Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, plaintiffs Michael and Crystal Haytasingh appealed a judgment entered in favor of the City of San Diego and Ashley Marino, a City lifeguard. Plaintiffs sued the City after an incident at Mission Beach in 2013: Michael was surfing and defendant Marino was operating a City-owned personal watercraft. Although the parties offered different versions of what occurred that day, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Marino was operating her personal watercraft parallel to Haytasingh, inside the surf line, when she made an abrupt left turn in front of him. In order to avoid an imminent collision with Marino, Haytasingh dove off of his surfboard and struck his head on the ocean floor. Haytasingh suffered serious injuries, including a neck fracture. Plaintiffs alleged that Marino was negligent in her operation of the personal watercraft. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action, determining that Government Code section 831.7 provided complete immunity to the defendants on plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action. After the trial court granted summary adjudication as to plaintiffs’ claim of ordinary negligence, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege they were entitled to relief pursuant to two statutory exceptions to the statutory immunity provided for in section 831.7: (1) that Marino’s conduct constituted an “act of gross negligence” that was “the proximate cause of injury;” and (2) that the City failed to “guard or warn of a known dangerous condition or of another hazardous recreational activity known to the public entity…that is not reasonable assumed by the participant as inherently a part of the hazardous recreational activity out of which the damage or injury arose.” A jury ultimately found in favor of defendants. While the Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not err in finding section 831.7 provided defendants with complete immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claim, the trial court did err, however, in determining that Harbors and Navigation Code section 655.2’s five mile per hour speed limit did not apply to City lifeguards, and in instructing the jury that all employees of governmental agencies acting within their official capacities were exempt from the City’s five mile per hour speed limit for water vessels that are within 1,000 feet of a beach under San Diego Municipal Code section 63.20.15. The Court concluded this error was prejudicial. Judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Haytasingh v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Martinez regularly crosses a Beverly Hills alley to get to her satellite office. The alley, paved with asphalt, has a concrete drainage channel (swale) running down its center. Martinez was walking through the alley when the front edge of her flip-flop hit the swale; the asphalt, normally flush against the swale, had worn away, creating a divot, 1.75 inches deep. The divot had been there since “at least 2014.” The city is aware that people sometimes walk in its alleys, but alleys are used by heavy commercial trucks and equipment, which degrades asphalt. Every two years, the city inspects streets and alleys for purposes of prioritizing resurfacing; it will inspect potential hazards in response to user calls. The city had not inspected the alley at issue since 2009 and received no complaints with respect to the divot.The court of appeal affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Martinez’s suit. Under Government Code 835.2, a public entity is charged with constructive notice of a dangerous condition only if that condition was sufficiently obvious that the entity acted negligently in not discovering and repairing it. Because alleys, unlike sidewalks, are primarily used for purposes other than walking, and because the cost of inspecting alleys with the same vigilance as inspecting sidewalks would be astronomical relative to the benefit of doing so, what is an obvious defect in the condition of an alley is not the same as for a sidewalk. The divot was not an obvious defect. View "Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 189 A. 599 (Conn. 1937), insofar as it concluded that an employee is entitled to compensation as a matter of law when, during the course of the employee's employment, he or she is injured due to an idiopathic fall onto a level floor.The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board (Board) affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff's application for benefits filed after she suffered a syncopal episode at her workplace, which caused her to fall backward and strike her head on the ground, concluding that, under Savage, Plaintiff's injury was compensable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed after overruling the portion of Savage at issue, holding that the risk or condition must be "peculiar to the employment" for the injury to be compensable. View "Clements v. Aramark Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the determination of the Medical Commission Hearing Panel that Scott Triplett failed to meet his burden to show entitlement to a right hip replacement, holding that the Medical Panel's decision was neither arbitrary or capricious.The Medical Panel determined that Triplett did not meet his burden of proof to establish that the hip replacement surgery was a reasonable and necessary medical treatment for any injury related to his work injury. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Medical Panel's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. View "Triplett v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision affirming the opinion, workers' compensation award, and order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) determining that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled, holding that there was no error.Appellee was injured during the course and scope of his employment. An ALJ determined that Appellee was permanently, totally disabled. