Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the Compensation Review Board upholding the finding and award of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second Districting ordering the town of Waterford to accept as compensable Plaintiff's claim for heart disease benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c, holding that the appellate court erred.In concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to benefits the Commissioner determined that section 7-433c does not define the phrase "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department." The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the town argued that the appellate court erred in determining that the definition of "member" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-425(5) does not govern whether the plaintiff was a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department for purposes of section 7-433c. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of "member" in section 7-425(5) governs eligibility for benefits under section 7-433c. View "Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dep't" on Justia Law

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In January 2022, plaintiffs A.S. and her husband B.S. brought a claim under the Child Sexual Abuse Accountability Act (CSAAA or “Act”) against a former high school athletic coach and a school district, alleging that the coach sexually abused A.S. between 2001 and 2005 when she was a minor. At the time plaintiffs filed suit, any previously available claims for this alleged abuse was time-barred. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the CSAAA was unconstitutionally retrospective to the extent it created a new cause of action for conduct that predated the Act, and for which any previously available claims would be time-barred. The Supreme Court concluded that because the CSAAA created a new cause of action for child sexual abuse, the Act created a new obligation and attached a new disability with respect to past transactions or considerations to the extent it permitted victims to bring claims for which any available cause of action would have been time-barred. Therefore, the CSAAA amounted to unconstitutional retrospective legislation as applied to the plaintiffs’ claim under the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. View "Aurora Public Schools v. A.S. & B.S." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the opinion and award filed by the North Carolina Industrial Commission in favor of Plaintiff following a tractor-trailer accident in which Plaintiff, an employee a trucking company, sustained injury, holding that the agency's decision should not have been disturbed by the lower appellate court.After the accident, Plaintiff provided notice to her employer and its insurance carrier of the accident and of the injury her husband received in the accident but did not report injury to herself. The Commission concluded that Plaintiff's injury was causally related to the accident, that Plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for not providing notice of her injury until two years later, that Defendants were not prejudiced, and that Plaintiff was totally disabled as a result of her injury. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no error in either the Commission's findings of fact or in its conclusions of law. View "Sprouse v. Turner Trucking Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction to hear the claim of Roger Hall, who suffered a work-related injury after being exposed to asbestos-containing material while working for the Letcher County Board of Education, that he was permanently and totally disabled and was entitled to medical benefits, holding that there was no error.As to jurisdiction, the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that nothing in Ky. Rev. Stat. 49.020 prevents an employee with proceeding on a claim against his or her employer pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department of Workers' Claims had jurisdiction over Hall's case. View "Letcher County Bd. of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff worked for Defendant Huntington Ingalls (formerly “Avondale”) as a shipyard electrician from February 1969 to June 1977. In March 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following his diagnosis, he filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging that Avondale, among other defendants, caused Plaintiff to contract mesothelioma by exposing him to asbestos in a negligent manner. Because Plaintiff primarily worked on United States Navy ships when he was exposed, Avondale removed the case to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute. Plaintiff never claimed benefits under the LHWCA, which provides a no-fault compensation remedy to injured workers. Avondale moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the claims are preempted.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held express preemption does not apply. Despite the clear proclamation of exclusivity in the LHWCA’s text that prohibits any liability “at law or in admiralty” for injuries covered by the Act, there is no express preemption here. The court wrote that its conclusion that conflict preemption does not apply is supported by the existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the acceptable incongruity inherent therein, the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of arguments resisting that regime, the LHWCA’s role of supplementing rather than supplanting state law, the limited category of claims at issue here, and the similarity between these claims and those the Supreme Court has already permitted in Hahn. View "Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe failed to warn motorists of unsafe road conditions. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit. It has waived immunity in some FTCA cases but expressly retains immunity in cases involving “a discretionary function or duty.” If the discretionary function exception applies, “it is a jurisdictional bar to suit.” The court wrote that Plaintiffs “have failed to rebut the presumption that the Tribe’scdecision not to post warning signs was grounded in policy.” Accordingly, the court concluded it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. View "Jade Mound v. The United States of America" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) denying Workers' Compensation Division benefits for treatment to Appellant's upper back, neck, and arms, holding that the OAH's determination was supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.Eight days after she twisted her back at work Appellant was in a motorcycle accident. The Division concluded that Appellant had suffered a compensable injury to her lumbar spine but denied payments for treatments for cervical spine, carpal tunnel syndrome, and cervical disc degeneration because those conditions were not related to Appellant's work injury. After a contested case hearing, the OAH upheld the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Vandom v. State, ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

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The Sativa Water District was created in 1938 under the County Water District Law to provide potable drinking water to the residents living in a neighborhood in the unincorporated community of Willowbrook and parts of the City of Compton within Los Angeles County. On July 9, 2018, four named individuals— (collectively, Plaintiffs)—filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Sativa Water District. The Sativa Water District moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit. Following a briefing, a hearing, and supplemental briefing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in (1) granting the Sativa Water District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, (2) denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the order dismissing the County as a defendant, and (3) decertifying their class as to the nuisance claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Reorganization Act grants a LAFCO discretion whether to permit a district to wind up its own affairs or whether instead to appoint a successor agency responsible for doing so. Because the LAFCO, in this case, took the latter route, Plaintiffs’ class action lawsuit against the dissolved district must be dismissed. The court further concluded that the trial court’s dismissal of the successor agency was proper because Legislature expressly granted civil immunity to that agency. View "Barajas v. Satvia L.A. County Water Dist." on Justia Law

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In 2010, Stephen Clevenger committed suicide in an Orange County jail. Lesley Feliz, guardian ad litem for Clevenger’s daughter, then engaged in years of unsuccessful litigation in federal court against the County of Orange and Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchens (the County), in which she asserted both federal claims and a supplemental state law claim for wrongful death. After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of her claims, rather than timely refile her state law claim in state court, Feliz endeavored to vacate the judgment under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In December 2018, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of her rule 60(b)(6) motion, Feliz filed this action in state court, asserting wrongful death and related claims against the County. The trial court dismissed Feliz’s claims after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, concluding they were time-barred, among other grounds. On appeal, Feliz invoked section 1367(d) of title 28 of the United States Code (section 1367(d)), which tolled the running of state statutes of limitations while supplemental state law claims remain pending in federal court, and argued its tolling period extended to the rule 60(b)(6) proceedings. Alternatively, she contended her claims were timely under the equitable tolling doctrine. The California Court of Appeal held section 1367(d)’s tolling provision covered only Feliz’s appeal of the district court’s judgment and did not extend to the rule 60(b)(6) proceeding. The Court also concluded Feliz did not establish entitlement to equitable tolling. View "Feliz v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

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The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) provides that health centers receiving funding under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”) may be deemed Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated their duty to report a court-ordered Lane County Mental Health patient’s refusal to comply with the terms of his probation. Plaintiffs alleged they were injured as a result of Defendants’ failure to report a patient’s repeated failures to comply with his mental health treatment plan. Defendants contended that they were entitled to Section 233 immunity. The district court held that Section 233 immunity did not apply to Defendants and remanded to state court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order remanding to state court Plaintiffs’ action alleging negligence and wrongful death claims against federally funded community health centers and their employees (“Defendants”), and remanded to the district court to enter an order substituting the United States as the defendant and deeming the action as one brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel first addressed whether there was jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Ordinarily, a remand order is not reviewable on appeal, except for cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. The panel agreed with Defendants that Section 233 immunity did not turn on who brings the claim, but rather on whether the conduct giving rose to the claim arose out of the Defendants’ performance of “medical, surgical, dental or related functions.” View "SAM FRIEDENBERG, ET AL V. LANE COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law