Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her deceased husband, brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States alleging that a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs hospital negligently failed to diagnose her husband with lung cancer. Prior to trial, the government conceded that the hospital’s ten-month failure to diagnose her husband was a departure from the standard of care. Following a two-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment and awarded $975,233.75 in damages to Plaintiff, including $850,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for loss of consortium.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued: (1) the district court erred in failing to adequately explain its factual findings and methodology for arriving at its awards as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); and (2) the district court’s awards for pain and suffering and loss of consortium were based on legal errors.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court first clarified that the appropriate standard of review for assessing a district court’s FTCA damages award governed by New York law is whether the award “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,” as articulated under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 5501(c). The court nonetheless found Plaintiff’s challenges to the district court’s damages awards to be unpersuasive. The district court’s explanation for the awards in its factual findings and conclusions of law, as well as in its denial of the motion to amend or alter the judgment as to these awards, satisfied the requirements of Rule 52. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant Tanner Altizer suffered serious injuries when he ran into a suspended cable fence while riding his off-road motorcycle on an unpaved area in an unoccupied area of the desert. The owner of the property, respondent Coachella Valley Conservation Commission (the Commission), placed the cable fence around its property to stop illegal dumping and off-road vehicles in order to protect the sensitive habitat. Altizer sued the Commission, alleging that the cable fence created a dangerous condition on public property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission, and Altizer appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Commission was entitled to hazardous recreational activity immunity under Government Code section 831.71 and affirmed. View "Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Com." on Justia Law

In 2016, Salansky, the Great Smoky Mountains National Park’s Fire Management Officer, discovered a slow-moving fire covering less than an acre. Due to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, most of the Park’s staff were away. Eight days later (November 24), Salansky observed that building a fire line would be impossible. Salansky opted to let the fire burn, using the natural terrain for containment. On November 27, Salansky requested additional firefighting resources. A National Guard helicopter dropped water onto the fire. By evening, the fire had spread to 35-40 acres within Park boundaries. Salansky did not monitor the fire overnight. At 4:05 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a high-wind warning. By 7:30 a.m., Salansky estimated that the fire had grown to 250-500 acres. Burning embers created smaller fires a mile away. People in Gatlinburg observed heavy smoke and ash. A 10:58 a.m. call was the first communication between Park staff and any local official about the fire. Around 5:45 p.m., the Gatlinburg Fire Department received reports of fires within the city. Winds gusted to 87 mph and the fire grew to 5,000 acres. Total evacuation of the Gatlinburg area was ordered. Evacuation efforts were hampered by infrastructure damage. Ultimately, 14 people died, 191 were injured, 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed, and more than 17,000 acres burned.The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of “failure to warn” suits under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). Before filing suit under the FTCA, a claimant must “present” that claim to the agency, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a); the plaintiffs’ forms sufficiently enabled the Department of the Interior to investigate. On remand, to determine whether the claims are barred by the FTCA's discretionary-function exception, the district court should address whether certain publications constitute mandatory directives. View "Abbott v. United States" on Justia Law

