Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

An employee suffered a severe workplace injury in 2013 while working for a construction company, resulting in permanent and total disability with ongoing medical needs. The employee brought a third-party tort action against entities other than his employer involved in the accident and settled for $5 million. From the settlement, over $2.1 million was used to pay attorney fees and litigation expenses, with the remainder placed in trust. By the time of settlement, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier had already paid over $1.5 million in benefits but stopped payments after the settlement, leaving the employee responsible for his ongoing care. The value of anticipated future medical costs was estimated at over $7 million.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially found that only past benefits paid by the employer should be included in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with the third-party settlement, setting that share at 31.6%. On review, the Commissioner disagreed, concluding that future anticipated benefits should also be included, as the employer’s interest in the recovery included the right to offset future benefits. The ALJ recalculated, finding the employer’s proportional share exceeded the total legal expenses, and ordered reimbursement to the employee for expenses already paid. The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed these decisions. It held that when an employer or insurance carrier seeks both reimbursement for past payments and an offset against future workers’ compensation liability from a third-party recovery, both past-paid and future-anticipated benefits must be considered in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with that recovery. The court also held that the employer must reimburse the employee for its share of legal expenses before offsetting future benefits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Labor Commission. View "Auto Owners Insurance v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

Jeremy Starr, a delivery driver for Graybar Electric, claimed workers’ compensation for a back injury sustained in March 2018 while unloading pipes. Starr had a history of lumbar issues stemming from a 2004 motor vehicle accident, including a disc herniation documented by MRI. After his workplace injury, Starr underwent further imaging and treatment, ultimately receiving lumbar fusion surgery in 2022. Medical opinions diverged: some attributed the need for surgery to degenerative changes originating from the earlier accident, while others suggested the work injury was a significant cause. Starr provided additional evidence, including new medical evaluations and a deposition from his surgeon, to argue the surgery was compensable.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially found Starr suffered only a lumbar strain from the workplace incident and ruled the fusion surgery was not work-related, thus non-compensable. The ALJ awarded temporary total disability benefits for a limited period and later amended the award upon reconsideration. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings, concluding that any factual misstatement was not so unreasonable as to compel a different result and that new evidence submitted by Starr did not meet the standard for “newly-discovered evidence,” having been available with due diligence.The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ should have considered Starr’s additional evidence and correcting factual misstatements, reasoning that interlocutory orders are not final and that contested issues remained open for adjudication. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court held that under Bowerman v. Black Equipment Co., dispositive interlocutory factual findings cannot be reversed in a subsequent final opinion absent newly-discovered evidence, fraud, or mistake. The Court found no gross injustice from the ALJ’s factual misstatement and determined the additional evidence was merely cumulative and not newly discovered. View "GRAYBAR ELECTRIC V. STARR" on Justia Law

Three children attending a government-owned daycare center at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia suffered physical and emotional abuse at the hands of two childcare workers. The children’s parents, who had entrusted them to the Center and paid for their care, alleged that the government had provided assurances of safety and had adopted formal criteria to prevent and respond to child abuse. The parents claimed that the Center’s director failed to report the abuse to authorities and that the government breached its duty to protect the children.The parents brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, alleging negligence in failing to protect the children. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, which preserves sovereign immunity for claims arising out of certain intentional torts, including assault and battery. The district court agreed, finding that the parents’ claims were dependent on the employment status of the abusers and thus fell within the exception. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied the parents’ motion to amend, reasoning that amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception did not apply because the government’s duty to care for and protect the children was independent of the employment status of the abusers. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider whether the parents had stated a claim for relief. View "John Doe, 1 v. USA" on Justia Law

Two sisters, aged twelve and nine, were sexually abused by their tutor during sessions at public libraries owned by two Alabama municipalities in 2017. The abuse was witnessed by library employees who allegedly failed to intervene or report the misconduct. The sisters disclosed the abuse to their mother later that year, prompting a police report. In 2023, the tutor was convicted of sexual abuse. In 2024, the sisters and their mother sued the municipalities, asserting negligence in failing to respond to the abuse.The initial complaint named nonprofit corporations associated with the libraries as defendants but was amended to substitute the municipalities themselves. Prior to filing the amended complaint, the plaintiffs served notices of claim to each municipality, but these were submitted more than six years after the alleged tortious conduct. Both the City of Irondale and the City of Birmingham moved to dismiss, arguing noncompliance with Alabama Code § 11-47-23, which requires notice of claim against a municipality within six months of claim accrual. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted their motions, dismissing the claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether minors are exempt from the six-month notice requirement under § 11-47-23. The plaintiffs argued that minority status should toll the notice period, referencing statutory provisions that extend the time for filing suit by minors. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that § 11-47-23 contains no exception for minors and that the statutory tolling provision applies only to statutes of limitations, not notice-of-claim statutes. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of the claims against both municipalities, holding that minors are subject to the same notice requirements as adults under Alabama law. View "A.G.R. v. The City of Irondale" on Justia Law

