Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision granting T.A.'s application for benefits, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion.Travis Gelhausen died shortly after getting into an accident while driving a truck for Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. T.A. applied for benefits on behalf of her and Gelhausen's minor daughter, S.G., for Gelhausen's loss of the use of his arms and legs before his death. The Commission granted the application. Waste Management sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission either to vacate its award or to limit the award. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's award was proper. View "State ex rel. Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that toxic chemicals used during the carpet manufacturing process have been allowed to seep into the rivers that supply drinking water to communities near Dalton, including Rome, Georgia and the rest of Floyd County. On behalf of himself and a proposed class of water subscribers and ratepayers, he sued Dalton Utilities, a municipal corporation that operates Dalton’s wastewater treatment system, for violating the Clean Water Act and for creating a public nuisance. His lawsuit claims that Dalton Utilities has caused the City of Rome’s domestic water supply to be contaminated with dangerously high levels of toxic chemicals.   The question before the Eleventh Circuit was whether Dalton Utilities is entitled to municipal immunity from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement (injunctive relief) claim. The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Dalton Utilities’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed district court’s order denying Dalton Utilities’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim on municipal immunity grounds. The court explained that at oral argument counsel for Dalton Utilities conceded that if Phillips is still good law, Plaintiff has properly alleged a Phillips kind of nuisance claim for personal injury. The court agreed and held that municipal immunity does not shield Dalton Utilities from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim. View "Jarrod Johnson v. Water, Light, and Sinking Fund Commission of City of Dalton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a deceased employee's prior timely filing of a workers' compensation claim for an injury was sufficient to establish the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction over a dependent's subsequent claim for death benefits allegedly resulting from that injury, thus reversing the court of appeals' ruling below.The Commission in this case denied Plaintiff's claim for death benefits and dismissed the claim with prejudice on the grounds that Plaintiff's untimely filing could not grant the Commission jurisdiction over the claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decedent's timely claim established the Commission's jurisdiction over this matter. View "McAuley v. N.C. A&T State University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the opinion and order of the Workers' Compensation Board denying Officer Tracy Toler's petition for reconsideration of the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) declining to award Toler an additional two percent impairment rating for pain, holding that a physician that is not licensed in Kentucky does not meet the definition of "physician" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(32).Dr. Craig Roberts conducted an independent medical examination on Toler and assessed a six percent whole person impairment rating. To contest the rating, Toler's employer filed a report by Dr. Christopher Brigham believing a four percent impairment rating was more appropriate. The ALJ found Dr. Brigham's opinion to be more credible than Dr. Roberts' and did not award Toler an additional two percent impairment rating for pain. On appeal, Toler argued that Brigham did not qualify as a "physician" under section 342.0011(32). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ALJ's opinion and order, holding that Dr. Brigham did not meet the statutory definition of "physician" under the statute, and therefore, his report was inadmissible. View "Toler v. Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversing the rulings of the compensation judge finding that C. Jeremy Lagasse was entitled to contingent fees under Minn. Stat. 176.081, subd. 1(c) and that Larry Horton was entitled to partial reimbursement of fees under Minn. Stat. 176.081, subd. 7, holding that the WCCA incorrectly applied subdivision 1(c) in its standard of review.Horton, who was injured during his employment with Aspen Waste Systems and sought permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits through Aspen's insurer (Insurer), retained Lagasse to represent him in the matter. The compensation judge determined that Lagasse was entitled to contingent fees and that Horton was entitled to partial reimbursement of fees. The WCCA reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the WCCA incorrectly applied subdivision 1(c); and (2) the compensation judge and the WCCA incorrectly applied subdivision 7. View "Lagasse v. Horton" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment affirming the decision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission granting Respondent's request for compensation for his hernia, holding that the court of special appeals did not err.In granting Respondent's request for compensation, the Commission found that Respondent sustained an accidental injury during employment, that his current hernia was the result of the accidental injury, and that, as a result of the hernia, Respondent was totally disabled for several months. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court of special appeals did not err when it (1) held that "definite proof" under L&E 9-504(a)(1) applies to the quality of evidence presented and not the standard of proof a claimant must meet; and (2) concluded that Respondent met his burden of persuasion when producing medical evidence to a preponderance of the evidence standard. View "United Parcel Service v. Strothers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Walmart, Inc. ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Dianna Hixson temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on the basis of State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), holding that Klein applies prospectively only.Before the Supreme Court issued Klein, the Commission awarded Hixson TTD compensation. After Klein was released, Walmart, Hixson's former employer, filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the termination of Hixson's TTD compensation after the date notified Walmart of her retirement. The court of appeals granted the writ, concluding that the Commission abused its discretion by awarding TTD compensation for the period following Hixson's retirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Klein does not apply retroactively and should be applied prospectively only. View "State ex rel. Walmart, Inc. v. Hixson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1043.01(B), which limits workers' compensation claims for mental illnesses to those that arise from an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation, does not violate Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 8 or equal protection guarantees under Ariz. Const. art. II, 13.Plaintiff, an officer with the Tucson Police Department, filed an industrial injury claim arising from an incident in June 2018, claiming that it exacerbated his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff's claims for mental injuries non-compensable because the June 2018 incident was not an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation under section 23-1043.01(B). The court of appeals affirmed the denial of benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-1043.01(B) does not unconstitutionally limit recovery for stress-related workplace injuries. View "Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Appellant temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation after sustaining a work injury, holding that the Commission's order was neither unsupported by evidence in the record nor was it contrary to law.Appellant gave Appellee two weeks' notice of her intention to resign and subsequently sustained a work injury. The Commission awarded Appellant TTD compensation. The court of appeals granted a writ ordering the Commission to reverse its decision because Appellant had resigned from her employment prior to her injury. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), the court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the decision in Klein did not redefine voluntary abandonment of the workforce as voluntary abandonment of the injured worker's position; and (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that, but for her work injury, Appellant would have remained gainfully employed. View "State ex rel. Ohio State University v. Pratt" on Justia Law

Pakistan International Airlines (“PIA”) failed to transport the body of N.B. to Pakistan for burial due to a miscommunication by employees of Swissport USA, PIA’s cargo loading agent. N.B.’s family members sued PIA and Swissport in New York state court under state law; PIA removed the action to the district court. Following cross-motions for summary judgment and an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Montreal Convention, which preempts state-law claims arising from delayed cargo, does not apply because human remains are not “cargo” for purposes of the Montreal Convention and because their particular claims are not for “delay.”   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that human remains are cargo for purposes of the Montreal Convention; and on the facts found by the district court, the claims arise from delay. The claims are therefore preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court further wrote that it was Plaintiffs who cut off PIA’s ability to perform under the terms of the waybill. That decision was understandable given the need to bury N.B. quickly, and it cannot be doubted that Plaintiffs found themselves in a hard situation. But their only recourse against PIA and Swissport was a claim under the Montreal Convention, a claim which they have consistently declined to assert. View "Badar v. Swissport USA, Inc." on Justia Law