Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs’ son suffered serious injuries when a soccer goal tipped over at the Little Rock Air Force Base where Plaintiffs were stationed. Although he sued the Air Force for negligently failing to secure the goal to the ground and warn of the potential danger, the district court concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act stood in the way.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing about the soccer-goal-safety statute alters the “plain and unambiguous” language of the recreational-use statute. And the only way to conclude otherwise is to recognize a tort-based enforcement scheme for a statute without one—something the court cannot do.   Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs lived in on-base “military housing” when the accident occurred. Even assuming that living there made them tenants of the Air Force, Warfit Field is not part of “the base housing area.” Rather, it is a facility that they were “invited or permitted” to use because they are a military family. The court held that Plaintiffs cannot show that a private party in the Air Force’s shoes would have been liable for the injuries suffered by their son. As tragic as the circumstances of this case are, there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity. View "Andrew Hutchinson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appeal brought by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in this housing discrimination case, holding that this Court was compelled to affirm.For several years, Richard Cantillon harassed his neighbor, Kelly Howard, by making obscene gestures, calling her racial epithets, and physically menacing Howard. Howard eventually filed a neighbor versus neighbor claim with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that Cantillon had violated her civil rights on account of her race. Cantillon defaulted, and the referee awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in damages. The Commission appealed the award as insufficient, but neither Howard nor Cantillon participated in the appeal. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that there was no legal basis for it to second-guess the amount of the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court appropriately resolved the Commission's claims under the circumstances of this case. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that a Transportation Security Officer (“TSO”) sexually assaulted her during an airport security screening. At issue is whether Plaintiff may bring claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel held that TSOs fall under the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso,” which waives sovereign immunity for torts such as assault and battery committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The panel joined the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to certain intentional torts committed by TSOs. The district court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FTCA claims.   The panel considered whether, as officers of the United States, TSOs are “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The government argued that TSOs do not “execute searches” by conducting screenings. The panel held that the screenings fit the ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings of searches. View "MICHELE LEUTHAUSER V. USA, ET AL" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law

The Idaho Industrial Commission issued an order denying Veronica Arreola’s petition for a declaratory ruling and motion for reinstatement of compensation. Arreola brought her petition and motion against the Granite State Insurance Co. (“the Surety”), when the Surety, without an order from the Commission invoked I.C. section 72-434 to suspend Arreola’s compensation payments. In the Surety’s unilateral and private determination, suspending Arreola’s compensation payments was appropriate because the Surety had purportedly scheduled Arreola’s Independent Medical Exam (“IME”) with its physician at a “reasonable” time, and Arreola “unreasonably” failed to submit to or had obstructed the scheduled IME by not appearing. Arreola’s petition and motion disputed these private conclusions by the Surety. Arreola also maintained that only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate the underlying medical exam dispute and determine whether there is a factual basis to execute the enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72-434. The Commission denied the petition and motion, instructing Arreola to instead proceed through a complaint for relief. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded its decision in Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab, 71 P.3d 458 (2003) interpreting Idaho Code section 72-434 was manifestly wrong. "Only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate medical exam disputes, and to enforce that adjudication through the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434." In light of this, Arreola’s concern that the Surety’s unilateral execution of the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434 also suspended her right to file a “complaint” to seek relief was now abated. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not affirm: given the shift in the legal landscape with Brewer overruled, the Commission’s order denying the petition and motion was vacated, and the case remanded with instructions that the Commission: (1) order payment of prospective compensation payments that might be owed until such time as the Commission determines that payments are not required under section 72-434; (2) reconsider the appropriate procedural mechanism for adjudicating the underlying factual dispute; and (3) instruct the Surety what procedural mechanism it must use to obtain an order authorizing it to lawfully suspend compensation payments. View "Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and orders approving a settlement between Robert Allum and Montana State Fund and dismissing Allum's claims for benefits, holding that Allum resolved all of his dispute benefits, and therefore, the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) did not have jurisdiction over Allum's remaining stand-alone constitutional challenges.The State Fund accepted liability for the knee injury Allum received at work. Later, Allum notified State Fund that he also asserted a back condition resultant from his knee injury. Allum filed a petition seeking a hearing on his injury claims and also sought a hearing on his claims challenging the constitutionality of the Montana Workers' Compensation Act and the WCC. Allum and State Fund settled the injury claims prior to trial. The WCC approved the settlement agreement and then concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address Allum's constitutional challenges because Allum had resolved all of his benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC's conclusions of law were correct. View "Allum v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the Compensation Review Board upholding the finding and award of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second Districting ordering the town of Waterford to accept as compensable Plaintiff's claim for heart disease benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c, holding that the appellate court erred.In concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to benefits the Commissioner determined that section 7-433c does not define the phrase "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department." The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the town argued that the appellate court erred in determining that the definition of "member" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-425(5) does not govern whether the plaintiff was a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department for purposes of section 7-433c. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of "member" in section 7-425(5) governs eligibility for benefits under section 7-433c. View "Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dep't" on Justia Law

In January 2022, plaintiffs A.S. and her husband B.S. brought a claim under the Child Sexual Abuse Accountability Act (CSAAA or “Act”) against a former high school athletic coach and a school district, alleging that the coach sexually abused A.S. between 2001 and 2005 when she was a minor. At the time plaintiffs filed suit, any previously available claims for this alleged abuse was time-barred. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the CSAAA was unconstitutionally retrospective to the extent it created a new cause of action for conduct that predated the Act, and for which any previously available claims would be time-barred. The Supreme Court concluded that because the CSAAA created a new cause of action for child sexual abuse, the Act created a new obligation and attached a new disability with respect to past transactions or considerations to the extent it permitted victims to bring claims for which any available cause of action would have been time-barred. Therefore, the CSAAA amounted to unconstitutional retrospective legislation as applied to the plaintiffs’ claim under the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. View "Aurora Public Schools v. A.S. & B.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the opinion and award filed by the North Carolina Industrial Commission in favor of Plaintiff following a tractor-trailer accident in which Plaintiff, an employee a trucking company, sustained injury, holding that the agency's decision should not have been disturbed by the lower appellate court.After the accident, Plaintiff provided notice to her employer and its insurance carrier of the accident and of the injury her husband received in the accident but did not report injury to herself. The Commission concluded that Plaintiff's injury was causally related to the accident, that Plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for not providing notice of her injury until two years later, that Defendants were not prejudiced, and that Plaintiff was totally disabled as a result of her injury. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no error in either the Commission's findings of fact or in its conclusions of law. View "Sprouse v. Turner Trucking Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction to hear the claim of Roger Hall, who suffered a work-related injury after being exposed to asbestos-containing material while working for the Letcher County Board of Education, that he was permanently and totally disabled and was entitled to medical benefits, holding that there was no error.As to jurisdiction, the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that nothing in Ky. Rev. Stat. 49.020 prevents an employee with proceeding on a claim against his or her employer pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction over Hall's case. View "Letcher County Bd. of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law