Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Lori Greenwood was injured while working for J.J. Hooligans, LLC. Greenwood was informed that because of nonpayment, FirstComp Insurance Company (FirstComp) was not the workers’ compensation insurance carrier on the date of the accident. Greenwood filed a petition against J.J. Hooligan’s and FirstComp seeking workers’ compensation benefits. FirstComp filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was not a proper party because it had timely notified J.J. Hooligan’s that it had terminated its insurance coverage for nonpayment of its premium and therefore did not provide workers’ compensation insurance on the date of the accident. The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court sustained the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that FirstComp failed to present sufficient competent evidence as to whether it complied with the employer notice of cancellation requirement in Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-144.03 to warrant an order of dismissal. View "Greenwood v. J.J. Hooligan’s, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the determination of the Industrial Commission that Plaintiff was not entitled to any compensation for permanent partial disability under N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-31. Plaintiff suffered a compensable accident and sustained injuries while he was walking at his job site. During the years after his work-related accident, Plaintiff continued to have neck pain. Plaintiff later sought permanent partial disability benefits. After a remand from the Supreme Court, the Commission entered an amended opinion and award denying benefits. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Commission did not err in concluding that Plaintiff was not entitled to any compensation for permanent partial disability. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission failed to carry out the court of appeals’ mandate that it make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of Plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits under section 97-31. View "Harrison v. Gemma Power Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

Michael and Jacqueline Ray, acting as coconservators for their minor child, Kersch Ray, filed an action against Eric Swager, Scott Platt, and others, in part alleging that Swager was liable for the injuries suffered by Kersch when Kersch was struck by an automobile driven by Platt. Kersch was thirteen years old and a member of the Chelsea High School cross-country team at the time of the accident; Swager was the coach of the team and a teacher at the high school. Kersch was struck by the car driven by Platt when Kersch was running across an intersection with his teammates and Swager during an early morning team practice. Plaintiffs alleged that Swager had instructed the runners to cross the road even though the “Do Not Walk” symbol was illuminated. Swager moved for summary judgment, arguing that as a governmental employee he was entitled to immunity from liability. The trial court denied Swager’s motion, concluding that whether Swager’s actions were grossly negligent and whether he was the proximate cause of Kersch’s injuries (and therefore not entitled to immunity under the GTLA) were questions of fact for the jury to decide. Plaintiffs appealed. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, reasoning Swager was immune from liability under MCL 691.1407(2) because reasonable minds could not conclude that Swager was the proximate cause of Kersch’s injuries; rather, Platt’s presence in the roadway and Kersch’s own actions were the immediate and direct causes of Kersch’s injuries, and the most proximate cause of Kersch’s injuries was being struck by a moving vehicle. Plaintiffs appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals incorrectly analyzed proximate cause under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ray v. Swager" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus and ordering the Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System Board and Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System (collectively, the Board) to conduct a “physical-capacity evaluation” of Appellee. The Board originally approved Appellee’s disability retirement application but later terminated Appellee’s disability-retirement benefits based on evidence that Appellee was fully recovered and no longer disabled. Appellee appealed, submitting new evidence and a recommendation that Appellee receive a physical-capacity evaluation. The Board upheld its prior decision to terminate disability-retirement benefits without referring Appellee for a physical-capacity evaluation. The court of appeals granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Board to conduct the physical-capacity evaluation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board’s decision was based upon sufficient medical evidence and that the Board had no legal duty to conduct a physical-capacity evaluation before terminating Appellee’s disability benefits. View "State ex rel. Burroughs v. Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are current and former federal law enforcement employees and their spouses who were deceived into investing in a Ponzi scheme presenting as the Federal Employee Benefits Group (FEBG). Plaintiffs filed suit against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), for negligent conduct and aiding and abetting the scheme. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Government's motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held that the misrepresentation exception applied to bar plaintiffs' claim. In this case, plaintiffs' claims arose out of Kenneth Wayne McLeod's misrepresentations about his bond fund. McLeod founded and ran the FEBG Bond Fund. View "Alvarez v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) to reverse the denial of Respondent's claim for ankle-fusion surgery.Respondent, who was injured during the course of her employment, filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for ankle-fusion surgery. The compensation judge denied Respondent’s claim for the ankle-fusion surgery. The WCCA reversed. Respondent’s employer appealed, arguing that the WCCA exceeded the scope of its review when it reversed the compensation judge’s decision to deny benefits to Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation judge’s finding was “supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate,” and therefore, the WCCA clearly and manifestly erred in rejecting this finding. View "Mattick v. Hy-Vee Foods Stores" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Penny Weymiller, a former employee of Lockheed Idaho Technologies (“Lockheed”), appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s order that she was not entitled to additional medical care in relation to her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”). The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Commission erred in holding that Weymiller failed to prove her entitlement to additional care because the Court determined the decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. “[T]he Commission’s failure to consider palliative care in the form of wrist braces as treatment is contrary to our holding in Rish [v. Home Depot, Inc., 390 P.3d 428 (2017)]. The Commission misapplied the law and there was sufficient uncontradicted evidence to support Weymiller’s claim for replacement braces.” View "Weymiller v. Lockheed Idaho Technologies" on Justia Law

