Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Ponderay Police Department Officer Michael Watkins injured his knee while chasing a suspect. Because Watkins was injured during the performance of his duties as a police officer, he was eligible to receive his full base salary during the period of his disability under the Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Act. Rather than receive payments under the Act, Watkins accepted worker’s compensation benefits from the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Nearly a year later, Watkins filed a complaint against the City of Ponderay seeking payment of his full base salary. The Commission fashioned a remedy which required the City to pay Watkins his full base salary, but reduced that amount by the worker’s compensation payments Watkins had already received. Watkins appealed, arguing the Commission failed to follow the Act and exceeded its authority by ordering that the City receive a credit for benefits Watkins received. Finding the Commission erred in ordering the City receive a credit for the worker's compensation benefits, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. View "Watkins v. City of Ponderay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of a decision of a hearing examiner with the Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System for the City of Baltimore denying Petitioner's request for line-of-duty disability retirement, holding that the petition was untimely.Petitioner, a police officer, sustained an injury during a car accident that occurred while he was responding to an emergency call. A copy of the hearing examiner's decision denying line-of-duty disability retirement but granting him non-line-of-duty disability retirement. At issue was whether former Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera's administrative tolling order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic applied to Defendant's case. The circuit court concluded that the extension applied only to deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks' offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. The appellate court certified the question of whether the fifteen-day extension applied to all cases whose statute of limitations and deadlines related to initiation expired between those dates. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the fifteen-day extension under the administrative tolling orders applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks' offices between the relevant dates. View "In re Hosein" on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

In summer 2010, plaintiff Carol Conforti obtained a restraining order against her husband. On September 8, he was arrested for violating the restraining order by returning to the marital home to see his son. Conforti was taken to the OCJ, where he was evaluated by a staff member of Correctional Health Services (CHS). A CHS staff member wrote on the “Intake Receiving and Screening” form that Conforti reported: (1) drinking half a gallon of vodka each day; (2) major surgery that left him with rods and screws in his back; (3) feeling “hopeless or helpless”; and (4) the “[r]ecent significant loss” of his marriage. A physician prescribed him one extra mattress and medicine for back pain and alcohol dependence, and instructed that he not be assigned work or a top bunk. After 27 days, Conforti was released. Just over a week later, Conforti was arrested for again returning to the marital home to see his son. He arrived at OCJ on October 13, 2010. A document from Conforti’s file acknowledged his previous incarceration and history of binge drinking but stated he had “[n]o current mental health issues/concerns” and was cleared for OCJ’s general population. On October 16, he requested medical attention for back pain. On October 20, Conforti wrote a suicide note to his parents, closed the door to his cell, covered the cell door window with a sheet, and hung himself. During discover, plaintiff submitted an expert report who opined that defendants the County of Ocean and the Ocean County Jail acted negligently by failing to adequately train and supervise OCJ staff to prevent inmate suicide. The County defendants moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). A jury found defendant negligent and apportioned liability 60% against the County and 40% against Correctional Health Services (CHS). Defendants moved for JNOV, reasserting their medical-facility-immunity argument. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence count at the summary judgment stage, and no error in refusing to overturn the jury’s verdict after trial. View "Conforti v. County of Ocean, et al." on Justia Law

While responding to an emergency, City of Oxford Police Officer Matthew Brown collided with Patricia Phillips’s vehicle at an intersection. Phillips filed suit to recover for injuries suffered in the collision. After a bench trial, the circuit court found that Officer Brown did not act with reckless disregard in response to the emergency and determined that the City of Oxford was entitled to police-protection immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Phillips appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed. The majority of the appellate court held that the trial court’s finding that Officer Brown’s actions did not rise to the level of reckless disregard is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that Oxford was not entitled to police-protection immunity. IThe dissent’s opinion said that the circuit court’s judgment was supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, the Court of Appeals lacked the power to disturb the trial judge’s findings. After its review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the record contained substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the decision of the trial court. View "Phillips v. City of Oxford" on Justia Law

