Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Beverly Stickle sued Jefferson County after sustaining an injury from a fall in a parking structure adjacent to a county building. She claimed that a poorly marked curb, which created an optical illusion and made the walkway and parking area appear as a single flat surface, was a dangerous condition that caused her injury. The county argued for dismissal on the grounds of immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), asserting that the parking structure was not a "building" and that the condition causing the injury was solely due to the parking lot's design. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the parking structure qualified as a "building" under the CGIA. The court also held that the optical illusion was not solely attributable to the parking lot's design but was also, at least in part, a result of the maintenance of the facility. As such, the county was not immune from the lawsuit under the CGIA, and Stickle's claim could proceed. View "County of Jefferson v. Stickle" on Justia Law

In September 2019, Kathryn Abbott was assisting her child on a slide at Vivaldi Park in Henderson when she slipped and fractured her leg in multiple places. Abbott and her husband, Andrew Dodgson-Field, sued the City of Henderson, alleging negligence arising from premises liability and loss of consortium, respectively. The City of Henderson claimed immunity under Nevada's recreational use statute, NRS 41.510, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding the City of Henderson immune from suit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 41.510's protections can apply to any premises, superseding a previous ruling that limited the statute's application to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential" property. The court determined that Abbott was engaged in a "recreational activity" as defined by the statute when she was injured, as walking and assisting a child playing on a playground is similar to the enumerated activities listed in the statute. The court also concluded that Abbott failed to present evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Therefore, the City of Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor. View "Abbott v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, the plaintiff, Ali Shalghoun, appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in favor of the defendant, North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. Shalghoun, an administrator of a residential facility for developmentally disabled persons, sued the regional center after he was attacked by a resident at the facility. The resident, known as J.C., was a client of the regional center, which had arranged for his placement at the facility.The central issue in the case was whether the regional center had a legal duty to protect the employees of a residential facility from a developmentally disabled person who had been placed there. The plaintiff argued that the regional center was negligent in failing to immediately move J.C. to another facility after being informed that the facility could no longer provide the level of care he required.However, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the regional center did not owe a duty of care to the facility's employees. The court reasoned that the regional center's duty, as mandated by the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act, was to provide services and support to the developmentally disabled person (the "consumer"), not to protect third-party employees at a residential facility. The court also noted that the regional center did not have the unilateral power to relocate a consumer; it depended on the acceptance of the consumer by another residential facility.According to the court, the imposition of liability on regional centers for injuries inflicted by consumers could potentially drive the centers out of business, disrupt the entire system of services and support for developmentally disabled individuals, and contradict the Act's mandate to place consumers in the least restrictive environment. The court therefore concluded that public policy factors weighed against recognizing a duty of care running from the regional center to the employees of the residential facility. View "Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2020, a joint federal task force between the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) attempted to arrest Mason Meyer. While fleeing from CPD officers, Meyer crashed into a restaurant, killing Gayle and Raymond Laible and severely injuring Steven and Maribeth Klein. The Laibles’ estate and the Kleins filed a lawsuit alleging that three CPD officers were negligent in their execution of the high-speed car chase. The officers claimed they were federal employees and therefore immune from common-law tort actions due to their participation in the federal task force. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that CPD Sergeant Donald Scalf was a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment during the chase and therefore immune under the Westfall Act. However, it affirmed the district court's denial of immunity for Sergeant Timothy Lanter and Officer Brett Thomas, as they were not federal employees at the time of the incident. View "Laible v. Lanter" on Justia Law

