Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Paul Cameron submitted his application for disability retirement on May 22, 2009, after the second of two injuries he sustained during his tenure as a Sacramento County employee. The SCERS staff referred this matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings where it was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In 2013, the ALJ found that the application was untimely and denied the application for service-related retirement. Based on the ALJ’s findings, SCERS denied plaintiff’s application for service-connected retirement. Cameron appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff failed to show he was continuously disabled within the meaning of Government Code sections 31722 and 31641, subdivision (a), between the discontinuance of his service and the time he filed his application for service-connected disability retirement. Consequently, his application was not timely under section 31722. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded that plaintiff did not show that SCERS failed to inform him of his rights regarding disability retirement, misled him concerning those rights, otherwise breached its fiduciary duty to him, or caused plaintiff’s delay in making his application. View "Cameron v. Sacramento Co. Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Weaver (individually and as administrator of the estate of his wife, Marceline Weaver) and James Sousa, appealed superior court decisions granting summary judgment in favor of defendants the Town of Pelham (Town), Pelham Police Chief Joseph Roark, Pelham Police Officer Derek Gioia (collectively, the Pelham defendants), and Woody’s Auto Repair & Towing, Inc. This case stemmed from an automobile accident allegedly caused by Randall Stewart, the owner and driver of a vehicle that collided with plaintiffs. With respect to the Pelham defendants, the superior court concluded they were not immune from suit under RSA chapter 507-B (2010) or under the common law, they were entitled to summary judgment because of the lack of evidence that they proximately caused the motor vehicle collision that resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries. After review of that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence that the Pelham defendants proximately caused the accident. Accordingly, the Court did not address the Pelham defendants’ cross-appeal on immunity. With regard to Woody's, the superior court granted summary judgment, concluding that: (1) because Stewart’s vehicle had been towed the night before the collision pursuant to RSA 262:32 (2014), rather than impounded pursuant to RSA 262:40 (2014), Woody’s was not required to obtain authorization from the police or a court prior to releasing the vehicle the next day to its owner; (2) Woody’s could not be liable for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle because of the lack of evidence that a Woody’s employee knew, or should have known, that the owner was impaired when he picked up his vehicle from impound; and (3) given the absence of evidence demonstrating that Woody’s breached a duty owed to plaintiffs, it was not liable for negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment too. View "Weaver v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nathalie Davaut appealed the denial of her claim for workers' compensation benefits for injuries she sustained attempting to leave her workplace. To reach her car, which was in a university lot provided for faculty and student parking, Petitioner was required to cross Hubbard Drive (the Street), which bisected University of South Carolina Lancaster's (USCL) campus. While crossing the Street, Petitioner was struck by a vehicle and injured. It was undisputed that the Street and the crosswalks that spanned it are not owned or controlled by the University of South Carolina (USC); rather, they were maintained and controlled by the City of Lancaster. However, it was also undisputed that both the library (where Petitioner had been working) and the parking lot (where Petitioner was headed) belonged to USC. Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits from her employer and its insurer, State Accident Fund (collectively, Respondents). Respondents, relying on the going and coming rule, denied Petitioner's injuries were compensable, on the basis Petitioner was injured away from USC's property. Petitioner claimed that because she was injured while traveling from one portion of USC's property to another, the Panel erred in denying her relief. The court of appeals disagreed and upheld the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of coverage. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that when an employee crosses from one portion of her employer's property to another over a reasonably necessary and direct route, the employee remains in the course of her employment for purposes of workers' compensation. View "Davaut v. Univ. of So. Carolina" on Justia Law

A worker whose Alaska workers’ compensation case was closed in 1977 filed a new claim in 2012 related to his injury from the 1970s. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board dismissed the new claim, and he appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission. The Commission granted the worker three extensions of time to file his brief and later issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. The Commission dismissed the appeal, relying on its interpretation of a Board regulation. Finding that the interpretation of that regulation was made in error, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Eder v. M-K Rivers" on Justia Law