In 2016 Martin Mariano, an employee of plaintiff L & S Framing Inc., was working on a residential house under construction when he fell from the second floor onto the concrete ground floor below, sustaining serious injuries. Following an investigation, real party in interest California Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation, which eventually included a serious accident- related citation for violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 1626(b)(5). Plaintiff appealed the citation. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the Division’s mid-hearing request to amend the citation to allege a violation of section 1632(b)(1), denied the Division’s post-hearing motion to amend to allege violation of section 1626(a)(2), and concluded the Division failed to prove the alleged violation of section 1626(b)(5). The Division filed a petition for reconsideration with the defendant California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Appeals Board). The Appeals Board concluded the ALJ improperly denied the two requests to amend and upheld the citation based on violation of both section 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2). Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court: (1) erred in permitting the Appeals Board to amend the citation; (2) incorrectly concluded sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) applied; and (3) incorrectly concluded section 1716.2 did not apply and did not supersede the other regulations on the facts of this case. The Court of Appeal surmised that second and third of these contentions depended on the question whether the specific location from which Mariano fell qualified as a floor opening (§ 1632(b)(1)) and/or a stairwell (§ 1626(a)(2)), or instead an “unprotected side[] or edge[]” (§ 1716.2(f)). After review, the Court affirmed, finding the Appeals Board properly allowed the Division to amend the citation, the Appeals Board reasonably deemed the location at issue to fall within the scope of sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) and that determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the Appeals Board properly determined section 1716.2 did not apply. View "L & S Framing Inc. v. Cal. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that under California's Motor Carriers of Property Permit Act, Cal. Veh. Code 34600 et seq., a commercial automobile insurance policy does not continue in full force and effect until the insurer cancels a corresponding certificate of insurance on file with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).Insured was driving a truck covered by his policy with Insurer when he collided with a car, killing its driver. The driver's parents sued Insured for wrongful death, and Insured tendered his defense to Insurer. Insurer settled the claim for its policy limits and then sued Insured's former insurer (Defendant) for declaratory relief, equitable contribution, and equitable subrogation. The trial court held that Defendant's policy remained in effect on the date of the collision because one of Defendant's cancellation notices was rejected by the DMV as incomplete. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that the Act does not require a commercial auto insurance policy to remain in effective indefinitely until the insurer cancels the certificate of insurance on file with the DMV. View "Allied Premier Insurance v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Ye sought to recover against GlobalTranz, a freight broker, following the death of her husband in a highway accident. Ye claimed, under Illinois law, that GlobalTranz negligently hired the motor carrier (Sunrise) that employed the driver of the truck that caused the accident. Ye obtained a $10 million default judgment against Sunrise.The district court concluded that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) bars Ye’s claim against GlobalTranz and that the Act’s safety exception in 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the significant economic effects that would result from imposing state negligence standards on brokers. Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, with a specific carveout for laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority." Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz falls within 14501(c)(1)’s express prohibition on the enforcement of state laws “related to a ... service of any ... broker ... with respect to the transportation of property.” Rejecting the "safety exception" claim, the court reasoned that a common law negligence claim enforced against a broker is not a law that is “with respect to motor vehicles." View "Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that an appeals officer erred in denying benefits to the widow and child of an employee who died while on a work trip, holding that there is no requirement that an employee's activities be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.Jason Buma died when he traveled from Nevada to Texas for a work conference and had an accident one evening while riding an ATV around a ranch owned by his coworker. Plaintiffs, Buma's wife and child, requested workers' compensation benefits, but the request was denied. An appeals officer upheld the denial. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeals officer failed to apply the traveling employee rule. On remand, the appeals officer again denied benefits on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record that Jason's employer could have foreseen that Jason would be riding ATVs. The district court granted Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer misinterpreted this Court's decision in Buma I and that this Court did not impose a requirement that an employee's activities need be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits. View "Providence Corp. Development v. Buma" on Justia Law

Twenty-eight individuals and businesses commenced this citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), which creates a private right of action against any entity that has “contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” Plaintiffs complained of elevated levels of radiation detected on their land and seek to hold responsible three entities that operated nearby chemical plants during the twentieth century. The district court dismissed their complaints, holding, among other things, that the radioactive materials found on the plaintiffs’ properties fall outside the scope of RCRA because they were recycled industrial byproducts rather than discarded waste. Defendants raised a host of additional arguments in support of dismissal.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that as to Defendants Union Carbide Corporation and Occidental Chemical Corporation, the complaint plausibly alleged the elements of a citizen suit under RCRA, or the Plaintiffs have identified extrinsic evidence that may render amendment fruitful. However, as against defendant Bayer CropScience Inc., there are no particularized allegations from which liability can reasonably be inferred. The court reasoned that there is one probative allegation implicating Bayer: Stauffer’s Lewiston plant was located within 2,000 feet of the Robert Street properties and within a mile of four of the Plaintiffs’ other properties. But proximity alone is insufficient to make Bayer’s contribution plausible. View "Talarico Bros. Bldg. Corp., et al. v. Union Carbide Corp., et al." on Justia Law