Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After an alleged collision with a mail vehicle, Plaintiff submitted a claim to the U.S. Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), seeking about $15,000 for damage to his truck. The postal service denied his claim because Plaintiff’s insurance covered it. Under the FTCA, this triggered a six-month window in which Plaintiff could either seek reconsideration or sue. He did neither. Instead, over eight months later, Plaintiff filed a second claim with the postal service, now seeking $2 million for back injuries from the same incident. The district court dismissed his suit as time-barred and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.   The court explained that Plaintiff’s first SF-95 presented his entire claim based on the November 14, 2019, accident. This claim could have been amended to include personal injury damages or appealed—all consistent with the procedures outlined in the FTCA. When the USPS denied that claim on March 26, 2020, the six-month clock started running, and it stopped ticking on September 26, 2020. During that time, Plaintiff neither sought reconsideration nor filed suit. Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that Plaintiff’s action is untimely and his claim is, therefore “forever barred.” View "Broussard v. USA" on Justia Law

After a series of prolonged airport security screenings, Plaintiff filed Bivens claims against the Customs and Border Protection officers who detained him. The district court found that the officers had qualified immunity and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff then filed a new complaint, under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court dismissed the new complaint for failure to state a claim, and Plaintiff appealed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims on grounds of collateral estoppel. Applying the four elements of collateral estoppel from Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012), the court held that Plainitff's claims against the federal officers were barred due to the determinations made in the prior Bivens action. View "Daniel Kordash v. USA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Medical Commission Hearing Panel (Commission) upholding that decision of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division denying Claimant's request for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits for a work-related injury that Claimant asserted made him unemployable, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was unaffected by any error of law.At issue was Claimant's request for PTD benefits for a work-related back injury Claimant suffered in 2002. The Division denied Claimant's application for PTD benefits, and the Commission upheld the Division's denial of PTD benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly determined that Claimant did not meet his burden of proving he was entitled to PTD benefits under the odd lot doctrine. View "Genner v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

Olson and Zdroik sustained injuries while volunteering at municipal fireworks displays in 2018. Fireworks distributed by Spielbauer Fireworks exploded prematurely at both events, severely burning the two. Both towns used teams of volunteers to operate their Fourth of July displays. Olson opened and closed a bin from which other volunteers retrieved fireworks during the Rib Lake show. Zdroik worked at the Land O’Lakes event as a “shooter,” manually lighting the fuses on mortar shells.Spielbauer’s insurer, T.H.E. Insurance, contested coverage under Spielbauer’s general and excess liability policies, which stated: This policy shall NOT provide coverage of any kind ... for any claims arising out of injuries or death to shooters or their assistants hired to perform fireworks displays or any other persons assisting or aiding in the display of fireworks whether or not any of the foregoing are employed by the Named Insured, any shooter or any assistant. The issue was whether the exclusion extends to all volunteers or only to those assisting hired shooters or hired assistants.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in favor of T.H.E. Insurance. The Shooters Endorsement plainly and unambiguously excludes from coverage hired shooters and their hired assistants and “any other persons” who assist the fireworks display, regardless of whether they assist hired persons. View "T.H.E. Insurance Co. v. Olson" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that a carpenter who admitted using alcohol and cocaine before his injury had a compensable disability because it determined the accident would have happened regardless of his drug and alcohol use. The Workers’ Compensation Benefits Guaranty Fund, which was responsible for payment if an employer defaults, appealed, arguing that the employee’s intoxication barred compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision because substantial evidence supported it. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "Alaska Workers' Compensation Benefits Guaranty Fund v. Adams, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against LAMMICO d/b/a Lammico Risk Retension Group, Inc. (LAMMICO); Mercy Hospital-Fort Smith (Mercy); various doctors, Mercy Clinic Fort Smith Communities; and John Does 1-10, alleging liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. Section 1395dd. Plaintiff claimed that Mercy made an “inappropriate transfer”. Plaintiff alleged that the delay in receiving vascular surgery within a six-hour window after the injury caused her leg to be amputated. Plaintiff further alleged that Mercy’s statutory duty under EMTALA is strict or absolute.”   The district court granted summary judgment. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants. Further, she argued that EMTALA imposes a strict liability standard for noncompliance with its directions.    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained EMTALA’s aim is to discourage bad-faith hospitals from dumping patients. Imposing liability upon a hospital’s good-faith effort to secure appropriate care for a patient that is beyond its capabilities is off the mark. Such liability would run contrary to EMTALA’s purpose and would undermine the express target of securing adequate care for patients who could not otherwise afford it. EMTALA’s “appropriate transfer” requirement should be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable transferring hospital at the time the hospitals agreed to the transfer and the patient departed the transferring hospital. Under this standard, Mercy effected an “appropriate transfer”: it sent Plaintiff to a hospital that, based on the information conveyed to it by the hospital, had “qualified personnel” for her treatment. View "Kimberly Ruloph v. LAMMICO" on Justia Law

