Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Personal Injury
Carney v. Hancock County
An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law
Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept.
Adam Schulze, a retired firefighter from the City of Newburgh, was injured on the job in 2012 and classified as permanently partially disabled in 2015. He received full salary payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and workers' compensation benefits until December 2015. In 2016, Schulze was approved for performance of duty (POD) retirement, entitling him to a 50% pension and supplemental payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2).A Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) awarded Schulze workers' compensation payments for periods before and after his retirement. The City sought reimbursement from these payments for its prior payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and (2). The WCLJ granted reimbursement for the period before Schulze's retirement but denied it for the period after. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld this decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing Matter of Harzinski v Village of Endicott, which held that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are not "wages" under Workers' Compensation Law §§ 25 (4) (a) and 30 (2).The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that neither Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) nor § 30 (2) entitles the City to reimbursement from workers' compensation awards for payments made under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). The court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are pension supplements, not wages, and that the statutory scheme requires the City to reduce its payments by the amount of workers' compensation benefits, not to seek direct reimbursement. The court concluded that the City is not entitled to reimbursement directly from Schulze's workers' compensation award for its prior payments. View "Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept." on Justia Law
Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education
In the summer of 2023, Sharonda Smith's minor child, K.S., participated in a summer program at a school operated by the Jefferson County Board of Education. On June 5, 2023, K.S. fell asleep on a bus driven by "Mr. Josh" and suffered significant emotional distress, dehydration, and other personal injuries. Smith filed a lawsuit on May 10, 2024, against the Board, "Mr. Josh," and 10 fictitiously named defendants. The Board moved to dismiss the claims against it, citing State immunity.The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the claims against the Board on August 1, 2024, but allowed Smith additional time to identify and serve "Mr. Josh." Smith issued subpoenas to the Board for records related to the incident, which the Board moved to quash, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion and ordered the Board to comply with the subpoenas. Smith later identified "Mr. Josh" as Joshua Dunn and added his estate as a defendant. The Board petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the discovery orders and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the only named defendant in the initial complaint, the Board, was entitled to State immunity, and "Mr. Josh" was a fictitiously named defendant. The court granted the Board's petition in part, directing the circuit court to vacate its discovery orders and refrain from issuing further orders against the Board. However, the court denied the Board's request to dismiss the entire action, as the Board, a nonparty, did not demonstrate a clear legal right to such relief. View "Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law
J.S. v. Ocean Springs School District
An eight-year-old student, J.S., was sexually assaulted by her bus driver, Sergio Sandoval, multiple times over a month. J.S.'s parents filed a lawsuit against the Ocean Springs School District under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, alleging negligence, negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, failure to adopt and follow policies, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The Jackson County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, finding it was entitled to discretionary-function immunity and that Sandoval’s actions were not reasonably foreseeable.The plaintiff appealed the decision. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that while the District was protected by discretionary-function immunity regarding the failure to adopt sufficient policies and procedures, the claims related to negligent hiring, supervision, and training were not barred by this immunity. The court found that these claims involved simple negligence and did not involve policy decisions.The court also held that the plaintiff had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the foreseeability of the injuries. The court noted that the District’s own measures to screen and monitor its bus drivers indicated that a person of ordinary intelligence could anticipate that failure to properly do so could lead to the type of injury sustained by J.S.The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its findings. View "J.S. v. Ocean Springs School District" on Justia Law
Scott v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001
A 10-year-old student at an elementary school in Lincoln, Nebraska, was injured during a game of tag in a physical education class. The student was holding a pool noodle to tag classmates when another student, K.H., grabbed the pool noodle, causing the student to fall and hit her head. The student's mother sued the school district for negligence. The school district claimed sovereign immunity under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), arguing the claim arose from a battery.The district court overruled the school district's motion for summary judgment, finding a factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body. The court noted that while K.H. intentionally grabbed the pool noodle without the student's consent, it was unclear if this contact constituted a battery since the pool noodle was not necessarily part of the student's person.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that public school districts are political subdivisions under the PSTCA and that if a claim falls within an exemption, the political subdivision is not liable. The court examined whether the contact with the pool noodle could be considered offensive contact with the student's body, which would constitute a battery. The court found that whether an object is part of a person's body is determined on an objective reasonable person basis and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding this question.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body precluded summary judgment. The case was allowed to proceed to determine if the school district retained sovereign immunity. View "Scott v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001" on Justia Law
Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education
A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law
LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT V. ALBRIGHT
Jennifer Albright, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased son David Albright, filed a lawsuit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) following David's death. David was swept into a drainage pipe in their backyard during a rainstorm and subsequently died from his injuries. The drainage system, including the pipe, was owned by MSD. Albright alleged that MSD was negligent in maintaining the drainage system and failing to warn of its dangers, particularly by not installing a grate over the pipe entrance.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of MSD, finding that MSD was entitled to municipal immunity under the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA). The court reasoned that MSD's decision not to install grates was a discretionary act protected by CALGA. Albright appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that MSD was not entitled to immunity under the facts of the case.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that MSD, while subject to CALGA, was not entitled to immunity because the alleged negligent acts were ministerial in nature, not discretionary. The court emphasized that municipalities have a ministerial duty to non-negligently maintain and repair their sewer systems. The court also found that MSD's decision not to install a grate or warn of the pipe's dangers did not arise from its legislative or quasi-legislative authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT V. ALBRIGHT" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Crane
Scott Frey was injured while riding his bike on the Katy Trail in March 2020. He alleged that his injury occurred when his bike tire became lodged between wooden motor-vehicle reinforcements on a bridge managed by the Department of Natural Resources. Frey had not paid any fee to enter the trail and was using it for recreational purposes. The department had installed the reinforcements shortly before the accident and had posted warning signs about the rough surface.Frey filed a personal injury lawsuit against the department, claiming the bridge's condition was dangerous due to the department's negligence. The department sought summary judgment, arguing it was protected from liability under the Recreational Use Act and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the department's motion, and the department's request for a writ of prohibition was also denied by the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and determined that the Recreational Use Act provided the department with immunity from liability. The court found that the department met all the criteria for immunity under the Act: it owned the land, Frey entered without charge, and his entry was for recreational purposes. The court also concluded that the exceptions to the Act's protections did not apply, as there was no evidence of malicious or gross negligence by the department, nor was the condition of the bridge considered ultrahazardous. Consequently, the court made the preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, effectively barring Frey's claims against the department. View "State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Crane" on Justia Law
Evans v United States
Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law
Galette v. New Jersey Transit
Cedric Galette initiated a negligence action against Julie McCrey and New Jersey Transit (NJ Transit) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Galette alleged that he was injured when a vehicle operated by McCrey, in which he was a passenger, was struck by an NJ Transit vehicle. NJ Transit, an instrumentality of the State of New Jersey, filed a motion to dismiss the suit, invoking interstate sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion.NJ Transit appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Superior Court held that NJ Transit is not an instrumentality or arm of the State of New Jersey and, therefore, is not entitled to sovereign immunity protections. The court applied a six-factor test from Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority to determine NJ Transit's status and concluded that the factors did not support NJ Transit's claim to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (Hyatt III) compels a conclusion that interstate sovereign immunity bars Galette’s suit against NJ Transit. The court held that NJ Transit is indeed an arm of the State of New Jersey, emphasizing the statutory classification of NJ Transit as an instrumentality of the state, the degree of control the state exercises over it, and its core function of providing public transportation, which is a governmental function. Consequently, the court reversed the Superior Court's judgment, resulting in the dismissal of Galette’s suit against NJ Transit. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings regarding Galette’s claims against McCrey. View "Galette v. New Jersey Transit" on Justia Law