Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Wendy McKenzie was injured by a falling tree branch while jogging in Lower Bidwell Park, a municipal park owned by the City of Chico, California. She and her husband, Leslie McKenzie, real parties in interest, sued the City for personal injuries. The City sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of its motion for summary judgment and to grant the motion, arguing the trial court, in denying the motion, failed to recognize the City was immune from liability for injuries caused by a natural condition of unimproved public property, under Government Code section 831.2. The Court of Appeal concurred with the City and issued the requested writ. View "City of Chico v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation (Department) concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim seeking workers' compensation benefits, holding that the Department had the authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's claim.Plaintiff was injured in Wyoming while working at a job for Defendant, a corporation formed and headquartered in South Dakota. Plaintiff applied for and received workers' compensation benefits in Wyoming. Later, Plaintiff sought benefits in South Dakota, which has more favorable workers' compensation statutes. The South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation dismissed the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that South Dakota had a substantial connection to the parties' employment relationship sufficient to provide the Department with authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's claim. View "Anderson v. Tri State Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals applying the law of the case doctrine to this appeal of an award of workers' compensation benefits but affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the Workers Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff, holding that the evidence supported the award.Plaintiff's claim was initially denied on the basis that, although Plaintiff had clearly suffered an injury, he failed to establish an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event that caused the injury. The Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner's ruling and entered an award of benefits. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its application of the law of the case doctrine; and (2) the evidence supported the Commission's award of benefits to Plaintiff. View "City of Charlottesville v. Sclafani" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, California, the County of Butte Health and Human Services Department (Health and Human Services), and the County of Butte Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office) (collectively County) for negligence under a theory Health and Human Services and the Sheriff’s Office failed to perform mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the investigation and reporting of allegations of child abuse perpetrated against plaintiff by his parents. The County demurred, contending plaintiff’s allegations were time barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The question before the trial court was, and on appeal was whether the discovery was available to plaintiff to excuse his filing of his complaint after the statute of limitation had expired. The trial court agreed with the County that the discovery rule was unavailable when section 338(a) was the applicable statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal reversed: “The problem with the County’s argument is that, whether diligent or not, plaintiff brought his claim within three years of the triggering event, thus falling within the statute of limitations when the discovery rule is applied. The discovery rule postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. Once the cause of action accrues, the injured party still has the statute of limitations period to investigate the parameters of his or her claim. Because plaintiff filed his action within three years from when he had reason to know of his causes of action, his suit is timely.” View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law

A loaded gun issued by the Bureau of Land Management to a ranger was stolen from the ranger’s parked personal car while the ranger was traveling with his family. Four days later, Steinle was shot and killed while walking on Pier 41 in San Francisco when Lopez found the pistol and fired it. It is not known who stole the pistol, how many people possessed it after it was stolen, or how the pistol came to be near the bench where Lopez found it. Steinle’s family filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the ranger’s negligence in failing to store or secure his firearm properly and in leaving it loaded, in an unattended vehicle in an urban location where the firearm could be stolen readily. The district court entered summary judgment on the ground that the ranger’s conduct was not the proximate cause of Steinle’s death.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying California law, the court concluded that the connection between the ranger’s storage of the pistol in his vehicle and Steinle’s death was so remote that, as a matter of law, the ranger’s acts were not the proximate or legal cause of the fatal incident. View "Steinle v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant Beverly Sumpter worked as a school aide. She reported an injury to her cervical spine after she repositioned a disabled student in his wheelchair. Sumpter had significant preexisting cervical spine problems. Doctors disagreed about whether the incident she described could have aggravated these problems and if so for how long. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that her work was not the substantial cause of her ongoing disability and need for medical care, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Sumpter appealed, contending that the Board and Commission applied incorrect legal standards and that the Board failed to make findings about material and contested issues. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "Sumpter v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor and Regulation determining that a copy of a letter to Appellant's insurer seeking a review of his workers' compensation benefits did not constitute a petition for a hearing, holding that the Department and the circuit court did not err.Appellant injured his left and right shoulder at work. Western National Insurance (Insurer), the workers' compensation for Appellant's employers, paid workers' compensation benefits. Five years later, Appellant sent a letter to Insurer seeking a review of his workers' compensation benefits and sent a copy of this letter to the Department requesting that the Department determine that the letter constituted a petition for hearing. The Department concluded that the letter was not a petition for hearing because it lacked the information required by ARSD 47:03:01:02. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Appellant's letter did not satisfy ARSD 47:03:01:02. View "May v. Spearfish Pellett Co." on Justia Law

Decker employed Pehringer at its Montana open-pit surface mine, 1977-1999. There were periods when Pehringer did not work, including a roughly three-year-long strike. For most of his mining career, Pehringer was regularly exposed to coal dust while working primarily as a heavy equipment operator. After being laid off in 1999, Pehringer was awarded Social Security total disability benefits. He never worked again. In 2014 a month before his sixty-fifth birthday, Pehringer sought black lung benefits, citing his severe COPD, 30 U.S.C. 923(b). A physician determined that “Pehringer is 100% impaired from his COPD” and that coal “dust exposure and smoking are significant contributors to his COPD impairment.”The Benefits Review Board affirmed a Department of Labor (DOL) ALJ’s award of benefits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a constitutional challenge to 5 U.S.C. 7521(a), which permits removal of an ALJ only for good cause determined by the Merits Systems Protection Board. DOL ALJ decisions are subject to vacatur by people without tenure protection; properly appointed, they can adjudicate cases without infringing the President’s executive power. The ALJ did not err in adjudicating Pehringer’s claim nor in rejecting untimely evidentiary submissions. Decker did not rebut the presumption of entitlement to benefits after a claimant established legal pneumoconiosis and causation, having worked for at least 15 years in substantially similar conditions to underground coal mines. View "Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer" on Justia Law

Kent Turner suffered from multiple sclerosis (MS), which caused loss of his motor skills. When his wife, Kathy Turner, could not, due to her own health issues, provide necessary in-home assistance, Kent moved into a nursing home and then into an apartment, where he died in a fire. Kent’s estate, through Kathy Turner, sued the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and Lewis-Mason-Thurston Area Agency on Aging (LMTAAA) (the area agency on aging) with case management responsibilities for Kent’s care, for negligence and for abuse or neglect. DSHS and LMTAAA moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court ruled that no special relationship was formed and only an ordinary duty of care was owed. The trial court further held that no breach occurred and causation was lacking. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the claims against DSHS and LMTAAA. View "Turner v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs." on Justia Law

L.B. lived within the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. L.B. and her mother went to a bar and had alcoholic drinks. After they returned home, L.B.’s mother went for a drive. L.B. called the police and reported that her mother was driving while intoxicated. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Officer Bullcoming determined that L.B.’s mother was safe and then went to L.B.’s residence, where her children were asleep in the other room. L.B. admitted to consuming alcoholic drinks. Bullcoming threatened to arrest L.B. for child endangerment because she was intoxicated while in the presence of her children. L.B. pleaded with Bullcoming not to arrest her because she would lose her job as a school bus driver. Bullcoming took L.B. outside for a breathalyzer test. L.B. believed that her choices were to go to jail or have sex with Bullcoming. L.B. and Bullcoming had unprotected sexual intercourse. L.B. became pregnant as a result of the encounter and gave birth.L.B. brought a Federal Tort Claims Act suit, seeking to hold the government liable for Bullcoming’s misconduct. The government asserted that Bullcoming was not acting within the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B so his actions fell outside the scope of the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court: whether, under Montana law, OBullcoming’s sexual assault of L.B. was within the scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer. View "L. B. v. United States" on Justia Law