Several residents of Estherville, Iowa, sued a former police officer, the police chief, the City of Estherville, and its insurance company, alleging that the officer repeatedly accessed and disseminated their confidential criminal history and intelligence data for improper purposes between 2015 and his resignation on May 3, 2019. The officer used this data for personal gain, including assisting with vehicle repossessions and harassing certain plaintiffs. Complaints about his conduct were made to the police chief, who ultimately placed the officer on administrative leave and accepted his resignation. Criminal charges were later brought against the officer in 2022 for his actions.After learning of the wrongful data access between 2021 and 2022, the plaintiffs filed suit on July 7, 2023, in the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, asserting statutory and common law claims, including invasion of privacy and conspiracy, and seeking damages under Iowa Code section 692.6. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the two-year statute of limitations under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA) barred the claims, since all alleged misconduct ended by May 3, 2019. The district court denied dismissal, holding that the statutory claim under section 692.6 was subject to a five-year limitation with a discovery rule, and that the remaining claims accrued when plaintiffs discovered the wrongdoing.On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court and ordered dismissal, concluding that all claims were governed by the IMTCA’s two-year statute of limitations and that the date of injury was when the data was accessed or disseminated, not when plaintiffs learned of it. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that the IMTCA’s statute of limitations applied to all claims and began at the time of the wrongful acts, regardless of later discovery or emotional harm. The case was remanded for dismissal. View "Abrahamson v. Scheevel" on Justia Law

Sanjeev Varghese was injured when he rode his bicycle into a steel cable stretched between two bollards on Pier 5 at Baltimore’s Inner Harbor. The barrier was located between a vehicular access road and a pedestrian promenade. The City of Baltimore had approved the design of the access road and its barriers, with changes for safety and aesthetics implemented in 2005. In 2017, a similar bicycle accident occurred, and the City received notice of that incident. In 2018, Varghese crashed into the barrier and subsequently sued the City for negligence, claiming the barrier was hazardous and that the City failed to address a known danger.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City allowed Varghese’s claims to proceed to a jury, which found the City negligent and awarded damages. The City moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing it was entitled to governmental immunity based on the discretionary nature of its design decisions. The circuit court denied this motion. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment, concluding that the City was not immune from liability for failing to fix a known hazard.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the City’s decisions regarding the design and placement of the barrier were discretionary governmental functions. The court reaffirmed that municipalities are immune from tort liability for such discretionary design decisions unless the condition created is so obviously dangerous that no reasonable person could disagree. The court found that this exception did not apply here, as the barrier was not shown to be obviously dangerous. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and instructed that judgment be entered in favor of the City. View "May. & City Cncl. Of Baltimore v. Varghese" on Justia Law

Ronald B. Panting, an independent contractor serving as a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) for the FAA, was conducting a pilot certification checkride for Michael Trubilla in a plane rented from the LeMay Aero Club, a government-affiliated organization. Both men died when the plane crashed during the checkride. Five days prior to the accident, Ronald signed a covenant not to sue the government for injuries sustained while participating in Aero Club activities, applicable to himself and his estate. His spouse, Lynne D. Panting, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent maintenance of the aircraft.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the covenant not to sue was void as against public policy under Nebraska law. The court did not address Lynne’s alternative argument that the covenant did not apply to Ronald’s activities as a DPE on the day of the crash. Following a bench trial, the district court found the government negligent and entered judgment for Lynne, awarding damages. The government appealed, challenging the district court’s decision regarding the covenant’s validity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment because the enforceability of the covenant was a purely legal issue. Applying Nebraska law, the appellate court determined the covenant was neither clearly repugnant to public policy nor the product of disparate bargaining power, and that the Aero Club did not provide a public or essential service. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the covenant covered Ronald’s activities as a DPE, and for further proceedings as appropriate. View "Panting v. United States" on Justia Law

Pedro Castaneda died in a traffic accident at an intersection on State Highway 249 that was under construction. At the time, the intersection’s traffic lights were installed but not yet operational, and there was a dispute about whether they were properly covered to indicate their status. Castaneda’s family sued the contractors involved in the project, SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. and Third Coast Services, LLC, alleging that negligence in the construction and installation of the traffic signals contributed to the fatal accident. The construction project was governed by an agreement between the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) and Montgomery County, with the County responsible for the project’s design and construction, but with TxDOT retaining authority over the adjacent frontage roads and final approval of plans.The trial court denied the contractors’ motions for summary judgment that sought dismissal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 97.002, which grants immunity to contractors under certain conditions. The contractors appealed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Section 97.002 applies only to contractors who are in direct contractual privity with TxDOT, and since neither contractor had a direct contract with TxDOT, they could not invoke the statute’s protection.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that Section 97.002 does not require direct contractual privity with TxDOT for a contractor to qualify for statutory immunity. The court determined that, based on the summary judgment record, SpawGlass and Third Coast performed work "for" TxDOT within the meaning of the statute, as their activities directly related to frontage roads that TxDOT would own and maintain. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the contractors met the remaining requirements of Section 97.002. View "THIRD COAST SERVICES, LLC v. CASTANEDA" on Justia Law

On November 14, 2020, Officer David Collier and his partner arrived at a residence in Escambia County, Florida, to serve arrest warrants on Jacob Settle and his wife. Settle was in his truck parked closely alongside the house in a dark, debris-filled backyard. When the officers approached and identified themselves, Settle refused to exit the vehicle. After Collier threatened to break the truck’s windows, Settle started the engine and shifted the transmission into gear. Collier, believing he and his partner were in imminent danger due to his proximity to the truck, fired his gun into the vehicle, fatally wounding Settle. Settle’s estate sued Collier for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and for battery under Florida law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida considered Collier's motion for summary judgment, in which he asserted qualified immunity and state law immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude Collier violated Settle’s constitutional rights by using deadly force on a non-moving vehicle that did not pose a risk to the officers. The district court also denied state immunity for the battery claim, reasoning that a jury could find Collier acted with wanton disregard for Settle’s safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that Collier was entitled to qualified immunity, concluding that his use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Settle’s actions—starting the engine and shifting the truck into gear while resisting arrest—could reasonably be perceived as an immediate threat. The court further held that Collier was entitled to state statutory immunity from the battery claim, as his conduct met the standards for justified use of force under Florida law. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Collier. View "Settle v. Collier" on Justia Law