Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Brenda Zaragoza fell in the parking lot of a Johnson County public library, resulting in serious injuries. She sued the Johnson County Board of Commissioners, alleging negligence for failing to mitigate the presence of a storm drain and warn of the change in elevation between the curb and the parking surface. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, citing recreational use immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), which bars negligence claims arising from the use of public property intended for recreational purposes unless gross and wanton negligence is involved. The court also denied Zaragoza's motion to amend her petition to add a claim of gross and wanton negligence.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the library's recreational use immunity applied and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zaragoza's untimely motion to amend her petition. Zaragoza then petitioned for review, raising both issues. After the petition was granted, she filed a supplemental brief raising a new constitutional argument, which was not considered because it was not presented in her petition for review or before the lower courts.The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court declined to consider Zaragoza's unpreserved constitutional challenge. It affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, agreeing that the library's parking lot fell under the recreational use immunity provision of the KTCA. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Zaragoza's motion to amend her petition, finding no evidence of gross and wanton negligence by the County. The court concluded that the library is public property intended for recreational purposes and that the parking lot is integral to its function, thus qualifying for immunity under the KTCA. View "Zaragoza v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs " on Justia Law

Eugene Sikora, a former prisoner, claims that the State of Iowa failed to release him from prison when his sentence was over. He was convicted of three felonies in 2016 and sentenced to concurrent five-year terms, which were suspended for probation. In 2017, his probation was revoked, and he was imprisoned until March 2019. Sikora alleges that due to a miscalculation, he was imprisoned for nearly five months longer than allowed, as the defendants did not credit him for 292 days served in county jails and a custodial residential center.Sikora filed a suit over three years after his release, seeking money damages for wrongful imprisonment. He named the State of Iowa and the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections as defendants, asserting five tort claims, including violations of his constitutional rights and negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit, arguing sovereign immunity and other defenses. The district court dismissed some of Sikora’s claims but allowed others to proceed. However, after the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Burnett v. Smith, which overruled the precedent allowing constitutional tort claims, the district court dismissed Sikora’s remaining claims and denied his motion to amend his petition to add new defendants and claims.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that sovereign immunity barred Sikora’s claims. The court concluded that all of Sikora’s claims were essentially false imprisonment claims, which are barred by sovereign immunity under Iowa Code section 669.14(4). The court also rejected Sikora’s arguments that constitutional torts and claims against individual state employees could proceed, emphasizing that the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) provides the exclusive mechanism for such claims and explicitly prohibits claims based on false imprisonment. View "Sikora v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

Faya Rose Toure sued the City of Selma, Chief of Police Spencer Collier, and police officer Devon McGuire following her arrest for fourth-degree theft of property and attempting to elude. Toure claimed McGuire and Collier committed assault and battery, false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, abuse of legal process, unreasonable seizure, and defamation/libel. She also accused the City of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and fostering a custom of police abuse. Toure sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.The defendants filed for summary judgment, citing peace-officer and State-agent immunity. They provided evidence including deposition testimonies, incident reports, and body camera footage showing McGuire witnessed Toure removing a campaign sign and subsequently attempting to elude him. Toure argued she removed the sign believing it was illegally placed and felt intimidated by McGuire, who was in an unmarked vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City but denied it for McGuire and Collier.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that McGuire and Collier were performing discretionary functions within their law enforcement duties, entitling them to immunity. The court determined that McGuire had at least arguable probable cause for Toure's arrest, and Toure failed to provide substantial evidence that McGuire or Collier acted willfully, maliciously, or beyond their authority. Consequently, the court held that McGuire and Collier were entitled to peace-officer and State-agent immunity and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in their favor. The petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte McGuire" on Justia Law

A minor, M.Y., was injured after falling into an open manhole on the lawn of Wingfield High School in Jackson, Mississippi, during a homecoming event. M.Y.'s mother, LaQuita Maxie, filed a lawsuit on his behalf against the City of Jackson and the Jackson Public School District (JPS), alleging negligence, gross negligence, premises liability, and res ipsa loquitur, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The Hinds County Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and later their motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the defendants' notice of the dangerous condition and their duty to maintain the manhole. The court also determined that the defendants were not entitled to discretionary-function immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA).The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that either the City or JPS had actual or constructive notice of the open manhole. The court noted that the defendants provided evidence of no prior complaints or notifications about the manhole, while the plaintiff relied solely on the complaint and general premises liability principles without presenting probative evidence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court's decision and rendered summary judgment in favor of the City of Jackson and JPS, concluding that the plaintiff did not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendants' notice of the dangerous condition. View "City of Jackson v. Maxie" on Justia Law

Following Hurricane Ida in 2021, Terrebonne Parish requested assistance from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to help restore power in Houma, Louisiana. LUS, in turn, requested help from the City of Wilson, North Carolina. Agreements were signed to facilitate emergency assistance, and the City of Wilson dispatched employees to Louisiana. Due to a shortage of hotels in Houma, the employees stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily. Kevin Worrell, a City of Wilson employee, was involved in a vehicle collision while driving from Houma to Lafayette, resulting in injuries to Edward and Linda Breaux and Jessie and Vickie Blanchard.The plaintiffs filed separate negligence lawsuits in Louisiana state court, which were removed to the federal district court in the Western District of Louisiana. The cases were consolidated, and the defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. The district court granted summary judgment, finding statutory immunity, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the Act's immunity provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted the need to interpret the Louisiana emergency preparedness law and expressed doubt about its ability to make a reliable Erie guess. Consequently, the court certified two questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether an employee of a city from another state working under an emergency assistance agreement is a "representative" of Louisiana or its political subdivisions, and (2) whether an individual providing emergency assistance is "engaging in emergency preparedness and recovery activities" while commuting from the recovery site to lodging. The Fifth Circuit will resolve the case based on the Louisiana Supreme Court's guidance. View "Breaux v. Worrell" on Justia Law