In August 2018, Mary Collington was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department, who was acting within the scope of his official duties at the time. Initially believing Deputy Curney was a Clayton County police officer, Collington sent notice of her claims to the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County. Collington later filed a lawsuit against Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney.Upon motion to dismiss by the defendants, the trial court dismissed Collington's claims, concluding that Collington's claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed as she had failed to present timely notice to the Sheriff's office under OCGA § 36-11-1. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a motor vehicle, and if so, whether presenting such a claim to the county commission satisfies the claimant's duty under the statute.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 36-11-1 does apply to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. Furthermore, the court decided that because a claim against a county sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-11-1, presenting the claim to the county governing authority satisfies the statute's presentment requirement. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of August 1, 2018, Gwendolyn Adams and Glenn Tyler Bolden were pursued in a high-speed chase by Michael William Becker, a peace officer employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Becker suspected Adams and Bolden of wrongdoing, although his suspicions were unfounded. The pursuit resulted in a catastrophic accident that caused severe injuries and, ultimately, the death of Adams's son, D'son Woods.Adams and Bolden filed a lawsuit against the CDCR, alleging negligence causing wrongful death, assault and battery, and violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. The CDCR sought summary judgment, arguing that Becker was not acting within the scope of his employment during the pursuit. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in favor of CDCR.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that whether Becker was acting within the scope of his employment when he pursued Adams and Bolden was a question of fact that should be decided by a jury. The court noted that Becker’s actions may have been influenced by his role as a peace officer, and it was not clear whether he was acting as a private citizen or a law enforcement officer during the pursuit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the CDCR. View "Adams v. Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed a case where a plaintiff, James Penny, brought a lawsuit against the City of Winterset and a police officer, Christian Dekker, for damages caused by a collision. Officer Dekker was responding to an emergency call and had his overhead lights and siren on. He was traveling northbound and James Penny was traveling westbound when their vehicles collided at an intersection. As a result of the collision, Penny sustained several injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the police officer's conduct was not reckless. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.On further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa found that Officer Dekker's conduct did not rise to the level of recklessness under Iowa law, affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court noted that while Officer Dekker did not come to a complete stop at the stop sign, he was not required to do so under Iowa Code section 321.231(3)(a) if he slowed down to a speed "necessary for safe operation." The court concluded that while it may have been negligent for Officer Dekker not to have perceived the lights to his right as coming from Penny's vehicle rather than a farmhouse, this failure did not rise to the level of recklessness. Thus, the court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Penny v. City of Winterset" on Justia Law

In this case, an accident occurred where Sara Spagnolini, a provider under the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program, ran a stop sign and crashed into a car driven by Hanah Keren Samson Yalung. Yalung and four of her five children were seriously injured, and one child was killed. Yalung, individually and as an administrator of her deceased daughter's estate and guardian ad litem for her other children, sued the State of California, among others, for Spagnolini's negligence.The plaintiffs argued that the State was liable for Spagnolini's negligence as her employer or as a joint employer with Spagnolini's recipient under the IHSS program. The Superior Court of Tulare County, however, sustained the State's demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. The trial court did not find the statutory scheme made the State the employer or joint employer of IHSS providers for all purposes, noting that no cases held the State was an employer for purposes of vicarious liability.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the IHSS statutes are incompatible with a finding of joint employment as a matter of law. The court found that while the State administers the IHSS program and has some oversight responsibilities, it does not control or direct the day-to-day tasks or activities of IHSS providers. Accordingly, the State could not be deemed an employer or joint employer for the purposes of vicarious liability. View "Yalung v. State of California" on Justia Law

Austin McGee was involved in a car accident on a stretch of Highway 45 in South Dakota that was undergoing resurfacing. He claimed that the accident was caused by a negligent failure by the South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) and several of its employees to ensure that the contractor responsible for the resurfacing complied with DOT standards and industry practices. The DOT argued that sovereign immunity protected it from the lawsuit. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that McGee could sue the DOT and its employees, rejecting the DOT's arguments that McGee lacked standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the DOT and the contractor, and that McGee failed to establish an actionable duty. The court found that the DOT had a ministerial duty under its own Standard Specifications not to exceed the estimated amount of tack coating to be applied each day, but found no ministerial duties relating to the use of precautionary measures. Thus, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mcgee V. Spencer Quarries" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri ruled in favor of three employees of a medical facility, Jayla Ruiz Morales, John Kimani, and Valarie Johnson, who were sued for wrongful death by the legal guardian of a patient, Ronald Scheer. Scheer, a resident at the St. Louis Developmental Disabilities Treatment Center-St. Charles Habilitation Center, died after his wheelchair's belt constricted his breathing. The employees were accused of failing to adequately supervise Scheer, failing to ensure that his wheelchair's seatbelt and pelvic harness were properly fastened, among other allegations. The employees argued that they were entitled to official immunity, a doctrine that protects public officials from liability for acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties. The lower court rejected this argument and the employees sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Missouri.The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the employees were entitled to official immunity. The court found that the tasks they were required to perform were not ministerial (routine or mundane tasks) but required discretion. Tasks such as checking on the patient, repositioning him, and using a seat belt and pelvic harness required the employees to use judgment to determine if Scheer needed additional care, and if so, what care to be administered. Therefore, these tasks were not ministerial and the employees were entitled to official immunity. The court made its preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, barring the lower court from taking further action in the case. View "State ex rel. Jayla Ruiz-Morales v. Alessi" on Justia Law