In 2009, Williamson, an Army veteran and U.S. postal worker, began experiencing pain in his right foot. He usually worked a walking route, walking up to eight miles per day on the job. He was also doing other physical activity, including running and CrossFit, which could have contributed to his injury. He eventually received benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA): $79,379.66 in temporary total disability net compensation from March 20, 2010 through October 25, 2012; $27,801.27 for medical expenses; and $19,974.19 as a lump-sum “schedule award.” Williamson then sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for medical malpractice by the Department of Veterans Affairs in the treatment of his injuries, which included two unsuccessful surgeries. The district court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Liability under FECA is “exclusive” of “all other liability of the United States” to the employee “under a Federal tort liability statute,” 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) (2012). Because this exclusion applies broadly even when a work-related injury has been negligently treated by an entirely non-work-related federal hospital, Williamson may not recover under the FTCA. View "Williamson v. United States" on Justia Law

An Industrial Commission order determining that a preexisting condition that was substantially aggravated by a workplace injury has returned to a level that would have existed absent the jury is not appealable to a court of common pleas under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512(A).Appellee suffered a workplace injury. Appellee’s claim for workers’ compensation was allowed for multiple conditions. The Bureau of Worker’s Compensation later moved to abate Appellee’s claim for substantial aggravated of preexisting dermatomyositis, asserting that Appellee’s dermatomyositis had returned to a level that would have existed without her workplace injury. A hearing officer granted the Bureau’s motion and ordered that compensation and medical benefits were no longer to be paid for the allowed condition. Appellee appealed. The trial court dismissed Appellee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that medical abatement of one condition of a claim is an extent-of-disability issue that cannot be appealed to a common pleas court under section 4123.512(A). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the order was appealable to the court of common pleas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a decision is not appealable under section 4123.512. Instead, a challenge to the Commission’s final decision regarding the extent of disability is properly made by an action in mandamus. View "Clendenin v. Girl Scouts of Western Ohio" on Justia Law

An employee is not eligible for benefits under Wis. Stat. 102.42(1m) if the disability-causing treatment was directed at treating something other than the employee’s compensable injury.Plaintiff suffered from a soft-tissue strain, which was work-related, and a degenerate disc disease, which was not work-related. In the belief that it was necessary to treat her soft-tissue strain, Plaintiff underwent surgery, which, in actuality, was treating the unrelated degenerative disc disease. The procedure left Plaintiff with a permanent partial disability. Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim, which the * Commission denied. The circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, based on its interpretation of section 102.42(1m), an employee need only have a good faith belief that the treatment was required. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the Commission’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits, holding that Plaintiff’s claim must be allowed because her surgery treated her pre-existing condition, not her compensable injury. View "Flug v. Labor & Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law