After D.G. was injured in a car accident involving a rental car driven by I.M. H.A. rented the car involved in the accident from Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles (ERAC-LA). I.M. was listed as an additional authorized driver in the rental agreement between H.A. and ERAC-LA. At the time of rental, I.M.  presented ERAC-LA with a facially valid driver’s license issued by Kyrgyzstan and a local California address on the rental paperwork. D.G. sued ERAC-LA, I.M., and EAN Holding, LLC (EAN) for negligence. Specifically, D.G. alleged ERAC-LA negligently entrusted I.M. with the rental vehicle, and therefore proximately caused her injuries. ERAC-LA filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court to reverse the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District issued a writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its May 24, 2022 and July 29, 2022 orders denying ERAC-LA’s motion for summary judgment and enter a new order granting the motion. The court held that requiring a rental car agency to investigate whether a prospective renter who presents a facially valid foreign driver’s license is still a resident of that jurisdiction at the time of rental goes beyond the scope of duties prescribed by the Legislature. The court further concluded that D.G. failed to carry her burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists regarding ERAC-LA’s compliance with section 14608, subdivision (a)(2). View "Enterprise Rent-A-Car of L.A. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Estate of N.K (the Estate), by and through Plaintiff, appealed from the judgment after the trial court granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Defendant, Glendale Adventist Medical Center (GAMC), following a jury trial of the Estate’s claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. The decedent, presented at the acute care hospital operated by GAMC with complaints of weakness and lightheadedness. N.K. underwent an MRI scan and sustained a burn to his abdomen due to GAMC’s failure to screen N.K. for electrically conductive materials prior to the scan.The trial court concluded that substantial evidence failed to support that GAMC had a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with N.K., and substantial evidence failed to support that GAMC’s conduct in failing to properly screen N.K. was neglect under the Act   The Second Appellate District affirmed holding that the trial court was correct on both grounds.  The court held that the evidence, in this case, does not permit the conclusion that a robust and substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with ongoing responsibilities existed between GAMC and N.K. The court clarified that it does not suggest that such a relationship can never exist when an elder or dependent adult is an inpatient for only two days. Rather, here, substantial evidence does not support the relationship. Moreover, there is no substantial evidence that GAMC harmed N.K. by “failing to provide medical care” or by failing to “attend to his basic needs and comforts.” View "Kruthanooch v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor brought a petition seeking review of a final order issued on December 31, 2020 by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission found the phrase “stored in tiers” in the second sentence of 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.176(b) did not apply to pallets of merchandise located in a Walmart Distribution Center in Johnstown, New York.   The Secretary argued that the Commission erred in finding Section 11 1910.176(b) inapplicable to Walmart’s tiered storage system because it unambiguously includes material placed or arranged one above another in tiered storage racks, such as the system used at the Distribution Center. Alternatively, the Secretary also argued that if the Court found the regulation ambiguous, the Court should defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded finding that the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation was reasonable. The court explained that the Commission’s cramped definition ignores other types of tiers, including seating arrangements at sporting events and music venues with layers of seats that are independently supported and placed one over the other with gaps between them. There is nothing inconsistent in the remaining language of the standard that militates against an interpretation that shelves can be tiers. Here, the pallets stored on the selective racking became unstable and merchandise on the pallets fell. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Secretary’s competing interpretation of the language of the standard is reasonable. View "Martin J. Walsh v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

A Delaware superior court affirmed an Industrial Accident Board (the “IAB” or “Board”) decision denying Appellant Joseph Wilson’s (“Wilson”) petition seeking payment for a cervical spine surgery. The parties agreed the treatment Wilson received was reasonable and necessary. Wilson was injured in a work-related accident on August 1, 2002 while working for Appellee Gingerich Concrete and Masonry (“Employer”). Sometime after the accident, Wilson started treatment with Dr. Bikash Bose (“Dr. Bose”), a certified Delaware workers’ compensation healthcare provider. Wilson’s injury necessitated two related cervical surgeries. The first surgery was performed while Dr. Bose was certified under the Delaware workers’ compensation system (the “Delaware Certification”) according to the requirements set forth in the Act. Employer’s carrier paid the bills related to Wilson’s first surgery. But Wilson’s first surgery proved unsuccessful, and Dr. Bose recommended a second surgery. During the time between Wilson’s first surgery and his second surgery, Dr. Bose’s Delaware Certification lapsed, and he did not seek re-certification for nineteen months. The issue presented was whether the second surgery was compensable given that the treating physician’s certification under the Delaware Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) had lapsed by the time of treatment. If the treatment was not compensable, as the IAB and superior court held, then Wilson asked the Delaware Supreme Court to anticipatorily resolve the question of whether he could be liable for the bill even though no one asserted such a claim. The Supreme Court concluded Dr. Bose’s lapse rendered him uncertified, and, thus, the disputed bills were not compensable under 19 Del. C. § 2322D. View "Wilson v. Gingerich Concrete & Masonry" on Justia Law