Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

While incarcerated in the Ada County jail, Appellant Tom Williamson fell from the upper bunk bed during a request that he stand for roll call. Williamson suffered a head injury and sued Respondents Ada County and the Ada County Sheriff (collectively “Ada County”), alleging they were negligent in maintaining unsafe bunk beds, ordering him to descend from the top bunk bed for roll call, and in responding to injuries he suffered. The district court dismissed the case after concluding Ada County was immune from liability under Idaho Code sections 6-904(1) and 904B(5). Williamson appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss Williamson’s claim that Ada County was negligent in ordering him to descend from the top bunk for roll call, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Williamson’s remaining claims. View "Williamson v. Ada County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the opinion of the court of appeals vacating the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of temporarily total disability (TTD) benefits and affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' opinion vacating the award of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement, holding that the court of appeals erred in part.Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury while working for Defendant. An ALJ awarded Plaintiff TTD benefits, PPD benefits, and medical benefits. The ALJ applied the two-times multiplier from Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)2 to Plaintiff's PPD benefits. The court of appeals vacated the ALJ's award of TTD benefits and vacated the award of PPD benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in awarding Plaintiff TTD benefits; and (2) the ALJ erred in enhancing Plaintiff's PPD benefits by the two-times multiplier. View "French v. Rev-A-Shelf" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) granting Austin Ellison's workers' compensation claim and awarding him disability benefits, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusions.Ellison, who was employed by Dee Whitaker Concrete as a general laborer, was leaving a job site and traveling back to Whitaker Concrete's premises when he was injured in an automobile accident. Whitaker Concrete denied Ellison's workers' compensation claim on the ground that injuries sustained while going to or returning from the workplace are not compensable. The ALJ ruled that Ellison's injuries were compensable, finding that Ellison fell within the traveling employee and the service to the employer exceptions to the going and coming rule. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ellison's status as a traveling employee qualified as an exception to the going and coming rule. View "Dee Whitaker Concrete v. Ellison" on Justia Law

After tripping over a deviation in a sidewalk in the City of Boulder (“City”), Joy Maphis sued the City for her injuries under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). The City moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it was immune from suit as the sidewalk did not constitute a “dangerous condition” under section 24-10-106(1)(d)(1), C.R.S. (2021), of the CGIA. The district court denied the City’s motion based on its finding that the deviation was “difficult to detect” and was larger than what the City classified as a “hazard” warranting repair. The City appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the undisputed evidence failed to establish that the sidewalk presented the type of dangerous condition for which the City had waived its immunity from suit. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that Maphis failed to establish a waiver of immunity. Reviewing de novo the legal question of whether the sidewalk constituted a dangerous condition under the CGIA, the Court held that Maphis’s evidence did not establish that the sidewalk deviation presented a risk that “exceeded the bounds of reason.” Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals and held that the City retained its immunity from suit under the CGIA. View "Maphis v. City of Boulder" on Justia Law

Dorothy Wright and her grandchildren (collectively, the “Decedents”) were killed when their vehicle was struck by a stolen vehicle that was being chased by College Park Police Department officers. At the time of the accident, the City of College Park had an insurance policy provided by Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (“Atlantic”), which provided coverage for negligent acts involving the City’s motor vehicles up to $5,000,000 but also included immunity endorsements which said that Atlantic had no duty to pay damages “unless the defenses of sovereign and governmental immunity are inapplicable.” Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, raising claims of negligence and recklessness resulting in the wrongful deaths of the three Decedents, to which the City raised sovereign immunity as a defense. Plaintiffs claimed the insurance policy limit was $5,000,000 for the three deaths, while Atlantic contended the policy limit was capped at $700,000 under the relevant statutory scheme and the terms of the City’s policy. As the parties agreed, pursuant to OCGA 36-92-2 (a)(3), the sovereign immunity of local government entities was automatically waived up to $700,000 in this instance, regardless of whether the City had a liability insurance policy. Atlantic intervened in the case to litigate the limit of the insurance policy. The trial court ruled that the policy limit is $5,000,000, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court then granted Atlantic’s petition for certiorari to decide whether the City’s insurance policy waived the City’s sovereign immunity under OCGA 36-92-2 (d)(3). The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled that the City’s insurance policy increased the sovereign immunity waiver notwithstanding the immunity endorsements, which expressly precluded coverage when a sovereign immunity defense applies. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co. v. City of College Park, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals holding that the decision of the North Carolina Industrial Commission should be reversed and this case remanded to the Commission for recalculation of Plaintiff's average weekly wage, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Plaintiff, an injured employee, received temporary disability benefits. Plaintiff later requested that his claim be assigned for a hearing, claiming that Defendant, his employer, had unilaterally lowered the amount of temporary total disability benefits that he had been receiving with respect to his back injury and that the parties could not agree with respect to the amount of benefits to which Plaintiff was entitled. The Commission determined that the fifth method for calculating Plaintiff's average weekly wage was appropriate for use in this case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the findings and conclusions that the Commission made in support of its average weekly wages determination appeared to rest upon a misapplication of the applicable legal standard. View "Nay v. Cornerstone Staffing Solutions" on Justia Law

In 2015, Talignani, a U.S. military veteran, consulted a VA neurosurgeon, who recommended that he undergo neck surgery. Because the VA could not perform a timely surgery, the surgeon suggested Talignani obtain evaluation and treatment at Saint Louis University Hospital. Talignani agreed and expressed a preference for the Hospital because he had previously undergone surgery there. A nurse obtained the VA’s approval to secure treatment for Talignani at a non-VA provider. The VA agreed to pay for “evaluation and treatment rendered pursuant to the non-VA provider’s plan of care.” The VA then sent a request for outpatient services to the Hospital. The Hospital agreed to treat Talignani and asked the VA to conduct several pre-operative tests. In January 2016, Dr. Mercier performed neck surgery on Talignani using the Hospital’s facility and staff. Talignani died shortly after being released.Talignani’s estate alleged he was prescribed excessive pain medication prior to his discharge, which proximately caused his death. An administrative complaint with the VA was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The Act waives sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by “employee[s] of the Government.” The estate’s claim does not involve a government employee. View "Talignani v. United States" on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal disputed the sequence for applying the provisions when calculating compensation for injured employees; another provision applied a cost-of-living ratio only to out-of-state recipients. Richard Roberge injured his shoulder in May 2014 while working for ASRC Construction Holding Company; he continued working with accommodations until the job ended in November. Roberge then returned to his Idaho residence. ASRC paid him $834.85 weekly in temporary total disability compensation through mid-August 2015, calculated by adjusting the maximum weekly compensation rate by the prevailing cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) percentage for his residence. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded We conclude the Act required first applying the cost-of-living ratio and then applying the maximum rate. View "Roberge v. ASRC Construction Holding Company, et al." on Justia Law

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order awarding compensation to Cami Bowman, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that the Commission abused its discretion.Bowman sought compensation for the permanent partial loss of her sight based on a seventy percent bilateral loss of vision. The Commission awarded compensation based on only a forty-five percent loss of sight in the left eye, maintaining a prior award based on a sixty-seven percent loss of sight in the right eye. The court of appeals granted Bowman a writ ordering the Commission to vacate its order and award her requested compensation, ruling that the Commission abused its discretion by relying on a portion of a physician's report that the physician had disclaimed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission failed to base its decision on medical evidence. View "State ex rel. Bowman v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law