Claimant Fran Rancourt appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision granting the request of the carrier, AIM Mutual — NH Employers Ins. Co., for a reduction of the claimant’s benefits from the Temporary Total Disability (TTD) rate to the Diminished Earning Capacity (DEC) rate. At the time of her injury, the claimant was employed as the “vice president of academic and community affairs” for the Community College System of New Hampshire (CCS). The injury occurred when the claimant slipped on ice, hitting her head. She was taken to the hospital where she received 11 staples to close a wound in her head. Three months later, the claimant was assessed by Dr. Glassman, an independent medical examiner, who recommended “partial duty modified work part-time” and physical therapy, and that the claimant see a concussion specialist. He concluded that claimant did “not have the ability to return to full duty work at this time,” but opined that “she could be evaluated for partial duty work, working three to four hours a day, two to three days a week.” In July 2019, claimant was visiting a friend in Maine when she fell stepping into a boat. As a result of the fall, the claimant severely injured her left hamstring, resulting in surgery. She reported that the fall was a result of problems with her depth perception related to her head injury. In March 2020, Glassman performed another independent medical examination to evaluate the extent of claimant’s continuing disability. Glassman reported that claimant continued to suffer from “postconcussion syndrome” as a result of the work injury in 2017. He concluded that claimant “has not returned to her pre-accident status” and “still has ongoing deficits and ongoing symptoms.” He reported that claimant feels about “60% improved,” and that, while “she is being seen by neuro-optometry and speech therapy,” she “has reached maximum medical improvement” for her post-concussion syndrome. It was his opinion that “no further treatment is indicated for the date of injury of November 20, 2017.” In May 2020, the carrier requested a hearing, pursuant to RSA 281-A:48 (2010), seeking to reduce or terminate the TTD indemnity benefits claimant had been receiving. The hearing officer granted the carrier’s request to reduce benefits as it related to claimant’s changed condition. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Rancourt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Andrew and Marian Szewczyk appealed superior court orders: (1) granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT); (2) striking the plaintiffs’ expert reports; and (3) granting the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Bellemore Property Services, LLC (Bellemore) and Continental Paving, Inc. (Continental). In 2016, plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident on Route 3 in Nashua. While driving, they encountered significant flooding in the left-hand travel lane of the highway, and the vehicle they were traveling in hydroplaned. After plaintiffs stopped and got out of their car, a second vehicle hydroplaned and struck plaintiffs’ vehicle, which then struck and injured plaintiffs. When the police arrived at the scene, they discovered the flooding had been caused by a clogged catch basin. At the time of the accident, Continental was repaving Route 3 pursuant to a contract with DOT. Continental had subcontracted with Bellemore to clean the catch basins along Route 3. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against DOT, Continental, and Bellemore alleging that the three defendants collectively undertook a repaving and drainage system rehabilitation project and their combined and individual negligence caused the flooding, which caused the motor vehicle crash that injured plaintiffs. DOT moved to dismiss the count brought against it, arguing that plaintiffs’ failed to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and later denied plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. Thereafter, Continental and Bellemore moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the opinions of plaintiffs’ expert, highway engineer Thomas Broderick. The trial court found that Broderick’s opinion regarding the cause of the clogging of the catch basin was “based entirely on pure speculation without any factual support,” and granted the motion to strike, but also granted plaintiffs leave to supplement their objections to the motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a supplemental objection, and submitted with it, among other things, an expert report written by a hydrologic/hydraulic engineer, Richard Murphy. The trial court declined to consider Murphy’s opinion on causation and granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the order, and plaintiffs appealed. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the order granting DOT’s motion to dismiss, but reversed the orders striking the expert reports and granting the motions for summary judgment. View "Szewczyk, et al. v. Continental Paving, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Ponderay Police Department Officer Michael Watkins injured his knee while chasing a suspect. Because Watkins was injured during the performance of his duties as a police officer, he was eligible to receive his full base salary during the period of his disability under the Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Act. Rather than receive payments under the Act, Watkins accepted worker’s compensation benefits from the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Nearly a year later, Watkins filed a complaint against the City of Ponderay seeking payment of his full base salary. The Commission fashioned a remedy which required the City to pay Watkins his full base salary, but reduced that amount by the worker’s compensation payments Watkins had already received. Watkins appealed, arguing the Commission failed to follow the Act and exceeded its authority by ordering that the City receive a credit for benefits Watkins received. Finding the Commission erred in ordering the City receive a credit for the worker's compensation benefits, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. View "Watkins v. City of Ponderay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of a decision of a hearing examiner with the Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System for the City of Baltimore denying Petitioner's request for line-of-duty disability retirement, holding that the petition was untimely.Petitioner, a police officer, sustained an injury during a car accident that occurred while he was responding to an emergency call. A copy of the hearing examiner's decision denying line-of-duty disability retirement but granting him non-line-of-duty disability retirement. At issue was whether former Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera's administrative tolling order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic applied to Defendant's case. The circuit court concluded that the extension applied only to deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks' offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. The appellate court certified the question of whether the fifteen-day extension applied to all cases whose statute of limitations and deadlines related to initiation expired between those dates. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the fifteen-day extension under the administrative tolling orders applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks' offices between the relevant dates. View "In re Hosein" on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

In summer 2010, plaintiff Carol Conforti obtained a restraining order against her husband. On September 8, he was arrested for violating the restraining order by returning to the marital home to see his son. Conforti was taken to the OCJ, where he was evaluated by a staff member of Correctional Health Services (CHS). A CHS staff member wrote on the “Intake Receiving and Screening” form that Conforti reported: (1) drinking half a gallon of vodka each day; (2) major surgery that left him with rods and screws in his back; (3) feeling “hopeless or helpless”; and (4) the “[r]ecent significant loss” of his marriage. A physician prescribed him one extra mattress and medicine for back pain and alcohol dependence, and instructed that he not be assigned work or a top bunk. After 27 days, Conforti was released. Just over a week later, Conforti was arrested for again returning to the marital home to see his son. He arrived at OCJ on October 13, 2010. A document from Conforti’s file acknowledged his previous incarceration and history of binge drinking but stated he had “[n]o current mental health issues/concerns” and was cleared for OCJ’s general population. On October 16, he requested medical attention for back pain. On October 20, Conforti wrote a suicide note to his parents, closed the door to his cell, covered the cell door window with a sheet, and hung himself. During discover, plaintiff submitted an expert report who opined that defendants the County of Ocean and the Ocean County Jail acted negligently by failing to adequately train and supervise OCJ staff to prevent inmate suicide. The County defendants moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). A jury found defendant negligent and apportioned liability 60% against the County and 40% against Correctional Health Services (CHS). Defendants moved for JNOV, reasserting their medical-facility-immunity argument. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence count at the summary judgment stage, and no error in refusing to overturn the jury’s verdict after trial. View "Conforti v. County of Ocean, et al." on Justia Law

While responding to an emergency, City of Oxford Police Officer Matthew Brown collided with Patricia Phillips’s vehicle at an intersection. Phillips filed suit to recover for injuries suffered in the collision. After a bench trial, the circuit court found that Officer Brown did not act with reckless disregard in response to the emergency and determined that the City of Oxford was entitled to police-protection immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Phillips appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed. The majority of the appellate court held that the trial court’s finding that Officer Brown’s actions did not rise to the level of reckless disregard is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that Oxford was not entitled to police-protection immunity. IThe dissent’s opinion said that the circuit court’s judgment was supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, the Court of Appeals lacked the power to disturb the trial judge’s findings. After its review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the record contained substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the decision of the trial court. View "Phillips v. City of Oxford" on Justia Law