Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) provides that health centers receiving funding under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”) may be deemed Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated their duty to report a court-ordered Lane County Mental Health patient’s refusal to comply with the terms of his probation. Plaintiffs alleged they were injured as a result of Defendants’ failure to report a patient’s repeated failures to comply with his mental health treatment plan. Defendants contended that they were entitled to Section 233 immunity. The district court held that Section 233 immunity did not apply to Defendants and remanded to state court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order remanding to state court Plaintiffs’ action alleging negligence and wrongful death claims against federally funded community health centers and their employees (“Defendants”), and remanded to the district court to enter an order substituting the United States as the defendant and deeming the action as one brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel first addressed whether there was jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Ordinarily, a remand order is not reviewable on appeal, except for cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. The panel agreed with Defendants that Section 233 immunity did not turn on who brings the claim, but rather on whether the conduct giving rose to the claim arose out of the Defendants’ performance of “medical, surgical, dental or related functions.” View "SAM FRIEDENBERG, ET AL V. LANE COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus directing the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Amanda Carpenter's request for death benefits after her fiancé, Christopher McDonald, died in an industrial accident, holding that a writ of mandamus was appropriate.In denying Carpenter's request for death benefits the Commission determined that Carpenter was not McDonald's surviving spouse. In issuing its limited writ of mandamus the Tenth District concluded that Carpenter could potentially qualify for death benefits as a member of McDonald's family. The court directed the Commission to vacate its order and to determine whether Carpenter was a member of McDonald's family under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.59(D) and, if so, the extent of her dependency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter had a clear legal right to have the Commission apply section 4123.59(D) correctly to her claim for death benefits, and the Commission had a clear legal duty to do so. View "State ex rel. McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

By 2011, due to weathering and aging, the condition of the concrete stairs leading to the entrance of the Oil City Library (the “library”) had significantly declined. Oil City contracted with Appellants Harold Best and Struxures, LLC, to develop plans for the reconstruction of the stairs and to oversee the implementation of those design plans. The actual reconstruction work was performed by Appellant Fred Burns, Inc., pursuant to a contract with Oil City (appellants collectively referred to as “Contractors”). Contractors finished performing installation work on the stairs by the end of 2011. In early 2012, Oil City began to receive reports about imperfections in the concrete surface, which also began to degrade. In September 2013, Oil City informed Burns of what it considered to be its defective workmanship in creating the dangerous condition of the stairs. Between February 28, 2012 and November 23, 2015, the condition of the stairs continued to worsen; however, neither Oil City nor Contractors made any efforts to repair the stairs, or to warn the public about their dangerous condition. In 2015, Appellee David Brown (“Brown”) and his wife Kathryn exited the library and began to walk down the concrete stairs. While doing so, Kathryn tripped on one of the deteriorated sections, which caused her to fall and strike her head, suffering a traumatic head injury. Tragically, this injury claimed her life six days later. Brown, in his individual capacity and as the executor of his wife’s estate, commenced a wrongful death suit, asserting negligence claims against Oil City, as owner of the library, as well as Contractors who performed the work on the stairs pursuant to their contract with Oil City. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether Section 385 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposed liability on a contractor to a third party whenever the contractor, during the course of his work for a possessor of land, creates a dangerous condition on the land that injures the third party, even though, at the time of the injury, the contractor was no longer in possession of the land, and the possessor was aware of the dangerous condition. To this, the Court concluded, as did the Commonwealth Court below, that a contractor may be subjected to liability under Section 385 in such circumstances. View "Brown v. Oil City, et al." on Justia Law

Fox TV obtained permission from Superintendent Dixon to film scenes for the television series, Empire, at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Fox used the Center’s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces for five days and returned to film retakes on seven additional days. During filming, several housing pods housed more detainees than the Center’s policy suggested; some detainees exercised indoors instead of in the outdoor yard; some classes were moved; and the Center postponed or canceled some extra‐curricular activities and held visitation hours in a smaller room.Three detainees filed a proposed class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Dixon partial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiffs had not shown “a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions” but did not dismiss state law claims. The court reasoned that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” Under the holding, Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Dixon is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act. The alleged wrongful conduct arose from decisions Dixon made within the scope of his authority. View "T. S. v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

