Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff was injured after a high-speed chase, during which officers were following a car that had been reported stolen; officers had gotten within 10 feet of the car in a parking lot and had ordered the driver out of the car at gunpoint. The driver sped off and hit the plaintiff. The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b), provides local public entities and public employees with absolute immunity from liability for “[a]ny injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner.”The appellate court held that the defendants, several police officers and their government employers, did not have immunity under section 4-106(b) for the plaintiff's injuries because the person the police officers were chasing was not “an escaped or escaping prisoner” within the meaning of the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A mere show of authority by police officers is not sufficient to establish physical custody. The driver’s freedom of movement was directly controlled or limited to a particular place; he was not “held in custody” in the parking lot within the plain and ordinary meaning of that phrase, and was not an “escaped or escaping prisoner” when he subsequently hit the plaintiff. View "Robinson v. Village of Sauk Village" on Justia Law

Schultz filed a wrongful death and survival action, alleging that the defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct by refusing to dispatch 911 services, which resulted in the decedent’s (his wife) death. Schultz had called 911, asking that police stop his wife from driving because she was intoxicated. The defendants allegedly first dispatched police to the wrong location and then refused to contact police after Schultz called back. The circuit court dismissed, finding that the defendants had absolute immunity from civil liability under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act and that the decedent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries and death. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Emergency Telephone System Act (ETS), 50 ILCS 750/15.1(a), did not apply to situations in which a 911 dispatcher allegedly failed or refused to dispatch emergency services but is limited to “provid[ing] an immunity for failures within that infrastructure and technology itself” and “was not designed to supersede the immunities set forth in the Tort Immunity Act.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The limited immunity of section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act governs this claim, but dismissal was appropriate because the decedent’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of her death. View "Schultz v. St. Clair County" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old boy was shot and killed by Defendant, a then-officer responding to a 911 call about possible underage drinking. The boy’s family and friends sued Defendant and the City of Balch Springs alleging excessive force. Later, Defendant was separately convicted of murder. The district court denied Defendant’s summary judgment motion claiming qualified immunity.On appeal, Defendant argued that the facts at the moment of the threat are undisputed and urged the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case on the issue of materiality. The court found that the resolution of this factual dispute is material because it affects both whether Defendant’s use of force was reasonable and whether the force he used violated clearly established law. The court found that if a jury accepts Plaintiffs’ version of the facts as true, particularly as to what occurred in the moments before Defendant shot at the car, the jury could conclude that the officers violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established right to be free from excessive force. Thus, because the factual dispute is material, the court ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the summary judgment denial. The court dismissed Defendant’s interlocutory appeal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle operated by a USPS employee; through counsel, Plaintiffs submitted a “claim for damage, injury, or death." Subsequently, Plaintiffs retained a new law firm (Pawlowski), and provided notice to the USPS. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the government and the USPS employee. On October 16, 2018, a copy of the complaint and summons in the first FTCA action was delivered to the government. Another law firm (“Youngblood”), filed the first FTCA action complaint.On October 22, 2018, the USPS mailed a certified letter denying Plaintiffs’ administrative claims to Pawlowski, indicating Plaintiffs had until April 22, 2019 to file suit against the government. Neither Pawlowski nor Youngblood provided the USPS notice of any change in representation. On August 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their second FTCA complaint. On March 4, 2020, the government moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred.Plaintiffs contend that the government failed to comply with the plain language of 39 C.F.R. Sec. 912.9(a) when the USPS sent the denial letter to Pawlowski. Further that the district court erred in finding they were not entitled to equitable tolling.The court ruled that the USPS mailed the denial letter to the legal representative who Plaintiffs most recently identified, thus complying with the regulation. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the government. View "Robert Wayne Dotson, et al. v. USA" on Justia Law

