Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-claimant Jason Malo appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision reducing the rate at which his indemnity benefits were paid from the temporary total disability rate to the diminished earning capacity rate. On appeal, he argued that the CAB erred by: (1) finding that his physical condition had improved since he sustained the original, compensable, work-related injury; (2) determining that the change in his physical condition affected his earning capacity; and (3) failing to make specific findings of fact and rulings of law sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Jason Malo" on Justia Law

Consolidated cases involved two city of Bellevue (City) firefighters who were diagnosed with malignant melanoma and filed claims for workers' compensation benefits. In both cases, the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) denied the firefighters' claims. Both firefighters then appealed the Board's decision to King County Superior Court. Under the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, a worker injured in the course of employment who suffers from an "occupational disease" is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The parties disagreed about various aspects of how and whether the presumption in RCW 51.32.185 should operate when a board decision was appealed to superior court. The Supreme Court noted that RCW 51.32.185 reflected a strong social policy in favor of the worker and concluded that: (1) whether the City rebutted the firefighter presumption was a factual determination that was properly given to the jury in Larson, but improperly decided as a matter of law in “Spivey;” (2) RCW 51.32.185 shifted both the burden of production and burden of persuasion to the employer; (3) in “Larson,” jury instruction 9 was proper; and ( 4) Larson was entitled to attorney fees at the Board level. The Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in “Larson” and reversed in “Spivey.” View "Spivey v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

In 2013, a golf ball struck Miguel Leyva in the eye while he and his wife, Socorro Leyva, walked along a public path adjacent to the Bonita Golf Club. The Leyvas appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Crockett and Company, Inc., the owner and operator of the Club. The Leyvas contended Crockett was not entitled to summary judgment because the immunities designated in Government Code section 831.41 and Civil Code section 846 did not apply to their tort claims. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 831.4 barred their action, therefore affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "Leyva v. Crockett & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging that Navy officers negligently allowed a training structure to remain in a dangerous condition and failed to warn her of the dangerous gap between the mats placed adjacent to the structure. Plaintiff, a sheriff's deputy, was seriously injured when she jumped from the structure onto the set of mats and landed in a gap between them. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the challenged Navy conduct fell within the FTCA’s “discretionary function exception” and therefore that Congress had not waived sovereign immunity for plaintiff's claim. The court affirmed and concluded that the Navy’s decisions regarding the maintenance of its military bases for use by civilian law enforcement involved policy judgments that Congress sought to shield from tort liability under the FTCA. View "Wood v. United States" on Justia Law

This dispute centered on subrogation claims Victoria Insurance Company and Nationwide Insurance Company asserted against the City of Wilmington. This appeal presented a question of first impression before the Supreme Court: whether, under Delaware's motor vehicle insurance statute governing subrogation disputes among insurers and self-insurers, the losing party may appeal de novo to the Superior Court from an adverse arbitration award. In considering consolidated motions to dismiss two such appeals filed by the City against the insurers, the Superior Court determined that 21 Del. C. 2118(g)(3), which mandated arbitration for subrogation disputes arising between insurers and self-insurers, did not provide a right to appeal. Because the statute unambiguously provided for appeals from mandatory arbitration of subrogation disputes between insurers and self-insurers, the Supreme Court reversed. View "City of Wilmington v. Nationwide Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Joseph Maravilla and J.R. Simplot Company both appealed the Industrial Commission’s (Commission) Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling. Maravilla was injured in an industrial accident while working for Simplot, and Simplot paid Maravilla’s worker’s compensation benefits for that injury. In a separate action, Maravilla brought suit against Idaho Industrial Contractors, Inc. (IIC), the contractor performing repairs on the area where Maravilla was injured. Maravilla and IIC settled the claim for $75,000 and Simplot claimed subrogation against Maravilla. In its order, the Commission ruled that Maravilla could have argued that Simplot was partly at fault for Maravilla’s industrial accident and that Simplot’s negligence, if proved, was not a bar to Simplot being reimbursed for worker’s compensation payments it had paid Maravilla. Simplot appealed the Commission’s decision that Maravilla’s settlement with IIC does not preclude Maravilla from attempting to prove Simplot’s negligence. Maravilla appealed the Commission’s ruling that Simplot was entitled to reimbursement even if Simplot’s negligence contributed to Maravilla’s injury. The Supreme Court, after its review, affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the controlling case law in this matter: “The adoption of comparative negligence and the abrogation of joint and several liability do not affect the rationale behind the Liberty Mutual rule, let alone require its abandonment.” The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Maravilla v. J. R. Simplot Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, Carrizales was making a left turn at an Atwater intersection when she struck and killed Gonzales, a pedestrian in a crosswalk. Gonzales’s family sued Carrizales and the city for wrongful death, alleging Carrizales was negligent and the city was liable under Government Code section 8351 for the dangerous condition of the intersection. A jury found Carrizales not negligent and the city solely liable and awarded plaintiffs approximately $3.2 million in damages. The trial court denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in which the city argued that the design immunity defense of section 830.6 shielded it from liability. The court of appeal reversed. The design immunity defense insulates the from liability for any dangerous condition of the intersection. The city made a discretionary decision to adopt permissive phasing as part of the 2001 plan for the intersection; plaintiffs conceded the 2001 plans were reasonable when adopted. View "Gonzales v. City of Atwater" on Justia Law

