Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Erie is a Chicago “Federally Qualified Health Center” (FQHC), 42 U.S.C. 254b (2012). FQHCs rely heavily on federal grants and Medicaid reimbursement. Erie Employees are federal employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a). Erie was founded as a project between Northwestern Memorial Hospital (NMH) and Erie Neighborhood House in 1957. NMH provides financial support and technical assistance, but Erie physicians seeking NMH privileges are required to apply for them. In 2005, Yarbrough went to the Erie after searching for a clinic that would not require insurance coverage. Yarbrough was informed that she would have her ultrasounds done at Northwestern and would likely deliver her baby at NMH. Based upon information she received during the visit, Yarbrough believed that Erie and NMH were the same entity. Yarbrough sued NMH. based on her daughter’s premature birth, alleging medical negligence. The Illinois Supreme Court answered a certified question: A hospital cannot be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of apparent agency set forth in Gilbert v. Sycamore, for the acts of the employees of an unrelated, independent clinic that is not a party to the litigation. Yarbrough sought treatment at Erie but looks to impose liability on NMH. Erie is neither owned nor operated by NMH. While Erie receives some charitable assistance from NMH, it relies heavily on federal money. Erie does not utilize the Northwestern name, Northwestern-related branding, or Northwestern’s trademark purple color. View "Yarbrough v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Cohen was riding his bicycle on Lakefront Trail, a shared-use path that runs along the shore of Lake Michigan, when his front wheel caught in a crack in the pavement and he fell. Cohen sued the Chicago park district, alleging it acted willfully and wantonly in failing to maintain the path and was responsible for his injuries. The circuit court granted the park district summary judgment, concluding that it was immune from suit under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/3-107(a), which grants absolute immunity to local public entities for injuries caused by a condition of a “road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas” or was immune from suit under section 3-106, which immunizes local public entities for injuries occurring on recreational property, except when the local public entity engages in willful and wanton conduct proximately causing the injuries. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part. Section 3-107(a) is inapplicable The district is, however, immune from suit under section 3-106. Lakefront Trail is not open to public, motorized traffic and is not a “road” within the meaning of section 3-107(a). The district’s actions were not willful or wanton. Cracks in paved surfaces are unavoidable in climates such as Chicago’s. The risk of injury from the crack was not an extraordinary and unusual risk; there were no prior injuries involving the crack. View "Cohen v. Chicago Park District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mahmoud Alzayat, on behalf of the People of the State of California, filed a qui tam action against his employer, Sunline Transit Agency, and his supervisor, Gerald Hebb, alleging a violation of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA or the Act). (Ins. Code, sec. 1871 et seq.) Alzayat alleged Hebb made false statements in an incident report submitted in response to Alzayat’s claim for workers’ compensation, and Hebb repeated those false statements in a deposition taken during the investigation into Alzayat’s claim for compensation. Hebb’s false statements resulted in Alzayat’s claim being initially denied. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings contending: (1) this lawsuit was based on allegedly false and fraudulent statements Hebb made in connection with a workers’ compensation proceeding and was, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b); and (2) Alzayat’s claim was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The superior court concluded the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule was inapplicable, but ruled the litigation privilege barred Alzayat’s claim. Alzayat appealed, contending the litigation privilege only applied to tort claims and not to statutory claims such as an action under the IFPA, and the IFPA was a specific statute that prevailed over the general litigation privilege. The Court of Appeal agreed with Alzayat that his lawsuit was not barred by the litigation privilege. Furthermore, the Court concluded this lawsuit was not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The trial court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings for defendants, so we reverse the judgment. View "California ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the North Carolina Industrial Commission’s decision to award Plaintiff benefits arising out of a 2009 automobile accident. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff was barred from pursuing compensation for his personal injury claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act because he had elected to settle his claim against the third-party tortfeasor without the consent of Defendant, the City of Charlotte, and had received disbursement of the settlement proceedings. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Act protects both the employer’s lien against third-party proceeds and the employee’s right to pursue workers’ compensation benefits under these circumstances; and (2) therefore, the Commission correctly concluded that Plaintiff had not waived his right to compensation under the Act. View "Easter-Rozzelle v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