A local housing authority, authorized by state statute and activated by city government, faced a personal injury lawsuit. The plaintiff alleged that the authority negligently failed to ensure the safety of the apartment complex where she was shot. The authority claimed sovereign immunity, arguing it was an instrumentality of the state, a municipal corporation, and an instrumentality of the municipality.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the housing authority, concluding it was protected by sovereign immunity under all three claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the authority's status as an instrumentality of the municipality. The appellate court relied on case law regarding state instrumentalities and concluded that the authority was entitled to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly applied state instrumentality case law to determine municipal instrumentality immunity. The Supreme Court noted that the Georgia Constitution does not explicitly extend sovereign immunity to municipalities or their instrumentalities, and any such immunity must be derived from common law as of 1776. The Court found that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had conducted the necessary common law analysis to determine if the housing authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as an instrumentality of the municipality.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration under the proper analytical approach, specifically examining the common law scope and nature of sovereign immunity as it applied to municipal instrumentalities. View "GUY v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF AUGUSTA" on Justia Law

A City of Houston police officer, while responding to an armed robbery, collided with another motorist, Maria Christina Gomez. The officer, Bobby Joe Simmons, was driving in heavy rain with his emergency lights on but did not engage his siren. He did not exceed the speed limit and applied his brakes when the traffic light turned yellow, but his car slid into the intersection and collided with Gomez's vehicle. Gomez sued the City for negligence, seeking damages for her injuries.The trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, citing the Texas Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception, which preserves immunity unless the officer acted with "conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others." The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed this decision, finding a fact question regarding the officer's recklessness. The City then supplemented its plea with additional evidence and appealed again after the trial court denied the plea.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the evidence showed, at most, ordinary negligence rather than recklessness. The court held that Simmons’s actions, including adjusting his radio and not exceeding the speed limit, did not demonstrate a willful or wanton disregard for safety. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing Gomez’s claim against the City for lack of jurisdiction, reaffirming the City’s immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception. View "City of Houston v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Rhonna Tindall slipped on a layer of ice in a parking lot owned by the County of Nevada and injured her knee. She sued the County, alleging that the icy parking lot was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under section 831, which provides that a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by weather conditions affecting the use of streets and highways.The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the parking lot was a “street” or “highway” within the meaning of section 831, and that the County was entitled to “weather immunity.” The court also found that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the potential existence of slippery ice in the parking lot. Tindall appealed, arguing that section 831 immunity does not apply to parking lots, that the dangerous condition resulted from a combination of weather and other factors, and that the County did not meet its burden to show that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the ice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the parking lot is a “street” within the meaning of section 831, largely based on the Vehicle Code’s definition of “street” as a publicly maintained place open to the public for vehicular travel. The court found Tindall’s arguments unpersuasive and determined that the County was not liable for her injury caused by the weather condition. The court also held that Tindall’s arguments regarding the combination of weather with other factors and the reasonably careful person standard were forfeited on appeal. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Tindall v. County of Nevada" on Justia Law

A student, E.I., attended El Segundo Middle School during the 2017-2018 school year and experienced bullying from classmates, particularly Skylar. Despite E.I. and her parents repeatedly reporting the bullying to school officials, including the principal and counselor, the school failed to take effective action. The bullying included verbal harassment, social media abuse, and physical aggression, which led E.I. to self-harm and develop PTSD and depression. The school’s anti-bullying policies were not adequately followed by the staff.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where a jury found the El Segundo Unified School District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in damages. The District moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied by the court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The District argued several points on appeal, including errors in allowing reliance on certain Education Code provisions, claims of immunity under Government Code section 820.2, insufficient evidence of causation, improper consideration of a negligent training and supervision theory, admission of expert testimony, and attorney misconduct during closing arguments. The appellate court found that many of the District’s arguments were either waived or lacked merit. The court held that the District was not immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, as the actions in question were operational rather than policy decisions. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s causation finding and determined that any potential errors were not prejudicial. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of E.I. View "E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A mother and daughter drowned while floating on innertubes on the Turkey River after going over a low-head dam. Their estates sued the State of Iowa, Fayette County, the Fayette County Conservation Board, and the City of Clermont, alleging negligence and premises liability for failing to maintain warnings about the dam. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims.The Iowa District Court for Fayette County dismissed all claims. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the public-duty doctrine and that the petition failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements in Iowa Code § 670.4A. The court also dismissed the claims against the State, referring generally to the reasons set forth in the State’s motion, which included qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, discretionary function immunity, and the public-duty doctrine.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the heightened pleading requirements did not apply to the estates’ common law tort claims of negligence and premises liability. The court also determined that the public-duty doctrine did not bar the claims, as the allegations involved affirmative acts of negligence by the defendants. Additionally, the court found that the State’s sovereign immunity and discretionary function immunity did not apply at this stage, as the petition alleged inattention rather than considered choices by the State. The court also rejected the recreational immunity defense, concluding that the estates sufficiently pleaded an exception to the statute.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Kahn v. City of Clermont, Iowa" on Justia Law