Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Textron Lycoming engine, manufactured in 1969, was installed on a Cessna aircraft in 1998. It was overhauled in 2004, with a carburetor in accordance with Lycoming’s type-certificated design. Sikkelee was piloting the aircraft when it crashed shortly after taking off. Sikkelee died. His estate sued, claiming that the aircraft lost power as a result of a malfunction or defect in the carburetor. The court held that Sikkelee’s claims, which were premised on state law standards of care, fell within the preempted “field of air safety.” An amended complaint incorporated federal standards of care by alleging violations of FAA regulations. Before trial, the court concluded that the federal standard of care was established in the type certificate. Reasoning that the FAA issues a type certificate based on its determination of compliance with pertinent regulations, it held that the FAA’s issuance of a type certificate for the engine meant that the federal standard of care had been satisfied as a matter of law. The court granted Lycoming partial summary judgment and certified an immediate appeal. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that federal statutes and FAA regulations reflect that Congress did not intend to categorically preempt aircraft products liability claims. Subject to traditional principles of conflict preemption, including concerning specifications included in a type certificate, aircraft products liability cases may proceed using a state standard of care. View "Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp" on Justia Law

Medtronic, Inc. produced "Infuse," a device that stimulates bone growth to repair damaged or diseased vertebrae. When it approved the device for sale, the FDA required the company to include a warning label instructing that Infuse should "be implanted via an anterior" surgical approach. Patricia Caplinger brought a state law tort suit against Medtronic, alleging that Medtronic promoted Infuse for use in a posterior surgical approach, which was considered an off-label" use. Caplinger alleged that Medtronic’s conduct exposed the company to liability under a variety of state tort theories. But the district court held all of these state law claims either insufficiently pleaded or preempted. Agreeing with the district court's conclusion that Caplinger's state law claims were insufficiently pleaded or preempted, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Caplinger v. Medtronic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint against Cardinal under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, based on an implied false certification of "merchantability" by Cardinal to the VA in connection with the sales of Cardinal's Signature Edition Infusion Device (Signature pump). In regards to plaintiff's implied false certification theory, plaintiff's new allegations that merchantability was a "standard condition," or material condition, of Cardinal's contract with the VA, or that the VA would not have paid for the Signature pumps had it known of the defect, were deficient under Rule 9(b). In regards to plaintiff's claim that the Signature pumps were worthless goods, plaintiff failed to allege that any Signature pump sold to the VA over nine years was ever found to be deficient or worthless; failed to allege that any patient was harmed due to the use of the Signature pump at a VA hospital; and that the VA was ever sued due to injury caused by a malfunctioning pump. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead her claims with sufficient particularity and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "United States, ex rel. Leslie Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

This case returns to the Supreme Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court (USSC) for reconsideration in light of its decision in "Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.," (131 S.Ct. 1311 (2011)). In the South Carolina Court's previous decision, it concluded Appellant's state-law products liability claims against Ford Motor Company were preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 205. The Court reaffirmed its previous decision. Appellant filed a products liability claim against Respondent Ford Motor Company premised on the allegation that its 1997 Ford F-150 pick-up truck was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it did not incorporate laminated glass in the vehicle's side and rear windows. In connection with implied conflict preemption, "Williamson" revisited the Supreme Court's decision in "Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.," (529 U.S. 861 (2000)). "We construe the key language in Williamson to hold that manufacturer choice among alternatives operates to preempt a state law claim only where the state law stands as an obstacle to a significant federal regulatory objective. Similarly, our previous decision was not based upon the notion that the mere presence of manufacturer choices in FMVSS 205 preempted Appellant's state tort suit. We adhere to the view that the manifest purpose of the federal regulatory scheme underlying FMVSS 205 would be frustrated if these state claims were allowed to proceed. Assuming implied conflict preemption remains a viable part of preemption, we believe it applies here to preclude Appellant's state law claims." View "Priester v. Cromer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Debbie and Max Walters appealed from a district court judgment that dismissed their petition for the issuance of a turnover order. In 1990, the Walters' thirteen-year-old son was killed on a hunting trip with his father when a Chinese-manufactured rifle the boy carried allegedly misfired. The Walters sued China and several entities allegedly controlled by China in the U.S. District Court on theories of products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture of the rifle. The Walters eventually won a $10 million default judgment, and sought to enforce it by collecting China's assets in the possession of the respondent banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., Bank of China, Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the district court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Without filing a new petition, the Walters argued on appeal that the Banks lacked standing to assert foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of China, and that China waived any immunity by its conduct underlying the default judgment and by its failure to appear. Upon review of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Second Circuit found Plaintiffs' arguments were without merit, and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss their case.