Petitioners-defendants Angela McClintock, Stephanie Streeter, and Christa Devaughn, all of whom were employees of the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources ("JCDHR"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus requesting that the Alabama Supreme Court direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity. Charges arose from the death of K.W., a newborn who was removed from her home following domestic abuse allegations at the home of T.H., K.W.’s mother. At the time of K.W.'s death, McClintock was the director of JCDHR; Streeter was an assistant director of child welfare for JCDHR; and Devaughn was a child-abuse and neglect investigative worker for JCDHR. In June 2011, T.H. was charged with third-degree domestic violence when S.W., T.H.'s mother, filed charges against her for striking a sibling in the face. K.W. was born in December 2011. While T.H. was still in the hospital, T.H.'s grandmother reported to JCDHR that she had concerns that T.H. would not be able to care for her new baby, that T.H. had left her father's home, and that T.H. had a history of running away. After conducting an investigation, JCDHR allowed T.H. to be discharged from the hospital to the home of K.M., T.H.'s second cousin. K.H., T.H.'s father, filed a dependency complaint, seeking custody of K.W. In January 2012, Devaughn filed a dependency complaint as to T.H. and a request for a pickup order for K.W. K.W. was picked up and placed in the foster home of Dennis Gilmer on that same date. K.W. died on February 24, 2012, while in foster care. K.H. and T.H. filed a complaint against the petitioners, Brandon Hardin, Dennis Gilmer, and JCDHR, stating claims of wrongful death of a minor, negligence, wantonness, and negligent/wanton training and supervision. The Alabama Supreme Court found petitioners established they had a clear legal right to summary judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted their petition for mandamus relief. View "Ex parte Angela McClintock et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against Lake County and Highland Park for personal injuries arising out of a bicycling accident on the Skokie Valley Bike Path. The circuit court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-107(b), which provides immunity with respect to “an injury caused by a condition of: (a) Any road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) a township or other road district highway. (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.” Plaintiff appealed against the city only. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Bike Path is not a “trail” as that word is ordinarily and popularly used; the words “hiking,” “fishing,” and “hunting” dictate a narrow construction of the term “trail.” If section 3-107(b) stated that immunity applied to “any jogging, riding, in-line skating, or stroller trail,” a shared-use path such as the Skokie Valley Bike Path would be a “riding trail.” However, the inclusion of the words “hiking,” “fishing,” and “hunting” in the same sentence as “riding” indicates that the legislature intended to apply blanket immunity only to primitive, rustic, or unimproved trails. View "Corbett v. The County of Lake" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Westmoreland's petition for review of the Board's final decision and order granting federal disability benefits to plaintiff, a retired coal miner, under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.SC. 901 et seq. The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision and order to award plaintiff benefits and the decision otherwise accords with applicable law. In this case, plaintiff timely brought his claim; given the array of evidence presented, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's calculation of plaintiff's smoking history; the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Rosenberg's opinion regarding the ability to show particularized causation; and the ALJ did not reversibly err in concluding that Westmoreland failed to carry its "strict" and "substantial" burden to completely rule out coal dust exposure as a cause of plaintiff's disability. View "Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Stallard" on Justia Law

In this case, we deny relief on a petition for review of an award of benefits made by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). In 2006, while working at Pearson Ford, Leopoldo Hernandez accidentally slammed the trunk of a car on his left hand and crushed one of his fingers. Although no bones in his hand were broken, he was unable to continue working at Pearson Ford because of continuing pain in his hand and shoulder. Hernandez applied for and received workers' compensation benefits. Pearson Ford's workers' compensation carrier retained the services of a private investigator, who conducted video surveillance of Hernandez following each of the three visits to his doctor in early 2010. Following each visit, Hernandez was observed taking off his sling, using his left hand to get in and out of his truck or a car, using his left hand to steer his truck or car, and on one occasion stopping at a grocery store and using his left hand to carry a bag of groceries. After the investigator witnessed other instances of Hernandez using his allegedly injured left hand, the carrier notified the district attorney, who in turn, commenced its own investigation. In specified circumstances, a worker who engages in criminal fraud in attempting to recover workers' compensation benefits and is convicted of doing so is thereafter barred from recovering benefits growing out of the fraud. However, in given circumstances where, independent of any fraud, a worker is able to establish his or her entitlement to benefits, benefits may be awarded. Here, the WCAB found evidence, independent of a worker's fraud, that he had suffered a compensable injury and was entitled to benefits. In doing so the WCAB relied on the determination of a medical expert. The Court of Appeal found no error in the WCAB's determination the workers' claim was not barred by the eventual misdemeanor conviction for workers' compensation fraud and in the WCAB's adoption of the expert's finding of a permanent disability. The Court denied the petitioner any relief on its petition asking that it vacate the WCAB's award. View "Pearson Ford v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

North Dakota, by the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's Youth Correctional Center, petitioned for a supervisory writ directing a district court to vacate its July 18, 2017 order denying the State's motion for summary judgment on Delmar Markel's negligence claim. Markel cross-petitioned for a supervisory writ directing the district court to vacate its January 21, 2016 order dismissing Markel's claim for constructive and retaliatory discharge. Markel worked at the North Dakota Youth Correctional Center on December 9, 2012, when several inmates broke out of their locked rooms. The inmates injured Markel during their escape. In 2015, Markel brought a complaint against the State alleging one count of negligence for failure to fix faulty locks permitting the inmates to escape and one count of constructive and retaliatory discharge. The State argued that the Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") Act in N.D.C.C. Title 65 barred Markel's negligence claim and that Markel failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding his discharge claim. On January 21, 2016, the district court dismissed the discharge claim for failure to pursue available administrative remedies. The district court also denied the State's motion to dismiss Markel's negligence claim. The North Dakota Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction by granting the State's petition and denying Markel's cross-petition. The district court erred as a matter of law in denying the State's motion to dismiss Markel's negligence claim. Markel failed to allege and support at least an "intentional act done with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury" to overcome the State's immunity. The State had no adequate remedy to avoid defending a suit from which it has immunity. View "North Dakota v. Haskell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Greggory Owings sustained an on-the-job injury, for which he received long-term disability benefits by defendant United of Omaha Life Insurance Company (United), under the terms of a group insurance policy issued by United to Owings’ employer. Owings disagreed with, and attempted without success to administratively challenge, the amount of his disability benefits. He then filed suit against United in Kansas state court, but United removed the action to federal district court, asserting that the federal courts had original jurisdiction over the action because the policy was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of United. Owings appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review of this matter that United was arbitrary and capricious in determining the date that Owings became disabled and, in turn, in calculating the amount of his disability benefits. Consequently, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of United and remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Owings. View "Owings v. United of Omaha Life" on Justia Law