Relator Gilbert Ellinger brought a qui tam suit on behalf of the People of the State of California against Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich), ESIS, Inc. (ESIS), and Stephanie Ann Magill, under Insurance Code section 1871.7, a provision of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA). In January 2016, Ellinger injured his back while working, and he immediately informed his supervisor. The following month, Ellinger reported to his employer’s human resources manager that he had sustained a work-related injury and had told his supervisor about it. The human resources manager created a “time line memorandum” summarizing the conversations she had with Ellinger about the injury. She placed the memorandum in Ellinger’s personnel file. Ellinger filed a workers’ compensation claim. Magill worked as a senior claims examiner for ESIS and was the adjuster assigned to investigate Ellinger’s claim. ESIS denied Ellinger’s claim on an unspecified date. Magill later testified that she denied the claim because of a written statement from Ellinger’s supervisor in which the supervisor claimed that Ellinger had not reported the injury to him. When the human resources manager was deposed in November 2016, she produced the time line memorandum, which Ellinger’s counsel in the workers’ compensation action did not know about until then. Nearly eight months after that disclosure, in July 2017, ESIS reversed its denial of the claim and stipulated that Ellinger was injured while working, as he had alleged. Contrary to Magill’s testimony, her email messages showed that the human resources manager had emailed Magill the time line memorandum in March and April 2016, and Magill thanked the manager for sending it. Ellinger alleged that Magill’s concealment of or failure to disclose the time line memorandum violated Penal Code section 550 (b)(1) to (3). On the basis of those alleged violations, Ellinger alleged that defendants were liable under section 1871.7. Against each defendant, Ellington sought a civil penalty and an assessment of no greater than three times the amount of his workers’ compensation claim. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend, concluding defendants could not be held liable under section 1871.7 for any failures of Magill in the claims handling or review process. Finding no reversible error in sustaining the demurrers, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California ex rel. Ellinger v. Magill" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the conclusion of the workers' compensation commissioner that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury rather than an unscheduled whole body injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2), holding that there was no error.Claimant sustained a work-related injury that was diagnosed as a "full thickness rotator cuff tear that has retracted to the level of the glenoid, severe AC arthrosis, tendonitis and tearing of the biceps tendon." In seeking permanent partial disability benefits, Claimant argued that her injury qualified as an unscheduled injury to the body as a whole, entitling her to industrial disability benefits. The commissioner concluded that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled injury to the shoulder, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined (1) Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2)(n); and (2) substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that Claimant failed to prove her biceps tear resulted in a permanent disability to her arm under section 85.34(2)(m). View "Chavez v. MS Technology LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Bisceglia appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants' the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (collectively the State). The court ruled that the State was immune from liability for plaintiff’s negligence claim under New Hampshire’s recreational use statute. Plaintiff and her family visited a historic lighthouse situated on land in New Castle, which was owned by the United States. That federal land was adjacent to Fort Constitution, which was owned and operated by the State. While plaintiff was standing on the federal land next to the outer wall of Fort Constitution, a portion of the wall fell on top of her, causing her substantial injuries. The trial court determined that because the State “held Fort Constitution out to the public at no charge” and the wall “was maintained as part of the historic site for the use and enjoyment of the public,” RSA 508:14, I, shielded the State from liability, “regardless of whether Plaintiff was physically on [the State’s] property at the time of the injury.” The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding it was undisputed that plaintiff did not use the State’s land; the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment based on RSA 508:14, I. View "Bisceglia v. New Hampshire Secretary of State & al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations.In 2015, Appellant was injured while working for Liberty Trailer and sustained a compensable right-shoulder injury. In 2019, Appellant requested additional benefits. An administrative law judge found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under a plain reading of Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-702(b)(1), Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was timely. View "Wynne v. Liberty Trailer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the compensation court denying James Spratt's request seeking to modify his workers' compensation award, holding that the compensation court erred in holding that it lacked the statutory to do so and, alternatively, that the principal of finality precluded relief.Spratt injured his back while working for Crete Carrier Corporation and received a workers' compensation award granting medical rehabilitation services for his lumbar back. Spratt subsequently requested that the compensation court modify the original award so that he may receive thoracic back treatment. The compensation court denied Spratt's request for modification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the compensation court erred in concluding that it lacked the power to modify the original award to treat Spratt's thoracic back; and (2) modification was not precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine. View "Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law