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellee's testimony regarding his psychological medical conditions was competent evidence; (2) the ALJ did not rely solely upon psychological testimony to find Appellee was permanently, totally disabled; and (3) there was substantial evidence in the record to sustain the ALJ's opinion and award. View "Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner AmGUARD Insurance Group (Carrier), insurer of Pelmac Industries, Inc. (Pelmac), appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision awarding workers’ compensation death benefits to the respondent, the decedent-employee’s estate. The Carrier argued that the decedent’s original June 5, 2018 injury was not a work-related injury, and, in the alternative, that his subsequent death by suicide did not result from the original injury. The Carrier also argued that the CAB violated its due process rights. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Pelmac Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Estate of Peter Dodier, appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) order denying the estate’s claim for workers’ compensation and death benefits following Peter Dodier’s death. The CAB denied the estate’s claim based on its determination that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were not a compensable injury. It therefore did not reach the issue of death benefits. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were compensable, it reversed the CAB’s decision and remanded for its consideration of whether the estate was entitled to death benefits. View "Appeal of Estate of Peter Dodier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus compelling the Ohio Industrial Commission to vacate its orders rejecting a proposed settlement between Employee and Employer, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.Employee suffered a work-related injury, and his workers' compensation claim was allowed. Employee applied for an award of additional compensation due to Employer's alleged violation of specific safety requirements (VSSRs). Employer and Employee subsequently submitted a proposed settlement for approval by the Commission. A staff hearing officer rejected the settlement as neither fair nor equitable and then granted Employee's request for a VSSR award. Employer sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to vacate its orders and approve the settlement, but the court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer's three propositions of law are rejected. View "State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The child at issue in this case, Grayson, was born on February 14, 2013 to a mother with a significant history of drug abuse; Grayson allegedly had drugs in his system at birth. Shortly thereafter, in March 2013, Grayson was adjudicated a “child in need of care,” placed in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), and entrusted to the physical care of foster parent Samantha Gafford. While in Gafford's, Grayson suffered severe personal injuries, which included brain damage, blindness, and seizures; it was also alleged that the child had bite marks on his thigh and abdomen. Gafford did not disclose these injuries until Grayson was taken to the hospital in May 2013. This suit was filed to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by an infant while in the custody of DCFS and in the physical care of foster parents. After all other claims were dismissed except allegations that DCFS was vicariously liable for the actions of the foster mother, based not only on an employer-employee relationship, but also based on DCFS’s non-delegable duty as the legal custodian of the child, as set forth in Miller v. Martin, 838 So.2d 761 (2003), DCFS filed a peremptory exception pleading the objection of no cause of action, claiming La. R.S. 42:1441.1 barred the application of La. C.C. art. 2320 to DCFS. The district court denied the peremptory exception, and the appellate court denied the ensuing writ application filed by DCFS. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kunath v. Gafford" on Justia Law

The City of Gulf Shores ("the City") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss tort claims brought against the City. The City contended the claims were barred by the recreational-use statutes found at 35-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. In June 2018, Sophia Paulinelli (minor) was injured while walking on a wooden boardwalk owned by the City. The boardwalk ran over beach property and allowed pedestrians to access the public beach. In addition to owning the boardwalk, the City owned the beach property on which the boardwalk sat. Sophia was walking on the boardwalk behind a man when the man stepped on a board, causing the board to spring up from the boardwalk. The dislodged board had a screw protruding from it, and the board and screw fell on Sophia's foot, impaling the screw in her big toe. In May 2019, Sophia's father, Ronald Paulinelli, sued the City and fictitiously named defendants claiming negligence and wantonness. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was entitled to immunity under the recreational-use statues. Two precedential cases were central to Ronald's argument the City was not entitled to immunity. The Supreme Court found nothing in the record that the City ever presented to the circuit court the arguments that it presented to the Supreme Court regarding the applicability of those decisions. Accordingly, the Court did not consider those arguments, and denied the City's petition. The Court expressed no opinion regarding the merits of Ronald's claims; rather the Court's decision was based on the City's failure to preserve key arguments before the circuit court. View "Ex parte City of Gulf Shores." on Justia Law