Magdalena Guardado, an undocumented worker, was employed as a machine manager for Roos Foods when she was involved in a work-related accident. She injured her left wrist and thereafter received total disability benefits. The employer petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (“the Board”) to terminate those benefits on the ground that the worker was no longer disabled and could return to work. The Board found: (1) the employer met its initial burden of showing that the worker was no longer totally disabled; (2) that the worker was a prima facie displaced worker based solely on her status as an undocumented worker; and (3) the employer had failed to meet its burden of showing regular employment opportunities within the worker’s capabilities. Accordingly, it denied the employer’s petition. The questions this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether an injured worker’s immigration status alone rendered her a prima facie displaced worker; and (2) whether the Board properly found that the employer failed to meet its burden of showing regular employment opportunities within the worker’s capabilities because its evidence failed to take into account the worker’s undocumented status. The Court concluded that an undocumented worker’s immigration status was not relevant to determining whether she was a prima facie displaced worker, but it was a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether she is an actually displaced worker. The Court also concluded that the Board correctly rejected the employer’s evidence of regular employment opportunities for the worker because that evidence failed to consider her undocumented status. View "Roos Foods v. Guardado" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Sperry, an inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility (LCF), filed a lawsuit seeking civil damages from the LCF Warden and the Secretary of Corrections, alleging that he had been exposed to lead paint and asbestos while incarcerated at LCF. The district court dismissed all claims except Sperry’s claims against the Warden and Secretary in their individual capacities. Approximately two years later, the district court dismissed all remaining claims when ruling on multiple motions to dismiss filed by the Warden and Secretary. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Sperry’s state law claims and reversed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. The Warden and Secretary petitioned for review, arguing that the district court and court of appeals erred in considering material outside the pleadings when ruling on motions to dismiss. Sperry cross-petitioned for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in ruling that his failure to attach proof that he exhausted his administrative remedies required dismissing his state law claims. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision that Sperry’s claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that the district court and court of appeals erred in not enforcing the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 141, and the error was not harmless. View "Sperry v. McKune" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Thomas Millard appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s (Commission) ruling that certain medical payments made by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah on behalf of Millard were payable at the statutorily scheduled fee amounts rather than the full invoiced amounts. Millard argued that the Commission incorrectly applied the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in "Neel v. Western Construction, Inc.," (206 P.3d 852 (2009)), by ruling that a surety may deny a claim then still be allowed to pay the medical fee schedule rate so long as the surety makes payment before the Commission issues a decision on compensability. Finding no reversible error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Millard v. ABCO Construction" on Justia Law