Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2020, Autumn Hilger visited the Mount Rushmore National Memorial and slipped on a temporary access mat that was installed due to renovations, which resulted in her breaking her wrist. Hilger filed a negligence claim against the United States Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking $2 million for her injuries. The Government denied her claim, leading her to sue and allege that the National Park Service (NPS), a government agency, negligently installed and maintained the access mat and failed to warn of its danger. The district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. Hilger appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court used a two-step test to determine whether the discretionary-function exception applies, first asking whether the challenged conduct or omission is discretionary, meaning it involves judgment or choice and is not controlled by mandatory statutes or regulations. Hilger had conceded in her appeal that there were no such controlling statutes or regulations, leading the court to agree with the district court that the challenged conduct was discretionary. The second inquiry was whether the judgment or choice was based on considerations of social, economic, and political policy. The court found that Hilger's complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to rebut the presumption that the discretion was grounded in policy considerations. The court concluded that the decisions regarding the mat were susceptible to policy analysis and that safety concerns, which Hilger argued were key in this case, are a typical policy consideration when applying the discretionary-function exception. As such, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing Hilger's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hilger v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellants’ father died in a multi-car accident caused by a deer crossing State Route 154 (SR-154). Appellants sued respondent California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and others for negligence. They alleged the road constituted a dangerous condition under Government Code section 835. The trial court found that design immunity applied to Caltrans and granted summary judgment. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it found design immunity was a complete defense to Caltrans’ liability. They also contend the court failed to address a separate basis of liability, failed to warn when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.The Second Appellate District affirmed. Appellants’ theory of the case, in sum, is that Caltrans designed SR-154 without certain specific features they contend would have made the highway safer. The court explained that Caltrans need not produce additional evidence to prove this point. A traffic engineer attested to the applicable design standards and how Caltrans addressed the dangers posed by deer entering traffic and vehicles crossing the median. This constitutes substantial evidence of advance approval. The court wrote that it would not second-guess the decision of Caltrans to include or omit certain design features. The court concluded that substantial evidence showed that a reasonable public employee would have adopted the SR-154 design plans, even without the features and changes Appellants contend Caltrans should have considered and included. View "Stufkosky v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus requiring the Industrial Commission of Ohio to award him a scheduled award of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B) for the loss of the use of his right hand, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.Appellant was injured during the course of his employment as a laborer when he fell from a roof onto concrete below. A district hearing officer granted Appellant's request for scheduled-loss compensation, but a staff hearing officer vacated that order on appeal. The court of appeals denied Appellant's ensuing complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence supported the commission's decision denying Appellant's request for compensation for the loss of the use of his right hand, and the commission did not abuse its discretion. View "State ex rel. Block v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final award of the labor and industrial relations commission affirming and adopting an administrative law judge's award of permanent total disability benefits to Jannie Harper under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, holding that the commission's decision was supported by competent and substantial evidence.Harper filed a claim for workers compensation against Springfield Rehab and Health Center and Premier Group Insurance Company Corvel Enterprise Company (collectively, Springfield Rehab). The commission awarded Harper permanent and total disability benefits, finding that Harper suffered a compensable injury arising from a workplace accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the commission's final award of permanent total disability compensation and future medical care. View "Harper v. Springfield Rehab & Health Care Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that Maryann Gray's applications for review were timely filed pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.480 and overruling Hawthorn Children's Psychiatric Hospital's motion to strike, holding that the Commission did not err in finding that Gray's applications were timely filed.Gray, a registered nurse at Hawthorn, filed applications for review of the denial of her claims for injuries sustained during her employment. After a hearing, the Commission found Gray timely filed her applications and affirmed the denial of benefits as to a 2012 injury but ordered Hawthorn to pay Gray partial permanent disability benefits for 2013 and 2014 injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in finding that Gray's applications were timely filed under section 287.480. View "Gray v. Hawthorn Children's Psychiatric Hospital" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Board of Review affirming an