylvania Adoption Opportunities Act (AOA). The Department of Public Welfare (DPW) appealed the Commonwealth Courtâs decision. Upon review of the underlying cases, the Supreme Court held that "adoption subsidies were never intended to be windfalls for adoptive parents." The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and reinstated the DPW's ruling with respect to the appellants in the consolidated cases.

Appellant, the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association, appeals a portion of the opinion and order issued by the Commonwealth Court that invalidated a provision of âAct 111â that addressed the pay state troopers are to receive while on âunion leave.â A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was set to expire in 2008. When the parties reached an impasse in their negotiations for a new CBA, the Association requested arbitration pursuant to Act 111. After a hearing, the Act 111 Panel entered an award concerning several issues, including the issue of payment to troopers while on âunion leave.â The Commonwealth appealed the arbitration award to the Commonwealth Court. The Court vacated the union leave provision of the award. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Commonwealth argued that the union leave provision of the award violated the State Employeesâ Retirement Code (SERC). The Supreme Court held that the union leave provision did not violate SERC, and that arbitration award was within the authority of the arbitration panel to award. Because arbitration awards issued pursuant to Act 111 are final and binding on the parties with no appeal permitted to any court, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Courtâs decision to the extent it contradicted the holding of this case.

In 1998, Appellee Stephen Heim filed a professional liability action against two doctors and their medical practices alleging that their negligent care from 1992 to 1996 caused the death of his wife. In August 2000, Mr. Heim received a jury verdict for over $1 million. The jury attributed a substantial percentage of fault to Mrs. Heim, and apportioned the remaining liability among the defendant doctors, which they bore jointly and severally. At the time of the alleged negligent acts, the doctors each maintained primary professional liability insurance coverage for $200,000 per occurrence under a policy issued by a private insurer. That insurer went bankrupt, and the policy was assumed by the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Association (PPCIGA). Excess liability protection was provided to health care providers through a government-run contingency fund known as the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund (CAT Fund). It was determined that the primary insurance policy left a $100,000 shortfall in order to satisfy Mr. Heimâs judgment. The CAT Fund determined it had no responsibility to redress the shortfall from the primary insurerâs bankruptcy. With no insurance money to protect them, Mr. Heim sued against the doctorsâ assets seeking to recover the unpaid portion of the judgment that neither the insurance company nor the CAT Fund would pay. The Commonwealth Court ruled in Mr. Heimâs favor, but in accordance with joint and several liability, applied the order to both PPCIGA and the CAT Fund. The Fund appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that under the statutory scheme that governs the CAT Fund, the facts of this case clearly implicated the Fundâs responsibility to the doctors to pay for the $100,000 shortfall left by their primary insurance policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court.

The Court reviewed measures taken in an investigation surrounding the leak of protected information related to a convened grand jury. The grand jury was investigating matters relating to a gambling license application; developments in the investigation appeared in the local newspapers. The Court exercised extraordinary jurisdiction on the allegation that information of the grand juryâs deliberations were leaked to the local press. A Special Prosecutor was appointed, and prepared a report finding that âprocedures adopted by the Office of the District Attorney and left uncorrected by the Supervising Judge were inappropriate and set the stage for improper disclosures.â The Court relinquished jurisdiction, ordered the Special Prosecutorâs report unsealed and sent to the Attorney General for further review.