On April 7, 2020, Matthew Wallace was hired by the Centreville Police Department, located in the Town of Centreville, Mississippi. In 2021, Wallace was dispatched with a Town of Centreville certified police officer, to a scene involving multiple juveniles riding all-terrain vehicles in the town limits. An altercation occurred; at some point during the altercation, Wallace went to the patrol unit to retrieve the police-issued pepper spray. Upon returning to the scene, Wallace released the pepper spray. Sometime following the incident, one of the juveniles and his mother filed charges against Wallace for simple assault on a minor. The issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered around a probable cause hearing pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28. Before the hearing, the State petitioned the circuit court to determine whether Wallace was entitled to a probable cause hearing, alleging Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer. At the hearing, the circuit determined that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing. Wallace moved the circuit court for a probable cause hearing for the same underlying incident. The circuit court denied the motion, finding, again, that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28. Wallace appealed. The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer who is not certified pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 45-6-11(3)(a) is not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i). Further, the Court held Wallace was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i) because he was not a law enforcement officer as defined by Mississippi Code Section 45-6-3(c). View "Wallace v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2018, Terri Richardson Mattson (“Mattson”) and her husband filed this action against the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its employee, Laurie Gallegos, a certified physician assistant (“Defendants”), alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent related to outpatient mental health services Mattson received from Defendants. As a part of those services, Gallegos prescribed Mattson Prozac (fluoxetine), an antidepressant. Roughly one month later, the day of her follow up appointment with Gallegos, Mattson woke up, took a firearm from her gun cabinet, went to the liquor store, bought a bottle of vodka, drank the entire bottle while driving to her follow up appointment, and when she arrived in the Department’s parking lot, fired the gun into her head. Mattson survived but suffered extensive injuries. Subsequently, Mattson and her husband filed this action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on two grounds: (1) Defendants were immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) because Mattson’s claims arose out of injuries sustained while she was receiving services from a “mental health center”; and (2) the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity did not apply as a matter of law. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision that Mattson’s and her husband’s claims fell within the purview of the “mental health center, hospital or similar facility” immunity provision in Idaho Code section 6-904A(2). However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision that there was no triable jury question under the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity. The Supreme Court found Mattson alleged sufficient facts at summary judgment to demonstrate that a reasonable person could find that Defendants’ acts or omissions were “reckless, willful and wanton[.]” Thus, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mattson v. IDHW" on Justia Law

The City of Lemoore (City) appealed following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, who was injured when he tripped over an uneven portion of a City sidewalk. The City asks us to declare the offending portion of the sidewalk not a “dangerous condition” under the Government Claims Act as a matter of law. The City argued the present sidewalk condition must be deemed trivial as a matter of law because of its open and obvious nature, Plaintiff’s admitted familiarity with the condition, and the absence of prior accidents there.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed. On balance, the factors do not combine to create a risk so trivial, minor, or insignificant that the sidewalk condition must be held not dangerous as a matter of law. Although the condition was visible on approach on an inferably clear, dry day and had not harmed others or Plaintiff in his many prior jogs, reasonable minds could still differ as to its dangerousness based on the evidence of the first defect’s relatively large height and rough edge, the presence of back-to-back defects, and the partial obstruction of the pine needles and debris. The determination of the condition’s dangerousness was properly left to the jury, whose verdict we will not overturn. View "Stack v. City of Lemoore" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of West Virginia, formerly owned Demcorp, LLC, which did business as “Dollar Stretcher,” a convenience store in nearby Winchester, Virginia. That store sold large quantities of cigarettes, which law enforcement agents of the Department of Homeland Security had evidence to believe was being resold in New York to avoid New York’s higher excise taxes, in violation of the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act. During their criminal investigation, agents, armed with warrants, seized 1,560 cartons of cigarettes from the Dollar Stretcher store, and the Department of Homeland Security then held them for several years, during which time the cigarettes passed their shelf life of one year. When the Department ultimately offered to return the cigarettes, Plaintiff refused them as they could no longer be sold and thus had no value. Plaintiffs commenced this action against the Department of Homeland Security and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking compensatory damages. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the criminal warrant served a range of obvious and stated criminal investigative purposes. Any damages action against the United States for the improper seizure and detention under such a warrant is barred by sovereign immunity. Even though the seizure of cigarettes, in this case, was authorized by both a warrant issued for criminal investigative purposes and a warrant issued for civil forfeiture — dual purposes — the court concluded that the United States is immune from suit. View "Reba Myers v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Board of Review (BOR) affirming the finding of the Office of Judges (OOJ) that Respondent's claim for occupational pneumoconiosis benefits against Petitioner was timely, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.The claims representative for Petitioner's worker's compensation insurance carrier found that Respondent's claim for benefits was filed outside of the pertinent three-year statute of limitations and therefore denied it. The OOJ reversed, ruling that Respondent was not time-barred from filing his claim. Thereafter, the Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board found that Respondent had a ten-percent impairment. The BOR affirmed on the timeliness issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BOR did not clearly err in finding that Respondent filed his occupational pneumoconiosis claim within the three-year limitations period. View "Argus Energy, LLC v. Marenko" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Manuel Hernandez appealed the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Stockton (City) based on his failure to comply with the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff sued for damages arising out of an allegedly defective public sidewalk. Plaintiff filed a government claim with the City, alleging that it negligently maintained public property by failing to correct a dangerous condition along a sidewalk. Plaintiff claimed that he sustained severe injuries when he tripped and fell due to a “dangerous condition” on the City-owned “sidewalk surface” that he identified only as an “uplifted sidewalk.” After his government claim was rejected, plaintiff filed this personal injury action, complaining broadly that the “sidewalk surface” harbored a “dangerous condition” that created an unspecified hazard. He later disclosed during his deposition that he tripped and fell when he stepped into a hole, specifically a tree well with no tree in it. When specifically asked whether it was “fair to say that [his] fall was not caused by an uplifted sidewalk,” he responded: “Correct.” The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that this action was barred because the factual basis for recovery was not “fairly reflected” in plaintiff’s government claim. View "Hernandez v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law