ALJ's denial of Robert Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Hood was making a delivery for his employer when he felt a pain in his right knee. The employer's claim administrator denied Hood's application for workers' compensation benefits after concluding that Hood did not sustain an injury in the course of and scope of his employment. An ALJ affirmed, as did the Board of Review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Hood's injury occurred while he was working, it did not result from his employment. View "Hood v. Lincare Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In April 2015, federal agent Quinn shot and killed Kellom while trying to arrest him. Kellom’s estate sued Quinn under the Federal Tort Claims Act with a “Bivens” excessive-force claim. The government replaced Quinn as the defendant in the tort claims. The estate then filed an unsuccessful claim with Quinn’s employer, DHS. The FTCA requires plaintiffs to seek relief “first” from the federal agency within two years: the government notified the estate that it needed to bring a new lawsuit for its FTCA claims. Instead, in May 2018, the estate amended its complaint, asserting the same claims. The district court treated the FTCA exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the FTCA claims. The Bivens claim proceeded. A jury ruled in Quinn’s favor. Meanwhile, Kellom’s family members brought FTCA claims by joining the estate’s amended complaint, which was filed in May 2018. The family had not sought relief from DHS, so the district court dismissed those claims. In October 2018, the family filed a claim with DHS. DHS denied the claim. Rather than rejoin the estate’s lawsuit, the family filed a new one. The district court dismissed the family’s claims as untimely.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The government did not waive or forfeit its exhaustion defense in the estate’s case by failing to oppose a motion to amend. The estate did not cure its failure to exhaust by filing an amended complaint. The family’s claims were untimely. View "Kellom v. Quinn" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States on Petitioner's claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and to the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) on Petitioner's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), 29 U.S.C. 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Petitioner's FTCA claims.Petitioner filed this action setting forth FTCA claims against the United States based on the treatment to which he was allegedly subjected while he was in immigration custody, as well as claims brought under the RHA and the ADA based on the alleged discrimination against him owing to his disability during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to the United States as it pertained to Petitioner's FTCA claims; but (2) did not err in awarding summary judgment to SCSD on Petitioner's RHA and ADA claims. View "Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Adams, born in 1960, smoked about a pack a day starting at age 18 and worked in coal mines at times between 1979-1995, mostly underground using a “cutting machine” in the “dustiest” areas. Adams struggled to breathe after his retirement. Adams’s 1998 application under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901(b), was denied because he failed to prove that he had pneumoconiosis. In 2008, Adams sought benefits from Wilgar. His treating physician, Dr. Alam, identified the causes of his 2013 death as cardiopulmonary arrest, emphysema, coal worker’s pneumoconiosis, throat cancer, and aspiration pneumonia.A 2019 notice in the case stated “the Court may look to the preamble to the revised” regulations in weighing conflicting medical opinions. Wilgar unsuccessfully requested discovery concerning the preamble and the scientific studies that supported its conclusions. The ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Adams had “legal pneumoconiosis” and giving Dr. Alam’s opinion that Adam’s coal mine work had substantially aggravated his disease “controlling weight.” All things being equal, a treating physician’s opinion is “entitled to more weight,” 30 C.F.R. 718.104(d)(1). Wilgar's three experts had opined that Adams’s smoking exclusively caused his disease The ALJ gave “little weight” to these opinions, believing that they conflicted with the preamble to the 2001 regulation.The Benefits Review Board and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The preamble interpreted the then-existing scientific studies to establish that coal mine work can cause obstructive diseases, either alone or in combination with smoking. The ALJ simply found the preamble more persuasive than the experts. View "Wilgar Land Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a wrongful death action for the death of the Appellants’ son against the City of Inglewood (the City). Appellants alleged the City was negligent and created a “dangerous condition” in a public park by failing to install security cameras in an area with ongoing criminal activity, which caused an unknown third party to fatally shoot their son. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend. Appellants filed a first amended complaint, which the trial court sustained, this time without leave to amend. The trial court then entered a judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellants’ dangerous and negligence claims failed and the trial court did not err in declining to grant leave to amend. The court explained that here Appellants’ proposed allegations about “additional problematic criminal activity in Darby Park” and “crime in the areas of Inglewood immediately surrounding Darby Park” are vague and not specific. Appellants in no way explain how these proposed amendments would change the legal effect of the allegations in their FAC and merely state in a conclusory fashion that they “could have created a dangerous condition and a duty to warn.” Furthermore, the court wrote that Appellants failed to propose any new facts addressing the main issue of the FAC. View "Summerfield v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law