Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed a wrongful death action for the death of the Appellants’ son against the City of Inglewood (the City). Appellants alleged the City was negligent and created a “dangerous condition” in a public park by failing to install security cameras in an area with ongoing criminal activity, which caused an unknown third party to fatally shoot their son. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend. Appellants filed a first amended complaint, which the trial court sustained, this time without leave to amend. The trial court then entered a judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellants’ dangerous and negligence claims failed and the trial court did not err in declining to grant leave to amend. The court explained that here Appellants’ proposed allegations about “additional problematic criminal activity in Darby Park” and “crime in the areas of Inglewood immediately surrounding Darby Park” are vague and not specific. Appellants in no way explain how these proposed amendments would change the legal effect of the allegations in their FAC and merely state in a conclusory fashion that they “could have created a dangerous condition and a duty to warn.” Furthermore, the court wrote that Appellants failed to propose any new facts addressing the main issue of the FAC. View "Summerfield v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were allegedly injured from a collision with an Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) Trooper. Less than three weeks after the accident, plaintiffs' lawyer sent the OHP a letter asking it to preserve any evidence relating to the incident, and to request some additional information. OHP forwarded the letter to the Oklahoma Office of Management & Enterprise Services (OMES) and OMES unilaterally determined that the request letter was the statutory notice of a governmental tort claim, triggering the time limits within the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the Act). Plaintiffs' lawyer disagreed. Less than one year after the accident, the lawyer sent a notice of governmental tort claim to OMES. Five months later, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the OHP, seeking recovery for their injuries. OHP filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the letter requesting the preservation of evidence was notice of a governmental tort claim triggering time limits which had already expired by the time plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the cause. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted review to determine whether plaintiffs' letter requesting the preservation of evidence constituted the required statutory notice of a governmental tort claim. The Court held that it did not. View "Ullman v. Oklahoma Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Anel Perez filed a personal injury action against the defendant-respondent school district after she was seriously injured while volunteering at an elementary school event. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the district on the ground that a resolution passed under Labor Code section 3364.5 in 1968 by the “Governing Board of Galt Joint Union School District of Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties” for the “Galt Joint Union School District” converted plaintiff’s status to that of an employee under the Act, rendering workers’ compensation the sole and exclusive remedy to compensate plaintiff for her injuries. Plaintiff argued that because there was no evidence the district board members were aware of their duties under Labor Code section 3364.5 when she was injured, none of the members were present at the event at which she was injured (a spelling bee), and there was no evidence they knew about the bee, she was not “authorized by the governing board” to act as a volunteer, and she was not performing services under their “direction and control” at the time she was injured. Thus, plaintiff reasoned, the trial court should have rejected the defendant’s affirmative defense that she was covered by the Act and, therefore, that workers’ compensation provided her exclusive remedy. Finding no reversible error in finding plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Act, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Perez v. Galt Joint Union Elementary School District" on Justia Law

While riding a bicycle, Plaintiff ran into an open car door being operated by a recruiter for the U.S. Marines. Plaintiff brought a claim for negligence against the United States, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the United States liable but concluded Plaintiff was also negligent and, therefore, partially liable.On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the evidence of Plaintiff's negligence was "dubious," and, even if Plaintiff was negligent, the district court failed to make the findings necessary to any holding that the plaintiff’s negligent conduct sufficiently caused the collision so as to make Plaintiff 40% responsible for the damages. View "Dooley v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus and ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to determine Appellee's appropriate pre-injury visual baseline and to apply that baseline to his request for compensation, holding that the Commission has discretion to use a claimant's vision as corrected by a hard contact lens as the claimant's pre-injury visual baseline.Appellee sustained an industrial injury to his right eye and underwent three surgical procedures to address the conditions allowed under his workers' compensation claim. Appellee then sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. After staff hearing officer denied Appellee's request Appellee filed a mandamus action arguing that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the writ was appropriate to determine Appellee's pre-injury visual baseline and to then use that baseline to determine whether the medical evidence supports an award for total loss of sight under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B). View "State ex rel. Cogan v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

Built in 1924, the Edenville Dam near Midland, Michigan, has earthen embankments spanning the Tittabawassee and Tobacco Rivers, forming a 2,600-acre reservoir. In 1998, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license to Wolverine Power to operate the Dam. FERC directed Wolverine to increase the Dam’s spillway capacity. Wolverine became insolvent. In 2003, Boyce’s predecessor purchased Wolverine’s license. Boyce promised to increase spillway capacity but failed to do so and committed numerous other regulatory violations: unauthorized repairs, dredging, and land-clearing; failing to file a public safety plan; and failing to properly monitor water quality. In 2018, FERC revoked Boyce’s license. Jurisdiction over the Dam passed to Michigan’s Department of Environmental, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE), which regulates over 1,000 dams. EGLE inspected the Dam and found it to be in “fair” condition. In May 2020, the Tittabawassee portion of the Dam collapsed following heavy rain, causing another downstream dam to fail. Thousands of residents (including the Allens) were forced to evacuate. Boyce filed for bankruptcy.The Allens sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages and restitution from the United States, arguing that FERC negligently entrusted Boyce with the Dam. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The United States was entitled to sovereign immunity and did not waive that immunity in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a–823g. Section 803(c) imposes liability on the licensees who build and manage hydropower projects. View "Allen v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation. View "Thomas v. Logue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Medical Commission to uphold the determination of the Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division that Jon Bressler was not entitled to compensation for three physical therapy sessions in connection with his work-related injury to his right arm, holding that there was no error.The Supreme Court affirmed the order upholding the three final determinations of the Division denying Bressler physical therapy benefits, holding that the Commission's conclusion that Bressler's continued physical therapy was not reasonable and necessary medical care for his work-related injury was supported by substantial evidence. View "Bressler v. State, ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. View "L. C. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals officer limiting the reopening of Appellant's claim to the lumbar spine and affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that the appeals officer properly determined that the reopening of Appellant's claim was warranted only as to the lumbar spine.Although Appellant was previously treated for injuries to several parts of her body, including her head and back, she sought to reopen her claim due to the worsening condition of her lumbar spine. The appeals officer ordered that Appellant's claim be reopened for the lumbar spine only, and Appellant sought judicial review. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer properly limited the reopening of the claim to the lumbar spine. View "Olvera v. Wynn Las Vegas" on Justia Law