After suffering a fall at work, Linda Mitchell returned to the same position she had before her injury, and continued to work for more than seven months until she was terminated for a cause unrelated to the injury. She then sought and was awarded disability benefits from the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. But because the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and Commission both failed to recognize that Mitchell’s return to work created a rebuttable presumption that she suffered no loss of earning capacity, the Supreme Court reversed the award of disability benefits and remanded this case to the Commission to apply the correct legal standard. View "Hudspeth Regional Center v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In this case, a jury determined that two New Jersey public entities, South Jersey Transportation Authority and the New Jersey State Police, were liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a multi-vehicle pile-up on the Atlantic City Expressway during a 2005 heavy snowstorm. Plaintiff alleged that the public entities were negligent in failing to adhere to standard operating procedures with respect to competing 9-1-1 calls for motorist assistance. The jury found no negligence on the part of plaintiff or the owners or drivers of the other vehicles involved in the several collisions. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the liability verdict against the public-entity defendants based on errors in the jury instructions with respect to the liability of the public entities for discretionary versus ministerial acts. The Appellate Division determined the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to determine predicate facts that resolved whether ministerial or discretionary acts were involved. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for retrial only with respect to the liability of the public-entity defendants. The public-entity defendants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that, at the retrial, the second jury should decide anew the liability of all parties. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. View "Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The issue in these four appeals was whether the $100,000 statutory cap of 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued in the officer's individual capacity. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the $100,000 statutory cap did not apply when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued individually. "The limitation on recovery in the second sentence of 11-47-190 is intended to protect the public coffers of the municipality, not to protect municipal employees from claims asserted against them in their individual capacity. [. . .] We recognize that municipal employees were not the intended subject of the legislature's enactment of 11-17-190, and we also recognize that the legislature is better suited to speak comprehensively on the individual liability of municipal employees."View "Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation v. Willie Allen " on Justia Law

Appellee Yvonne Butler was a principal at a DeKalb County elementary school. Appellant DeKalb County School District notified appellee it would be terminating her employment for: (1) incompetency; (2) insubordination; (3) wilful neglect of duties; and (4)for other good and sufficient cause. Appellee was placed on suspension while the charges were pending. A hearing was scheduled pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act (FDA), but the parties agreed to a continuance. The record revealed the hearing never took place. Appellant offered appellee, in lieu of termination, a contract for a classroom teaching position for the 2011- 2012 school year and required that she sign and return the contract before May 19, 2011, if she chose to accept the offer. On May 31, 2011, appellee responded to the May 11 letter by asserting that she had a right to an FDA hearing. In her May 31 response, appellee never indicated she would be accepting the offered position of classroom teacher. On June 30, 2011, upon hiring new counsel, appellee returned the signed teaching contract "under protest." In July, appellant issued appellee a separation notice indicating appellee’s employment had ended as of June 30, 2011. The following March, appellee filed this mandamus action, requesting an FDA hearing, a name-clearing hearing, and damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the proffered 2011-2012 teaching contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted and denied in part both parties’ motions: the decision effectively granted appellee’s petition for a writ of mandamus and held that appellee was entitled to an FDA hearing because she was a tenured employee and had been demoted from an administrator to a teacher. In addition, the trial court held that the request for a separate name-clearing hearing was moot as appellee could clear her name at the FDA hearing. Finally, the trial court denied appellee’s claim of damages for breach because it found that appellee had not timely accepted the contract to be a classroom teacher for the 2011-2012 school year. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since appellee had earned tenure as a teacher, at the time of her suspension from the position as principal in 2010, the only right she had under the FDA was continued employment as a teacher. Therefore, the School District complied with the FDA when it offered appellee a teaching position for the 2011-2012 school year rather than insisting upon her termination. At that point, the FDA did not require any additional action by appellant. Thus, it was error for the trial court to conclude that appellant was required to hold a demotion hearing pursuant to the FDA in addition to offering appellee continued employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in all other respects. View "Dekalb County Sch. Dist. v. Butler" on Justia Law

William Curtis was injured when Michael Lemna drove a golf cart over a retaining wall during a game of golf scheduled as part of a sales meeting in Arkansas. Both Curtis and Lemna were employees of Dial Corporation headquartered in Arizona at the time of the accident. Curtis sued Lemna in Benton County Circuit Court alleging negligence. The circuit court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction until the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission could determine the applicability of Arkansas’ workers’ compensation laws. Curtis subsequently requested a hearing before the Commission. The Commission concluded that Curtis and Lemna were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident and that co-employee immunity was extended to Lemna acting as the employer providing a safe work environment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Commission’s decision that Curtis’s injury occurred within the scope of his employment was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Commission’s decision that Lemna was entitled to immunity was supported by substantial evidence.View "Curtis v. Lemna" on Justia Law

Bruns, age 79, drove to a Centralia eye clinic. She did not use the parking lot, but parked on 2nd Street in front of the clinic, as she had on each of nine previous visits. As she walked toward the clinic, Bruns stubbed her toe on a crack in the sidewalk, causing her to fall and injure her arm, leg and knee. She had been looking “towards the door and the steps” of the clinic. Bruns “definitely” noticed the sidewalk defect every time she went to the clinic. Clinic employees had twice contacted the city about the defect, including after a previous accident, and offered to pay to remove the tree that caused it. The city would not authorize removal because of the 100-year-old tree’s historic significance. Bruns sued, arguing that the city should have reasonably foreseen that a pedestrian could become distracted and fail to protect herself against the dangerous condition. The trial court granted the city summary judgment, finding the defect open and obvious. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the summary judgment. The city has miles of sidewalk to maintain; imposing a duty to protect plaintiffs from open and obvious defects would not be justified.View "Bruns v. City of Centralia" on Justia Law